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Scientific evidence and ideas about climate change suggest the need for a global energy shift 
from oil and fossil fuels to renewables and other forms of clean energy. This transition will not 
be possible without understanding the dynamics and legal frameworks in petroleum-producing 
countries. More so, the current significant position of oil and fossil fuels in the global energy 
mix justifies the need to inquire into sustainability practices in the oil and gas industry, while 
the energy transition continues to gain momentum. Against this background, this thesis 
examines the role of law in climate change mitigation in oil and gas production to identify 
some characteristics of an effective regime for abating upstream gas flaring, venting, and 
fugitive emissions. It adopts a qualitative analytical approach consisting of conventional legal 
analysis, comparative analysis, and the theory of regulation to study the applicable regimes in 
twelve major petroleum-producing countries to obtain insights of a general nature. It also 
discusses some industry measures and private corporate initiatives of oil and gas companies as 
part of the overarching governance structure for mitigating upstream greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Findings from the comparative analysis put forward the necessity of adopting 
sector-specific and dedicated prescriptive regulatory arrangements and market-based 
instruments that send strong price signals to incentivise large-scale emissions reduction in 
petroleum production. The study also suggests the need for complementarity between state and 
industry regulatory approaches to incentivise innovative strategies to reduce upstream GHG 
emissions significantly. These considerations constitute a hybrid design that regulators can 
consider while undertaking law reforms on the topic. However, political will, dependency, rent-
seeking, and corruption are some political-economy issues that most petroleum-producing 
states must address to ensure the effective regulation of upstream GHG emissions and, by 
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 The Research Framework  
 
 General Introduction   
This introductory chapter establishes the foundation and contextualises the core themes of the 
research. It will state the research question for investigation, review the relevant literature, and 
define this study’s contribution to knowledge. It will also clarify the adopted methods, country 
selection for comparative analysis and describe the entire structure of the research.   
This thesis examines the role of law in abating flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions in 
upstream petroleum (oil and gas) production. The examination will proceed with the research 
question described in Part B of this chapter and the sequence of analysis explained thereafter. 
Matters related to the petroleum industry are technical, but reasonable care has been taken to 
describe operations and issues that are related to the specific subject of inquiry. The industry 
can be divided into the upstream, midstream, and downstream sectors.1 The upstream sector 
comprises five principal phases, namely exploration (searching for oil and gas), appraisal 
(feasibility study of the well or field and commercial viability of production), development 
planning, recovery of oil and gas, and decommissioning (field abandonment or closure). 2 
Upstream petroleum (oil and gas) production means the eventual recovery or extraction of 
crude oil and gas, mostly found together beneath land or ocean floors and formed by a similar 
geological process. However, oil and gas require different processing schemes due to their 
physical states.3 While oil undergoes a refining process after production, gas goes through 
treatment and compression for distribution.4 Some fields or wells produce just gas, while most 
wells have a mixture of oil and gas, water, and numerous contaminants that all undergo 
separation processes.5 
The midstream sector captures the processing and transportation of the produced petroleum 
products to refineries (for crude oil) and gas plants for treatment, processing, and compression 
(for gas) and different technical processes.6 The downstream sector involves refining produced 
petroleum into derivatives (heating oil, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, 
 
1 Joseph Hilyard The Oil and Gas Industry: A Nontechnical Guide (PennWell Corporation 2012) 226. 
2 Frank Jahn Mark Cook and Mark Graham Developments in Petroleum Science, vol. 55: Hydrocarbon 
Exploration and Production (2nd edn Elsevier 2008) 2-6. 
3 USEPA Oil – Exploration, Production, Transport and Natural Gas (US EPA 2010) 4. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Hâvard Davold Oil and Gas Production Handbook: An Introduction to Oil and Gas Production, Transport, 
Refining and Petrochemical Industry (Edition 3.0 Oslo, ISBN 978-82-997886-3-2 August 2013) 14. 




asphalt base, gasoline, and fuel oils) and marketing to end consumers. 7  Other essential 
derivatives in the refining process are petrochemicals, which are in three primary classifications, 
namely: olefins (ethylene, propylene, and butadiene), aromatics (benzene, toluene, and 
xylenes), and synthetic gas (syngas). 8  These three broad classifications of petrochemicals 
constitute raw materials for plastics, detergents, dyes, ammonia, fertiliser, and methanol.9  
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions occur in the oil and gas industry’s various sectors and 
phases.10 In 2019 alone, fuel combustion resulted in 33,622 million tonnes of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) globally.
11 Oil and gas consumption accounted for 55.4% of this figure, while coal 
accounted for 44%.12 All the industry’s phases – upstream, midstream, downstream, and even 
the end-use stage – require serious intervention, but it may be more important to channel urgent 
regulatory attention to the incidences that account for higher emissions. As this chapter will 
show, the upstream sector accounts for greater emissions compared to the downstream sector. 
It is important to clearly define the boundaries of this thesis. It will focus primarily on upstream 
GHG emissions and narrow down to the major drivers of the sector’s emissions in need of more 
urgent regulatory solution. The study does not consider emissions from downstream (refining) 
and end-use phases. Agreed, all phases and links in the industry’s chain need regulatory 
interventions, but they would also need various approaches, which may not be exhaustively 
addressed in one thesis. 
Masnadi and others define “upstream GHG emissions” as “all collective GHG emissions from 
exploration, well drilling and development, production and extraction, surface processing, and 
transport to the refinery gate (well-to-refinery).”13 This definition seems to combine GHG 
emissions in both the traditional upstream and midstream sectors. Jing and others 14  have 
recently compared GHG emissions from upstream and downstream operations across multiple 
jurisdictions and based on different types of crude. They show that the global average carbon 
intensity of crude oil production, transportation, and refining stands at 17.6 grams of carbon 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Davold, above n 5, at 19. 
9 Ibid. 
10  Giovanni Di Lullo, Hao Zhang and Amit Kumar “Evaluation of Uncertainty in the Well-to-Tank and 
Combustion Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Various Transportation Fuels” (2016) 184 Applied Energy 413, 414. 
11 IEA Key World Energy Statistics 2021 (IEA 2021) at 54. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Mohammad S. Masnadi and others “Global Carbon Intensity of Crude Oil Production” (2018) 361 Science 851, 
Supplementary Material at 6. 
14 Liang Jing and others “Carbon Intensity of Global Crude Oil Refining and Mitigation Potential” (2020) 10 
Nature Climate Change 526 at 529. 
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dioxide equivalent per megajoule of energy (gCO2e MJ
–1), broken down into 10.3 gCO2e MJ
–
1 for upstream and 7.3 gCO2eMJ
–1 for refining.15 Carbon intensity means the amount or rate of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent emitted in grams of carbon dioxide equivalent (gCO2e) to 
produce oil and gas and refine oil or process gas, normalised to an energy basis in mega joules 
(MJ-1).16 The volume of emissions attributable to the upstream and downstream sectors, as Jing 
and others17 show, clearly demonstrates that upstream operations have higher carbon intensity 
and therefore account for higher GHG emissions than downstream operations. This thesis is, 
therefore, important as it will help in identifying a suite of regulatory interventions that can 
help to reduce upstream GHG emissions in the most carbon-intensive sector of the oil and gas 
industry, thus contributing to the global climate change mitigation agenda. Regulatory 
approaches such as the European Union Fuel Quality Directive18  and the California Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS)19 seek to incentivise operators to reduce transportation fuels’ 
carbon intensity. This thesis will identify how the LCFS relates to reducing upstream GHG 
emissions.  
It is necessary to identify the dominant sources of upstream GHG emissions and address them 
with effective interventions. The Oil Production Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimator, 
developed by El-Houjeiri, Brandt, and Duffy,20 identifies exploration, drilling and development, 
production and extraction, surface processing, maintenance operations, waste treatment and 
disposal, and crude transport as the different elements that determine upstream production 
carbon intensity. At a global scale, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) from flaring and venting during the production, extraction, and surface 
processing phases account for approximately 75% of upstream field-level carbon intensity.21 
In the United States alone, upstream flaring accounts for an estimated 20 to 21 million metric 
tons in CO2 equivalents of GHG emissions annually.22 As of mid-2020, satellite data and 
estimates showed a 3% rise in global gas flaring from 145 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Masnadi and others, above n 11; Mohammed S. Masnadi and others “Well-to-Refinery Emissions and Net-
Energy Analysis of China’s Crude-Oil Supply” (2018) 3 Nature Energy 220 at 221-222. 
17 Liang Jing and others, above n 14. 
18 Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23  April 2009. 
19 Title 17. Public Health, California Code of Regulations (CCR), Sub-chapter 10. Climate Change, Sub-article 
7: Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Final Regulation Order, s. 95480 
20 Hassan M. El-Houjeiri, Adam R. Brandt, and James E. Duffy “Open-Source LCA Tool for Estimating 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Crude Oil Production Using Filed Characteristics” (2013) 47 Environmental 
Science and Technology 5998 at 6000. 
21 Ibid; Masnadi and others, above n 13. 
22 David T. Allen and others “Carbon Dioxide, Methane and Black Carbon Emissions from Upstream Oil and 
Gas Flaring in the United States” (2016) 13 Current Opinion in Chemical Engineering 119 at 121. 
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to 150 billion cubic meters in 2019, equivalent to the total annual gas consumption of Sub-
Saharan Africa.23 Nevertheless, flaring reduced by 5% from 150 bcm in 2019 to 142 bcm in 
2020.24  Flaring and venting account for over 400 million tons of CO2 equivalent emissions 
annually. 25  Besides, fugitive emissions – equipment leaks – from petroleum operations 
constitute direct and indirect sources of GHG emissions across the whole industry chain in 
many oil and gas jurisdictions of the world,26 and account for 5.8% of GHG emissions from 
energy production.27 Fugitive emissions also raise asset integrity questions in the upstream oil 
and gas production sector and underscore the need to fix or replace compromised facilities and 
installations.28 Industry regulators in petroleum jurisdictions need to require operators to detect 
and repair sources of fugitive emissions. The preceding figures show that flaring, venting, and 
fugitive emissions are an important aspect of GHG emissions that cannot be ignored. 
For appropriate context, flaring is the process of burning off excess associated petroleum gas 
(APG) – also known as solution gas – during the recovery or extraction of oil and gas.29 The 
APG is a by-product of oil in most reservoirs,30 which is released on extraction of the oil 
because of changes in temperature and pressure.31 The volume of APG released ranges between 
5 and 1000 m3 per tonne of oil and it is composed primarily of hydrogen, methane, ethane, 
propane, butane, isobutene, and other hydrocarbons with potential GHG implications in the 
event of inadequate re-injection or utilization. 32  It can be utilised for wellhead platform 
operations, re-injected or flared into the atmosphere.33 Venting is the intentional or controlled 
 
23 World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report (World Bank Global 
Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership July 2020). 
24 World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report (World Bank 
Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership April 2021) at 5. 
25 World Bank, ‘Zero Routine Flaring by 2030’ (World Bank) <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/zero-
routine-flaring-by-2030> accessed 2 February 2021. 
26 David Picard “Energy, Transportation and Fugitive Emissions: Fugitive Emissions from Oil and Natural Gas 
Activities” (25 February 2003) IPPC <www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp>. 
27 Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser “Emissions by Sector” (Our World in Data 2020) <www.ourworldindata.org>.  
28 Testo Flue Gas Analysis in Industry (Testo 2004) 18. 
29 Eman A. Eman “Gas Flaring in Industry: An Overview” (2015) 57:5 Petroleum and Coal 532. 
30 Cheryl L. Weyant and others “Black Carbon from Associated Natural Gas Flaring” (2016) 50 Environmental 
Science and Technology 2075. 
31 V.A. Kirillov and others “Experimental and Theoretical Study of Associated Petroleum Gas Processing into 
Normalized Gas by Soft Steam Reforming” (2017) 51:1 Theoretical Foundations of Chemical Engineering 12. 
32 A.A Solov’yanov “Associated Petroleum Gas Flaring: Environmental Issues” (2011) 81:12 Russian Journal of 
General Chemistry 2531; Irina Burenina “Associated Petroleum Gas: Problems, Prospects, Ways to Increase its 
Effective Use” (2017) 8:7 Journal of Environmental Management and Tourism 1399, 1400. 
33 M.R. Johnson, L.W. Kostiuk and J.L. Spangelo “A Characterization of Solution Gas Flaring in Alberta” 




release of gas and an alternative to flaring.34 Flaring and venting occur primarily due to lack of 
adequate utilization infrastructure and insufficient gas markets. 35  More so, optimal gas 
utilization requires a pipeline network, which is expensive. Operators can flare a significant 
volume of APG during oil extraction if the cost of building utilization infrastructure exceeds 
the derivable profit of commercialising the gas.36  
Upstream GHG emissions have a significant impact on energy return on investment (EROI) 
analysis. The EROI concept means the ratio of energy derived from an energy source to the 
energy requirement for producing that energy. Different energy sources – including fossil fuels 
and renewables – have EROI ratios and diverse financial and GHG implications.37 Flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions represent wasted energy streams that operators expend to 
extract oil and gas.38   
Improved energy efficiency ultimately leads to a concomitant reduction in flaring, venting, and 
fugitive emissions.39 There is also a broad consensus on the usefulness of energy efficiency in 
planning long-term climate change policies. 40  The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
forecasts that an efficient world scenario can result in a 12% reduction in energy-related GHG 
emissions by 2040, representing about 40% of the GHG emissions abatement requirement of 
 
34 USEPA “Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting from Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry: Background 
Technical Support Document” (US EPA 4 December 2012) <www.epa.gov>. 
35 Abass Olajire “The Petroleum Industry and Environmental Challenges” (2014) 5:4 Journal of Petroleum and 
Environmental Biotechnology 1. 
36 Erin Thomas “Capping the Flame: Solving North Dakota’s Natural Gas Flaring Problem through Cap and 
Trade” (2017) George Washington Journal of Energy and Environmental Law 137 at 141; Barry Babe, Claire 
Kaliban and Isabel Englehart “Taxing Flaring and the Politics of State Methane Release Policy” (2020) 37:1 
Review of Policy Research 6 at 23. 
37 Charles A.S. Hall, Jessica G. Lambert and Stephen B. Balogh “EROI of Different Fuels and the Implications 
for Society” (2014) 64 Energy Policy 141-152; Victor Court and Florian Fizaine “Long-Term Estimates of the 
Energy-Return-on-Investment (EROI) of Coal, Oil, and Gas Global Productions” (2017) 138 Ecological 
Economics 145-159. 
38 Adam R. Brandt and others “Energy Return on Investment (EROI) for Forty Global Oilfields Using a 
Detailed Engineering-Based Model of Oil Production” (2015) 10:2 PLoS ONE 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0144141; Vinay S. Tripathi and Adam R. Brandt “Estimating Decades-
Long Trends in Petroleum Filed Energy Return on Investment (EROI) with an Engineering-Based Model” 
(2017) 12:2 PLoS ONE https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0171083.  
39 IEA The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions: Insights from IEA Analysis (IEA 2020) at 52 
40Uwe Deichmann and Fan Zhang Growing Green: The Economic Benefits of Climate Action (World Bank 2013) 
at 26; Vaibhav Chaturvedi and Priyadarshi R. Shukla “Role of Energy Efficiency in Climate Change Mitigation 
Policy for India: Assessment of Co-Benefits and Opportunities within an Integrated Assessment Modelling 
Framework” (2014) 123 Climatic Change 597 at 606; Robert D. Marchand, S.C. Lenny Koh and Jonathan C. 
Morris “Delivering Energy Efficiency and Carbon Reduction Schemes in England: Lessons from Green Deal 
Pioneer Places” (2015) 84 Energy Policy 96 at  97; Santiago Creuheras “The Role of Energy Efficiency in Long-
Term Climate Change Mitigation Planning” (World Resources Institute 2019) <www.wri.org>.  
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the Paris Agreement.41 Besides, there is an increasing emphasis by the International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) on energy-efficient design across 
the operational chains of the upstream, midstream, and downstream sectors of the oil and gas 
industry.42 The GHG emissions reduction potential of an energy-efficient design relates to 
savings from reduced energy input from the use of power, heat, and fuels, which will reduce 
the overall carbon intensity of operations. 43  Some other avenues for energy efficiency 
improvements in the upstream petroleum operations include ensuring energy-efficient facilities, 
investing in research and development, stopping flaring and venting, and refocusing 
operational strategy.44 Thus, energy efficiency can help reduce the energy expended to produce 
oil and gas. As Brandt and others45 have shown, flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions are 
part of wasted energy streams in the petroleum production process. Consequently, this thesis 
will also examine the regulatory designs in different jurisdictions to encourage efficiency 
measures to reduce GHG emissions during oil and gas production. 
Turning to oil specifically, crude oil type also influences the volume of upstream GHG 
emissions.46 The major categories are sweet crude, sour crude, light crude, medium crude, 
heavy crude, sweet light crude, and synthetic crude.47 The physical and chemical properties of 
crude oil are the key determinants of the required processing methods and energy input.48 As 
Masnadi and others49 have shown, heavier crudes require more process energy and account for 
more wasted energy streams such as flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. In addition, the 
American Petroleum Institute (API) gravity, also known as density, indicates the composition 
of the crude and the ratio of distillation cuts that will result from processing the crude.50 Crude 
oil types have different API gravities, and the ones with heavier API gravity require more 
 
41 IEA Energy Technology Perspectives 2014 (IEA 2014) at 48; IEA Energy Efficiency 2018: Analysis and 
Outlook to 2040 (IEA 2018) at 13 and 17; IEA “The Often Overlooked Emissions Reducer” (IEA, The Energy 
Mix 23 September 2019) <www.sg-mktg.com>.  
42 IPIECA “Energy Efficient Design” (IPIECA February 2014) available at <www.ipieca.org>.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Euro Petroleum Consultants “4 Ways Oil and Gas Companies Can Improve Energy Efficiency within their 
Operations” (Euro Petroleum Consultants 2021) available at <www.europetro.com>.  
45 Brandt and others, above n 38. 
46 Jessica P. Abella and Joule A. Bergerson “Model to Investigate Energy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Implications of Refining Petroleum: Impacts of Crude Quality and Refinery Configuration” (2012) 46 
Environmental Science and Technology 13037 at 13039. 
47 Ibid; James G. Speight, Luca Fantacci, and James G. Speight Introduction to Petroleum Technology, 
Economics, and Politics (Wiley 2011) at 128. 
48 Abella and Bergerson, above n 46. 
49 Masnadi and others, above n 16. 
50 See McKinsey Energy Insights Reference Desk at <https://www.mckinseyenergyinsights.com>.  
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expended energy and account for higher GHG emissions. 51  Sulphur is an undesirable 
contaminant commonly found in crude oil and crude oil products and it is measured in weight 
percentage (wt%); thus, lower sulphur content is always desirable in crude oil requiring less 
energy input during processing, leading to lower GHG emissions.52 Its presence in the different 
types of crude oil varies from less than 0.05 to more than 10 wt%; so, crude oil with less than 
1 wt% is referred to as low sulphur or sweet, while that with more than 1 wt% sulphur is 
referred to as high sulphur or sour.53 Recent studies have also shown that the shift in the make-
up of oil and gas extraction influences the volume of GHG emissions.54 For example, Howarth 
estimates that shale gas has contributed 33% of the global increase in CH4 emissions in recent 
years, predominantly from operations in North America (the United States and Canada).55 
Greenhouse gas emissions are externalities and represent one of the biggest market failures in 
the world.56 Market settings make flaring and venting rational from a company’s perspective if 
doing so will be cheaper than utilizing the gas. Thus, petroleum-producing countries need 
optimal gas infrastructure, essentially a network of pipelines, for transporting the gas to local 
and international markets. Sometimes, institutional arrangements, politics and international 
relations hinder cross-country gas pipeline projects.57 
Upstream GHG emissions also underscore the contemporary debate on shifting from oil and 
fossil fuels to renewables and other cleaner forms of energy.58 Scholars have described climate 
change as one of humanity’s most significant concerns 59  and a super-wicked problem 
 
51 Jandyson M. Santos and others “Comparing Crude Oils with Different API Gravities on a Molecular Level 
Using Mass Spectrometric Analysis. Part 2: Resins and Asphaltenes” (2018) 11 Energies 2767; See also Masnadi 
and others, above n 11 and Supplementary Material at 22. 
52 A. Demirbas, H. Alidrisi and M.A. Balubaid “API Gravity, Sulfur Content, and Desulphurization of Crude Oil” 
(2015) 33:1 Petroleum Science and Technology 93. 
53 Fahim, Al-Sahhaf and Elkilani, above n 6, at 16. 
54 Stefan Schwietzke and others “Upward Revision of Global Fossil Fuel Methane Emissions Based on Isotope Database” 
(2016) 538 Nature 88; John R. Worden and others “Reduced Biomass Burning Emissions Reconcile Conflicting Estimates of 
the Post-2006 Atmospheric Methane Budget” (2017) 8:2227 Nature Communications https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-
02246-0.   
55 Robert W. Howarth “Ideas and Perspectives: Is Shale Gas a Major Driver of Recent Increase in Global 
Atmospheric Methane?” (2019) 16 Biogeosciences 3033 at 3038 and 3039. 
56 Nicholas Stern, ‘The Economics of Climate Change’ (2008) 98:2 American Economic Review 1. 
57 APEC Energy Working Group Great Expectations: Cross-Border Natural Gas Trade in APEC Economies 
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation November 2004) at 26-30; Anne Neuman, Juan Rosellon and Hannes Weigt 
“Removing Cross-Border Capacity Bottlenecks in the European Natural Gas Market – A Proposed Merchant-
Regulatory Mechanism” (2015) 15 Networks and Spatial Economics 149. 
58 Christian Ngo and Joseph Natowitz Our Energy Future: Resources, Alternatives, and the Environment (2nd edn 
Wiley 2016) at 661. 
59 Julian Cribb Surviving the 21st Century: Humanity’s Ten Great Challenges and How We Can Overcome Them 
(Springer 2017) at 2,18,21,30,127, and 138. 
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necessitating a serious multi-dimensional and multilateral response. 60  As an unavoidable 
impact of climate change on the ecosystem, at the beginning of 2015, an estimated 20.4 million 
people were food insecure, mainly in Niger, Nigeria, Mali, and Chad.61 Therefore, it is essential 
to ensure the existence of effective regulatory frameworks for mitigating different GHG 
emissions and their sources, including the ones that this thesis addresses. 
The Paris Agreement aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by 
limiting global temperature increase well below 2 degrees Celsius and pursue efforts to limit 
the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; 
increasing adaptation capabilities; and making financial flows consistent with low greenhouse 
gas emissions pathways and climate-resilient development.62 This Agreement is an essential 
overarching framework for reducing emissions and addressing climate change. However, 
countries have a lot of autonomy in deciding economic areas to decarbonise. The implication 
is that a petroleum-producing country can target other carbon-intensive industries while 
avoiding upstream petroleum activities. The Paris Agreement does not directly mention oil or 
fossil fuels.63 There are numerous other industries and activities that the Agreement does not 
directly capture or mention. So, countries may choose to meet their Paris Agreement 
commitments by other means or reducing GHG emissions in other sectors. However, achieving 
a low-carbon future requires countries to drastically reduce the carbon footprint of an industry 
known to be carbon-intensive. So, the thesis is relevant to all petroleum-producing countries, 
especially in planning their transitional measures to a low-carbon future. 
It is also probable that world leaders can establish a different treaty to facilitate global 
cooperation to reduce the GHG emissions associated with oil and fossil fuels production. 
Currently, there are diverse views about the future of fossil fuels in relation to the climate goals 
of the Paris Agreement. Newell and Simms have proposed a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty 
to phase out the production of oil, gas, and coal.64 While this proposition seems ambitious, a 
lot depends on the agreement and support of petroleum-producing countries. Moreover, as will 
 
60 Richard J. Lazarus “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future” 
(2010) 40:8 Environmental Law Reporter 10749; Kelly Levin and others “Overcoming the Tragedy of Super 
Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change” (2012) 45 Policy Sci. 
123. 
61 UNEP UNEP Frontiers 2016 Report: Emerging Issues of Environmental Concern (UNEP 2016) at 46. 
62 The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 12 
December 2015 and entered into force 4 November 2016, art 2. 
63 Thijs Van De Graaf and Benjamin K. Sovacool Global Energy Politics (Polity Press 2020) at 117. 
64 Peter Newell and Andrew Simms “Towards a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty” (2020) 20:8 Climate Policy 
1043-1054. See also https://www.fossilfueltreaty.org/.  
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be seen in Part C of this chapter, it is indeed difficult to phase out the production of fossil fuels 
completely; at least not any time soon. However, one clear point of increasing relevance is the 
need to decarbonise oil and gas production. In this context, Graaf and Sovacool have argued 
that there is no way to decarbonise the global economy without tackling head-on the production 
and consumption of fossil fuels.65 On the supply side, decarbonisation requires a drastic cut in 
GHG emissions traceable to production, while the demand side dimension focuses on energy 
consumption patterns, choices, and culture. This thesis addresses the supply-side aspect of 
decarbonising the upstream oil and gas sector. 
 Statement of Research Question and Thesis Structure 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the regulation of upstream GHG emissions in 
petroleum jurisdictions to understand some desirable characteristics of effective governance 
regimes for abating flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. It is a common fact that climate 
change considerations challenge the sustainability of the oil and gas industry.66 As Masnadi 
and others have shown, fugitive emissions, venting, and flaring of CO2, CH4, and other GHGs 
significantly contribute to climate change, 67  with devastating environmental and health 
implications.68 Flaring and venting have continued for many decades of oil and gas exploration 
and production in most oil-rich countries of the world,69 with adverse health and environmental 
effects, ranging from climate change to acidic rain and adverse medical conditions.70  
GHG emissions are now commonly classified into three scopes, and it will be useful to consider 
where the emissions in this thesis fall. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol, introduced by the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development and the World Resources Institute (WRI), is 
the main system used for this classification.71 Scope 1 emissions arise from direct sources under 
the company’s immediate ownership and control, for example, generation of electricity, heat 
or steam, physical chemical processing, transportation of raw materials, and fugitive 
 
65 Graaf and Sovacool, above n 63.  
66 Mohamad Danish Anis and Tauseef Zia Siddiqui “Issues Impacting Sustainability in the Oil and Gas 
Industry” (2015) 5 Journal of Management and Sustainability 115 at 118. 
67 Masnadi and others, above n 13. 
68 O. Saheed Ismail and G. Ezaina Umukoro “Global Impact of Gas Flaring” (2012) 4 Energy and Power 
Engineering 290 at 292. 
69 Odigie Eghon and Koso I. Idigbe “Injection of Natural Gas into Reservoirs: A Feasible Solution to Gas Flaring 
in Nigeria” (2013) 4:5 Academic Research International 90; World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Partnership Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report (World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership July 
2020). 
70  Anslem O. Ajugwo “Negative Effects of Gas Flaring: The Nigerian Experience” (2013) 1 Journal of 
Environment Pollution and Human Health 6 at 8. 
71 WBCSD and WRI The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate Reporting Standards (2nd edn. WBCSD and 
WRI 2004) 25. 
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emissions.72 Scope 2 emissions occur indirectly from the generation of electricity used by the 
company, while Scope 3 emissions occur outside the company’s immediate control but are 
indirectly linked to its operations. 73  The International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Agency (IPIECA) Joint Industry Tax Force on Greenhouse Gas74 relies on the 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol’s three-scope approach 75  but with oil and gas industry-specific 
context.76 Accordingly, Scope 1 GHG emissions come from combustion in stationary sources; 
flaring, incinerators, and mobile sources (motor vehicles, trucks, and oil tankers); process 
emissions; venting; and fugitive emissions.77 The emissions considered in this thesis – flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions – fall under this IPIECA Scope 1. Scope 2 GHG emissions are 
energy-related indirect emissions such as purchased electricity, steam, heating, and cooling 
systems in the industry.78 Scope 3 GHG emissions are a different category of indirect emissions, 
which do not come under Scope 2 but occur in the life cycle and necessarily incidental to its 
operations.79 Examples include raw materials necessary for operations, transportation, and 
disposal of products.80 
The debates about GHG emissions reduction and energy transition continue, but it is equally 
essential to ensure a fair process through which societies shift towards an economy free of CO2 
emissions – the just transition.81 This means moving away from fossil fuels and industrial 
processes that cause GHG emissions, and doing so in a fair manner, considering the collective 
interests of all stakeholders. It is a concept that requires substantial change across different 
interest groups – coal, oil and gas communities, cities, industries, and workers.82 Some other 
valuable perspectives are transitioning the labour force into clean jobs and involving 
communities and labour unions in planning and decision-making processes.83 This thesis does 
not say much about the just transition, but it fits broadly into the energy transition governance 
normative framework, especially regarding the mitigation of upstream GHG emissions, as oil 
 
72 Ibid, at 27. 
73 Ibid. 
74  This task force comprises the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA), the American Petroleum Institute, and the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP). 
75 WBCSD and WRI, above n 67. 
76 IPIECA, API and OGP Petroleum Industry Guidelines for Reporting Greenhouse Gas Emissions (2nd edn. 
IPIECA, API and OGP 2011) 5-1, at 3-14. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid, at 3-15. 
79 Ibid, at 3-17 
80 Ibid.  
81 Raphael J. Heffron and Darren McCauley “What is the ‘Just Transition?” (2018) 88 Geoforum 74. 
82 Samantha Smith Just Transition: A Report for the OECD (Just Transition Centre, OECD, May 2017) at 2. 
83 George Goddard and Megan A. Farrelly “Just Transition Management: Balancing Just Outcomes with Just 
Processes in Australian Renewable Energy Transitions” (2018) 225 Applied Energy 110 at 112-113. 
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and gas will remain a part of the global energy mix for decades. The next part of this chapter, 
therefore, will analyse oil and gas emissions in the energy transition. 
This thesis runs into six chapters. This introductory chapter explains the research’s background 
and objective. It also identifies the present state of knowledge on the topic and contextualises 
the themes for examination. Chapter 2 will discuss the theory of regulation to provide a 
conceptual framework for the thesis. The chapter will draw close connections between the idea 
of regulation and upstream GHG emissions. Regulatory measures at national and industry 
levels will emerge more directly in the following chapters. Chapter 3 will investigate the state 
of regulation in prominent petroleum-producing jurisdictions around the world. This analysis 
will help understand regulatory typology and practices; and identify critical issues militating 
against effective regulatory arrangements to address flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. 
Chapter 4 will examine private industry-driven initiatives to address petroleum upstream GHG 
emissions, focusing on flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Chapter 5 will discuss the 
research’s conceptual relevance and provide insights for law reform in petroleum-producing 
jurisdictions. Chapter 6 will summarise the study’s key findings and state how the central 
research question has been addressed. It will also highlight key policy implications of the study 
and present directions for future inquiries. 
 Oil and Gas Emissions in the Energy Transition 
Questions may arise about the relevance of conducting further research on oil and gas 
production, primarily because of upstream GHG emissions and their climate change 
implications. Such questions can be more validated by the recent report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).84 In this report, the IPCC projects that 
the global average temperature would reach 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels 
around the year 2030.85 This is a decade earlier than the IPCC earlier predicted in its Special 
Report on a global warming of 1.5 degrees.86 If carbon-intensive sectors continue to release 
GHG emissions, the state of the global climate will only get worse, with different parts of the 
world witnessing different proportions of the effects of climate change. Therefore, it may be 
counter-intuitive to conduct further research on oil and gas production, given that it is one of 
 
84 IPCC Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis: Working Group I contribution to the Sixth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Final Government Distribution Copy, August 2021). 
85 Ibid, TS-9 and TS-28. 
86 IPCC Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the 
global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty; 
report available at https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
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the activities that account for GHG emissions globally. This research seeks to answer such 
questions. While energy transition is necessary, it is also essential to meet human energy needs 
and provide development services. 
Historically, oil and fossil fuels have been the world’s dominant energy sources since the 19th 
century.87 Contemporary civilisation largely depends on fossil fuels to power industries and 
homes.88 During the 46 years of 1971-2017, oil, coal, and natural gas contributed about 81% 
of world energy consumption.89 During this interval, the global total primary energy supply 
increased by more than 2.5 times – from 5,519 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 1971 
to 13,972 Mtoe in 2017.90 This trend shows rising demand for and production of fossil fuels as 
primary energy sources. According to the United States Energy Information Administration 
(USEIA), fossil fuels account for the US’s highest energy production and consumption.91 In 
2018 alone, fossil fuels contributed 79% of domestic energy production and 80% energy 
consumption.92 This dominance is not only about transportation fuel. There are indeed other 
uses for oil, as this section shows later. In fact, according to the IEA, the volume of oil used 
for transportation fuel is approximately 50%, as petrochemicals become more relevant.93 
Currently, it is challenging to produce alternatives to some petroleum products and materials 
such as asphalt and tar for road construction and feedstock (or petroleum feedstock). 94 
Petroleum feedstock is a collective term for chemicals derived from petroleum and natural gas 
such as naphtha used as raw materials to produce other chemicals, plastics, and synthetic 
rubbers. 95  Other examples are solvents, dentures, films, electronics, insulation materials, 
lubricants, insecticides, toys, cosmetics, bandages, shampoo, paint, petroleum jelly, clothes, 
carpet, candles, heart valves, tyres, glasses, and cleaning products. Most of these items are 
everyday necessities around the world. The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
(IOGP) itemizes about 72 uses of oil in everyday life.96  
 
87 Tina Hunter “Redefining Energy Security: The New Prize in a Time of Arctic Petroleum Resources and 
Technological Development” in Slawomir Raszewski (ed) The International Political Economy of Oil and Gas 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2018) 9-22. 
88 Vaclav Smil Energy and Civilization: A History (MIT Press 2017) at 295. 
89 IEA World Energy Balances: An Overview (IEA 2019) at 4.  
90 Ibid, at 5. 
91 USEIA “Fossil Fuels Continue to Account for the Highest Share of US Energy” (USEIA 18 September 2019) 
<www.eia.gov>.  
92 Ibid. 
93 IEA World Energy Outlook 2018 (IEA 2018) at 136. 
94 Richard York “Do Alternative Energy Sources Displace Fossil Fuels?” (2012) 2 Nature Climate Change 441; 
EIA “What are Petroleum Products and what is Petroleum Used For?” (EIA 31 May 2019) <www.eia.gov>.  
95 Carl Schaschke A Dictionary of Chemical Engineering (OUP 2014). 
96 IOGP “Oil in Everyday Life” (IOGP) <www.iogp.org>. 
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The various uses of oil and fossil fuels contribute to man’s well-being through energy services 
and materials. This dependency creates a tension between human well-being and climate 
change mitigation. 97  As much as the world embraces energy transition, there is also an 
argument that certain technologies or energy sources may have no superior or sustainable 
substitutes for some time.98  
The demand for oil and fossil fuels may eventually decline but not wholly vanish anytime soon. 
Oil demand for cars could peak by the mid-2020s, while petrochemicals, planes, trucks, and 
ships will keep overall oil demand on a rising trend. 99  The IEA sustainable development 
scenario (SDS) charts a path that is consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement goals 
through sustainable energy production and consumption.100 Under the SDS, wherein net-zero 
emissions are achieved by 2070, oil production will fall from approximately 100 million barrels 
per day (mb/d) in 2019 to about 86.5 mb/d in 2030.101 Under new policies scenario, in which 
the world achieves net-zero emissions by 2050, oil production will average 65mb/d in 2030.102 
In the two scenarios, oil remains a dominant global energy source. Further, petrochemicals will 
account for more than a third of the growth in world oil demand by 2030 and nearly half the 
growth to 2050, adding almost 7 million barrels of oil a day by then.103 Petrochemicals are also 
poised to consume an additional 56 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas by 2030, and 83 
bcm by 2050.104 Besides, there are projections – by industry players, the IEA, World Energy 
Council, and the United States Energy Information Administration – of increased energy 
demand and between 40 to 48% oil and gas contribution to global energy supply by, and 
possibly beyond, 2040.105 
 
97 Nathan Wood and Katy Roelich “Tensions, Capabilities, and Justice in Climate Change Mitigation of Fossil 
Fuels” (2019) 52 Energy Research and Social Science 114-122. 
98 T. W. Murphy “Beyond Fossil Fuels: Assessing Energy Alternatives” in Woodwatch Institute Staff (ed) State 
of the World 2013: Is Sustainability Still Possible? (Island Press 2013) 172 at 174. 
99 IEA World Energy Outlook 2020 (IEA 2020); IEA, Oil 2021: Analysis and Forecast to 2026 (IEA 2021) at 12, 
18, 25, 93, 106-108. 
100 IEA The Oil and Gas Industry in the Energy Transition: Insights from IEA Analysis (IEA 2020) at 3.  
101 Ibid, at 57-69. 
102 Ibid. 
103 IEA The Future of Petrochemicals: Towards More Sustainable Plastics and Fertilisers (IEA 2018) at 3, 11 
and 69; IEA “Petrochemicals Set to be the Largest Driver of World Oil Demand, Latest IEA Analysis Finds” 
(IEA 5 October 2018) <www.iea.org>. 
104 Ibid. 
105 ExxonMobil 2017 Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040 (ExxonMobil 2017) at 11-29; IEA World Energy 
Outlook 2018 (IEA 2018) at 137; EIA International Energy Outlook 2019 with Projections to 2050 (EIA 2019); 
BP BP Energy Outlook 2019 Edition (BP 2019) at 7, 77 and 85; World Energy Council World Energy Scenarios 
2019: Exploring Pathways to 2040 (World Energy Council 2019) at 17-47. 
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Transportation, electricity generation, cement manufacture, and petrochemicals are examples 
of specific uses of oil and fossil fuels. Substitution is a problem in some of these areas. For 
electricity generation, recent trends show that it is possible to displace oil and fossil fuels. 
Globally, the use of oil for electricity generation has fallen. However, it still accounts for 
between 90-100% of electricity sources in some countries such as Lebanon, Cyprus, South 
Sudan, Brunei, Oman, and Qatar.106 For transportation, the penetration of electric vehicles (EVs) 
into the market shows that renewables can displace fossil fuels for cars and trains.107 The global 
electric mobility fleet rapidly grew and exceeded 5.1 million in 2018, with China as the largest 
EV market.108 One significant difficulty lies in establishing strong policy support to make EVs 
more affordable, strengthen production capacity, deploy more charging infrastructure, and 
incentivise greater uptake in society. 109  The IEA’s EVs Initiative is also committed to 
facilitating a multi-governmental policy forum to accelerate EVs’ uptake. Members of the 
Initiative have pledged to introduce policies to achieve their objective. 110  However, the 
electrification of light-duty vehicles alone will not meet climate goals without industry-wide 
technological innovation and complementary approaches, including measures that address the 
demand side issues of consumption and behavioural patterns.111 Even with a rapid change in 
the global mobility fleet from internal combustion engine vehicles to EVs, the production of 
oil will still occur in enormous quantities for decades to come. 
The difficulty in producing substitutes for aviation fuel, heavy-duty transport (trucks and ships), 
and petrochemicals can create doubts about the possibility of displacing oil and fossil fuels 
soon.112 More so, renewables are yet to generate adequate capacity to meet global energy 
demand in providing cheap, plentiful, and reliable energy to the world’s rising population.113 
In the future, renewables can dominate a clean energy economy with the right technology 
 
106 IEA World Energy Balances: Overview (IEA 2019) at 7. 
107 Kingsmill Bond, Ed Vaughan and Harry Benham Nothing to Lose but Your Chains: The Emerging Market 
Transport Leapfrog (Carbon Tracker November 2020).  
108 IEA Global EV Outlook 2019: Scaling up the Transition to Electric Mobility (IEA 2019) at 4, 6 and 32. 
109 Ibid. 
110 There were thirteen members at the time of writing. These include New Zealand, Canada, Finland, United 
Kingdom, India, China, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Chile, Japan and France. Information retrieved from IEA 
Electric Vehicles Initiative <www.iea.org>.   
111 Alexandre Milovanoff, I. Daniel Posen and Heather L. MacLean “Electrification of Light-Duty Vehicle Fleet 
Alone will Not Meet Mitigation Targets” (December 2020) 10 Nature Climate Change 1102; Kathryn G. Logan 
and others “UK and China: Will Electric Vehicle Integration Meet Paris Agreement Targets?” (2020) 8 
Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives 100245. 
112 Thomas Covert, Michael Greenstone and Christopher R. Knittel, ‘Will We Ever Stop Using Fossil Fuels?’ 
(2016) 30:1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 117. 
113 David G. Victor and Charles F. Kennel “Ditch the 2 °C Warming Goal” (2014) 514 Nature 30 at 31. 
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mix.114 Recent IEA analyses predict a 50% expansion in renewable energy capacity between 
2019 and 2024, primarily from solar energy, accounting for approximately 60% of the expected 
growth.115 
However, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) suggests global spending of 
approximately 27 trillion United States Dollars (USD) in installed renewables capacity from 
2016 to 2050 to support the global energy transformation and achieve the Paris Agreement 
emissions reduction goals.116 One can guess that the energy transition may eventually require 
higher investment levels globally, considering the projected span of years (over 30 years). 
There are always huge capital flows to fund projects in the energy sector. While this investment 
gap lingers, oil and fossil fuels will play an essential role in meeting global energy demand. 
An important point to consider is how countries support clean energy investments while 
cushioning the macroeconomic shocks from the 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Some 
social science energy experts have argued that countries’ emergency measures, including 
stimulus packages for economic recovery, can influence energy transition speed.117 This point 
depends on whether countries give more policy and financial support to clean energy 
undertakings or the fossil fuel industry. Therefore, it is pertinent for governments to initiate 
policy measures that support renewables and encourage behavioural changes to avoid relapse 
to pre-COVID-19 emissions levels. 118  Energy Policy Tracker – a real-time energy policy 
monitor – showed that G20 leaders committed over USD 150 billion to support fossil fuel 
investments and over USD 88 billion to support clean energy as of July 2020, when most 
countries started giving stimulus packages to affected industries.119 As of April 2021, the public 
money for fuel worldwide stood at USD 292 billion, with approximately 41% of this sum 
dedicated to fossil energy and 37% clean energy.120 It is clear that the financial support to the 
energy sector currently tilts mainly in favour of oil and gas production. This observation may 
mask country-specific circumstances, but it clearly shows the relevance of petroleum resources 
 
114 Neven Duic “Is the Success of Clean Energy Guaranteed?” (2015) 17 Clean Technologies and Environmental 
Policy 2093-2100; Aart Heesterman “The Pace and Practicality of Decarbonisation” (2017) 19:2 Clean 
Technologies and Environmental Policy 295-310; Mark Z. Jacobson and others “100% Clean and Renewable 
Wind, Water and Sunlight All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for 139 Countries of the World” (2017) 1 Joule 108-121. 
115 IEA Renewables 2019: Market Analysis and Forecast from 2019 to 2024 (IEA 2019). 
116 IRENA Global Energy Transformation: A roadmap to 2050 (IRENA 2019); IRENA “Investment Needs” 
(IRENA 2019) <www.irena.org>.   
117 Caroline Kuzemko and others “Covid-19 and the Politics of Sustainable Energy Transitions” (2020) 68 Energy 
Research & Social Science 101685. 
118 Mark Diesendorf “COVID-19 and Economic Recovery in Compliance with Climate Targets” (2021) 3 Global 
Sustainability 1-9. 




in the global energy matrix and humanity’s need for energy supply from a broad range of 
sources, in addition to the economic interests at stake in oil and gas investments globally. In 
the absence of more rapid policy intervention and behavioural changes, the IEA observes that 
longer-term growth drivers will continue to push up oil demand and supply, leading to the 
longer-term relevance of the upstream petroleum sector.121 
One other point that needs emphasis is the uncertainty about when the world would completely 
transition from fossil fuels to renewables.122 According to Smil, “Energy transitions have been, 
and will continue to be, inherently prolonged affairs, particularly so in large nations whose 
high levels of per capita energy use and whose massive expensive infrastructures make it 
impossible to greatly accelerate their progress even if we were to resort to some highly effective 
interventions.”123 Graaf and Sovacool present concrete examples of decades and centuries that 
characterised the transition from different energy sources, leading to the incumbent fossil 
economy. 124  The multi-dimensional – political, economic, technological, social – support 
enjoyed by the incumbent oil and fossil-dominated energy system represents a governance 
challenge for energy transition; and creates both inertia and path dependency. 125  These 
prevailing circumstances result in what Meadowcroft describes as “…a messy, conflictual, and 
highly disjointed process.”126  
The reality of the prevalent energy dynamics – where oil and fossil fuels dominate and could 
remain part of the global energy mix in the future – justifies the inquiry into regulatory 
approaches that incentivise the reduction of the GHG footprints of petroleum production.  
Therefore, this study will be necessary for mitigating climate change in the upstream petroleum 
sector. Nevertheless, the reduction of upstream GHG emissions can be a part of a transitional 
process where the world moves away from fossil fuels use to a global energy mix dominated 
by renewables and other sources of clean energy. A lot depends on how fast that future comes, 
 
121 IEA Oil 2021: Analysis and Forecasts to 2026 (IEA 2021) at 3. 
122  Benjamin K. Sovacool “How Long Will it Take? Conceptualizing the Temporal Dynamics of Energy 
Transitions” (2016) 13 Energy Research & Social Science 202-215. 
123 Vaclav Smil Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects (Praegar 2010) at 150. 
124 Graaf and Sovacool, above n 63, at 168. 
125  Andreas Goldthau and Benjamin K. Sovacool “The Uniqueness of the Energy Security, Justice, and 
Governance Problem” (2012) 41 Energy Policy 232-240; Janelle Knox-Hayes “Negotiating Climate Legislation: 
Policy Path Dependence and Coalition Stabilization” (2012) 6 Regulation and Governance 545-567; Gregory C. 
Unruh “Understanding Carbon Lock-in” (2000) 28 Energy Policy 817 at 828. 
126 James Meadowcroft, “What about the Politics? Sustainable Development, Transition Management, and Long 
Term Energy Transitions” (2009) 42:4 Policy Sciences 323. 
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given the uncertainty about the temporal dynamics of the energy transition, as earlier identified, 
and the emergence of viable substitutes to oil, gas, and coal.  
Given the study’s regulatory focus, the concept of regulation provides a theoretical context to 
underpin the research. Different kinds of regulation exist for the governance of separate spheres 
and issues in society. Chapter 2 will discuss the theory in more detail and highlight the types 
of regulation relevant to this thesis. This thesis will apply this theoretical foundation to country-
specific regulatory measures and industry-driven arrangements for emissions reduction.  
 Existing Research on the Regulation of Flaring and Venting  
Flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions have not received much scholarly attention from a 
legal perspective. Oyewunmi and others127 have recently examined the decarbonisation of the 
global energy system, considering how international investment law and international oil and 
gas operators can play complementary roles to reduce emissions emanating from petroleum-
producing operations.128 Nonetheless, they did not investigate flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions in major petroleum-producing countries. Similarly, Palgrave Macmillan recently 
commissioned The Palgrave Handbook of Managing Fossil Fuels and Energy Transitions.129 
The text features an array of scholarly contributions on managing the decline of fossil fuels in 
the energy transition process, focusing on China, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, India, and Africa.130 However, much of the text focuses more on reducing the use of 
fossil fuels, incentivising investment in renewables, and decarbonising the global energy 
system. There remains the need to inquire into how regulatory regimes in petroleum-producing 
jurisdictions can support the mitigation agenda through effective instruments and methods that 
target upstream GHG emissions and their most significant sources.   
Recently, modelling results by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) have 
shown that oil and gas extraction, processing, and distribution account for about 23% of global 
methane emissions.131  The UNEP has also suggested that targeted measures, such as the 
recovery and utilization of vented gas, upstream gas leak detection and repair, and improved 
control of fugitive emissions, could reduce GHG emissions from the oil and gas sector globally 
 
127 Tade Oyewunmi and others (eds) Decarbonisation and the Energy Industry: Law, Policy and Regulation in 
Low-Carbon Energy Markets (Hart Publishing 2020). 
128 Ibid Chapters 6-8. 
129  Geoffrey Wood and Keith Baker (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Managing Fossil Fuels and Energy 
Transitions (Palgrave Macmillan 2020). 
130 Ibid, Chapters 5-10. 




by 29 to 57 million tonnes per year. 132  One essential finding of the UNEP study is the 
significant role of international, national, and sub-national laws and regulations for abating 
methane and other GHG emissions, citing measures put in place in the US states of California 
and New York.133 Thus, the suggested measures and strategies may not be possible without a 
clear understanding of the legal frameworks and challenges prevalent in oil and gas producing 
countries. This thesis will play a significant role in ascertaining and analysing the regulatory 
circumstances of the major petroleum-producing jurisdictions and identifying vital elements 
for effectively mitigating upstream GHG emissions. 
Some studies examine country-specific circumstances in considerable detail. For example, 
Allan Ingelson134 has recently reviewed new prescriptive rules for controlling venting and 
fugitive emissions relating to petroleum production in the United States and Canada. 135 
Chaiyapa, Esteban, and Kameyama136 have also proposed adopting sectoral approaches for 
mitigating climate change in the Thai petroleum upstream sector. Their proposition accords 
with some of the arguments in this thesis. However, Thailand is not among the world’s leading 
petroleum jurisdictions. There are other striking recent examples of country-specific studies on 
Nigeria,137 Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.138 Still, such individual or stand-alone 
studies do not help form a comprehensive understanding of regulatory approaches for 
addressing upstream GHG emissions universally. 
The lack of data on upstream GHG emissions explains the scarcity of studies that look beyond 
country-specific circumstances. Researchers recently began to investigate and quantify 
upstream (and downstream) GHG emissions at a global scale.139 Even as it becomes desirable 
to deepen our understanding of global emissions through further research, the emerging data 
will provide evidence for scholars to examine regulatory interventions beyond country-specific 
 
132 Ibid, at 5, 9, 10, 13 and 15. 
133 Ibid, at 14 and 125. 
134  Allan Ingelson “Plugging the Holes: New Canadian and US Regulations to Reduce Upstream Methane 
Emissions” (2019) Journal of World Energy Law and Business 1-20. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Warathida Chaiyapa, Miguel Esteban and Yasuko Kameyama “Sectoral Approaches Establishment for Climate 
Change Mitigation in Thailand Upstream Oil and Gas Industry” (2016) 94 Energy Policy 204-213. 
137 Kingsley Omote Mrabure and Benedicta Ogbene Ohimor “Unabated Gas Flaring Menace in Nigeria: The Need 
for Proper Gas Utilization and Strict Enforcement of Applicable Laws” (2020) 46:4 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
753-779; Olusola Joshua Olujobi “Analysis of the Legal Framework Governing Gas Flaring in Nigeria’s Upstream 
Petroleum Sector and the Need for Overhaul” (2020) 9:8 Social Sciences 132. 
138 Bhaskar Sinha and others “Sustainable Green Policy by Managing Flare Gas Recovery: A Case with Middle 
East Oil and Gas Industry” (2020) 24:1 Vision, Sage Publications 35-46. 
139 Masnadi and others, above n 13; Jing and others, above n 14. 
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boundaries. This thesis helps to provide such a measure of understanding and fix this observed 
gap in the literature. 
Recently, Gaulin and Billon140 published a seminal global overview of supply-side policies to 
constrain fossil fuel production, but their analysis tilts toward stopping oil and gas operations 
and not on reducing upstream GHG emissions through regulatory approaches. An earlier 
similar work by Erikson, Lazarus, and Piggot 141  canvassed how restricting fossil fuel 
production can be the next big policy approach for mitigating climate change globally, 
especially by petroleum-producing countries. These themes also run across earlier scholarly 
contributions by Hoel, 142  Fæhn and others, 143  Lazarus and Asselt. 144  More so, the idea of 
phasing out fossil fuel subsidies to support climate policy has also received attention in the 
literature.145 
Another debate in the literature is the idea of leaving petroleum resources and coal unexploited 
while transitioning to renewables and other sources of clean energy.146 Collier and Venables147 
have specifically examined the moral imperative to shut down coalmines worldwide for 
environmental concerns. In support of this view, Erikson148 has argued for a lock-in of the entire 
fossil fuel supply infrastructure, emphasising scaling back coal production the most in a low-
carbon scenario. In 2019, a consortium of environmental institutes jointly issued The 
Production Gap Report, suggesting the necessity for countries’ fossil fuel production rates to 
be consistent with climate targets set under the Paris Agreement.149 The 2020 sequel of the 
 
140 Nicolas Gaulin and Philippe Le Billon “Climate Change and Fossil Fuel Production Cuts: Assessing Global 
Supply-Side Constraints and Policy Implications” (2020) Climate Policy 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1725409. 
141 Peter Erickson, Michael Lazarus and Georgia Piggot “Limiting Fossil Fuel Production as the Next Big Step in 
Climate Policy” (2018) 8 Nature Climate Change 1037-1043. 
142  Michael Hoel Supply Side Climate Policy and the Green Paradox (Memorandum of the Department of 
Economics, University of Oslo, Memo 03/2013-v1 January 2013). 
143 Taran Fæhn and others “Climate Policies in a Fossil Fuel Producing Country: Demand versus Supply Side 
Policies” (2-17) 38:1 The Energy Journal 77-102. 
144 Michael Lazarus and Harro van Asselt “Fossil Fuel Supply and Climate Policy: Exploring the Road Less Taken” 
(2018) 150 Climatic Change 1-13. 
145 Peter Erickson and others “Effect of Subsidies to Fossil Fuel Companies on United States Crude Oil Production” 
(2017) 2 Nature Energy 891-898; Harro van Asselt and Kati Kulovesi “Seizing the Opportunity: Tackling Fossil 
Fuel Subsidies under the UNFCCC” (2017) 17 International Environmental Agreements 357-370; Peter Erikson 
and others “Why Fossil Fuel Producer Subsidies Matter” (2020) 678 Nature E1-E7. 
146 Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins “Un-burnable Oil: An Examination of Oil Resource Utilisation in a 
Decarbonised Energy System” (2014) 64 Energy Policy 102-112. 
147 Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables “Closing Coal: Economic and Moral Incentives” (2014) 30:3 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 492-512. 
148  Peter Erikson Carbon Lock-in from Fossil Fuel Supply Infrastructure (Stockholm Environment Institute 
Discussion Brief 2015). 
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Production Gap Report suggests that global production of fossil fuels needs to decline annually 
by 11% (for coal), 4% (for oil), and 3% (for gas) between 2020 and 2030 to keep warming 
below 1.5°C, but there were indications of global fossil fuels production increases by 2% per 
annum. 150  This trend underscores the need for firm regulatory measures to reduce GHG 
emissions because of increased or persistent oil and gas production. 
Furthermore, the IEA has recently suggested that, as part of the key milestones for achieving 
net-zero emissions by 2050, there should be no new investments or extension of existing 
investments in oil, gas, and coal beyond projects already committed to as of 2021.151 Then there 
should be a reduction in the production of coal by 90%, oil by 75%, and gas by 55%, as well 
as a reduction in their carbon footprints, in 2050.152  These are ambitious and potentially 
realistic goals but their achievement will depend on the quality of countries’ laws and 
regulations, especially in major petroleum-producing jurisdictions. While the IEA analysis 
dwells more on the development of low-carbon or near-zero emissions technologies to support 
carbon neutrality by 2050, it also observes that reducing GHG emissions from core oil and gas 
operations should be the first-order priority for oil and gas companies.153 Yet, it does not 
address the question of good regulatory practices to incentivise that emissions reduction. Thus, 
this thesis complements the IEA’s study in two ways. First, it provides the analysis that is 
necessary for appreciating the applicable legal regimes in major petroleum-producing countries 
and suggests good regulatory practices and methods for abating upstream GHG emissions. 
Second, the analysis in this study underscores the present and future relevance of oil and gas, 
and the need to advance research on mitigating oil and gas production-related emissions. An 
earlier study by the IEA identified the need for infrastructure, investment incentives, and timely 
government policy coordination for reducing equipment leaks from the entire petroleum 
industry, as part of the governance architecture for reducing upstream GHG emissions.154 This 
thesis will discuss these strategic options in their proper contexts.   
 
1.5°C or 2°C (SEI, IISD, ODI, Climate Analytics, CICERO and UNEP, Special Report 2019); report available at 
<http://productiongap.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Production-Gap-Report-2019.pdf> accessed 31 May 
2020. 
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Apart from leaving petroleum resources in situ (underground) and unburned or unexploited, 
Muttitt and others155 have proposed a moderate option to manage the gradual decline of fossil 
fuel production to achieve the Paris Agreement’s climate targets. McGlade and Ekins156 have 
precisely quantified the volume of oil that must remain in situ from 2015 to 2035 in a low-
carbon transition scenario – 500-600 billion barrels of proven and probable reserves. In 
addition, a social movement has emerged against the production of oil and fossil fuels.157 
Nonetheless, one point that advocates of carbon lock-in need to consider closely is that 
reducing emissions from petroleum production is a function of multiple factors comprising 
technologies, institutional strengths, and changing energy consumption patterns.158 
From an energy transition perspective, the nexus between petroleum production and climate 
change has featured in academic inquiries by social scientists and policy scholars. Ruszel, 
Młynarski, and Szurlej159 have examined different states’ circumstances on the transition from 
oil and fossil fuels to renewables. Their study reveals variations in the trajectories of countries 
because of ostensible energy balance structures. They show a need for re-industrialisation that 
supports a new clean energy architecture. However, one major limitation of their analysis is 
that it excludes key petroleum-producing countries in the Middle East and other jurisdictions 
that are part of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Overland’s 
earlier work160 drew attention to the geopolitical ramifications of climate policies on demand-
supply imbalances of petroleum resources between exporting and importing countries. Graaf161 
has posed the question of whether OPEC is dead, considering the practical and economic 
implications of the energy transition to a low-carbon economy. Hastad162 has also argued for 
policy and regulatory measures that eliminate free-riding in the production and supply of fossil 
fuels without regard for environmental concerns. 
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160 Indra Overland “Future Petroleum Geopolitics: Consequences of Climate Policy and Unconventional Oil and 
Gas” in Jinyue Yan (ed) Handbook of Clean Energy Systems (John Wiley and Sons 2015) 1-29. 
161 Thijs Van de Graaf “Is OPEC Dead? Oil Exporters, the Paris Agreement and the Transition to a Post-Carbon 
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Leal-Arcas and others163 have recently examined the energy sector’s decarbonisation, but with 
minimal focus on petroleum production and more attention to electricity. They also limited 
their analysis to just four European countries – Bulgaria, Poland, France, and Finland. 
Valentine, Brown, and Sovacool 164  have also examined the continued production and 
consumption of oil and fossil fuels as part of the global energy transition challenges. They 
argue that the energy transition will be contested by global industries that rely on the fossil 
economy; for example, the petroleum sector, automobile manufacturing, and electric 
utilities.165 Their argument’s climax is the imperative of a “faster, further, farther” energy 
transition. 
Similarly, Graaf and Sovacool166 have recently examined global energy politics and energy 
transition through the lenses of geopolitics, the economy, the environment, and social justice. 
Through the environment lens, they revisit the nexus between climate change and petroleum 
production and emphasise the necessity of tackling both the production and consumption of 
fossil fuels during decarbonisation and energy transition. Although they offer no specific 
petroleum upstream decarbonisation approaches, they emphasise a problem that needs 
regulatory and policy solutions and insights on the energy transition’s geopolitical 
ramifications. Zelli and others’ collection167 investigates fossil fuel subsidy, carbon pricing, and 
renewable energy proliferation and adoption as three practical policy fields for governing the 
climate-energy connection. Although the authors explore functional themes in this collection, 
their analyses of these policy fields stem from political science and international relations. 
These scholarly efforts are relevant for providing an interdisciplinary lens to some pressing 
issues surrounding energy and climate change. Still, this thesis offers an analysis that is more 
law- and regulatory-centric. More so, contemporary studies predominantly focus on limiting 
petroleum production in a carbon-constrained world without adequately relating regulatory and 
policy measures to the prevailing dominance of oil and fossil fuels in the global energy matrix. 
Therefore, this thesis will build on the existing literature on how legal and regulatory measures 
help reduce upstream GHG emissions. 
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Transition: Policy for a Low-Carbon Future (Columbia University Press 2019) 1-59. 
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 Research Methods 
This thesis is doctrinal legal research. It adopts a qualitative framework built on three pillars – 
conventional legal analysis, comparative analysis, and the theory of regulation – and the tests 
adopted for assessing effectiveness. Chapter 2 will explain the tests and other complementary 
criteria that can help countries in designing a good regulatory system for achieving emissions 
reduction in the upstream petroleum sector.  
In the law domain, doctrinal legal research is the most frequent method applied by lawyers, 
academics, judges, and professional legal researchers. 168  Its importance (and near-
indispensability) in legal education is also well-rooted in literature.169 However, it has been 
difficult to explain as a research method to researchers of other disciplines and non-
professionals, hence the need for legal researchers to be more explicit about their dominant 
approach to interrogating issues, especially when working within a sophisticated and 
interdisciplinary research context.170 
In any case, what is doctrinal legal research? Holmes asserted long ago that the jurist’s work 
involves a logical analysis of the law in doctrinal terms towards ensuring that the law is well-
arranged, distributed, and in order.171 He also argued that a similar rational lens underpins the 
very root of courts’ legal proceedings and judgments. 172  Dworkin asserts that one of the 
fundamental aspects of doctrinal legal research is to examine the design of law by taking 
account of problems, alongside the legal and institutional measures for addressing the issues.173 
According to the Council of Australian Law Deans, doctrinal legal research, at its best, involves 
rigorous analysis and creative synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly 
disparate doctrinal strands, and the challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate 
mass of primary materials.174 Similarly, Jain explains that doctrinal legal research involves 
 
168 P. Ishwara Bhat Idea and Methods of Legal Research (OUP 2019) at 144 and 145. See also Amrit Kharel, 
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analysing case law, arranging, ordering, and systematising propositions, and studying 
institutions through legal reasoning or rational deduction.175 
Thus, the remit of the doctrinal legal research method is the analysis of law and legal issues 
using legal reasoning, partly because of the conceptual nature of law, which requires logical 
evaluation.176 Sometimes, doctrinal legal research also involves examining the law’s current 
state and methods for valuable reforms.177 In applying these and the preceding considerations, 
this thesis is analytical and primarily library-based. It explores the theory of regulation and 
narrows down to the regimes in prominent petroleum jurisdictions to address the specific 
problem of upstream GHG emissions, mainly focusing on flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. There is also a recognition of the relevance of legal and market-based instruments 
for environmental protection and risk governance.178 This thesis will analyse the robustness of 
diverse legal and regulatory mechanisms for mitigating upstream oil and gas production flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions within these contexts. 
In addition, the comparative legal method is applied to examine countries’ legal regimes to 
understand their peculiarities and contexts.179 It also involves learning about the similarities 
and differences in legal systems at both micro (within national and sub-national) and macro 
(international and global) levels.180 This learning provides a good understanding of the target 
jurisdictions’ legal cultures and internal dynamics for addressing the specific problems 
investigated.181 
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In contemporary legal scholarship, a comparative approach to research helps fill knowledge 
gaps using the insights drawn from other jurisdictions.182 The comparative approach is also 
becoming more relevant as one of the legal education methods in today’s world where legal 
scholars prepare to function in a global context and need a comparative understanding of the 
applicable law in their chosen domains.183 Besides, comparative legal research helps to pool 
various experiences and contemporary best practices for addressing problems. 184  A legal 
researcher can study specific patterns and trends in overseas or multiple jurisdictions to benefit 
one or more national legal systems and offer insights for future developments.185  
When applying these considerations to studying the regulatory regimes for addressing 
upstream GHG emissions in different petroleum jurisdictions, the focus is to understand the 
similarities and differences among the selected countries. Furthermore, it is necessary to look 
out for the differences in institutional arrangements, regulatory objectives, and the diverse 
methods that different jurisdictions adopt for achieving the regulatory goal of abating upstream 
emissions. This comparative method, coupled with the earlier described doctrinal approach, 
will distil some relevant characteristics of an effective regulatory regime for abating flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions in the upstream petroleum sector.  
 Country Selection  
This thesis does not cover all the numerous sovereign countries in the world engaged in oil and 
gas production but a wide range of jurisdictions to obtain insights of a reasonably general nature. 
Thus, the analysis will capture two groups – six countries from the IEA-designated oil and gas 
producer economies and six other petroleum-producing jurisdictions with a reputation for 
colossal oil and gas investments and activities. The first group is mainly susceptible to industry-
related economic trends and policy shifts because of high economic dependency on the oil and 
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1. Large production; 
2. One-third of the goods and services exported are oil and gas; and 
3. Oil and gas account for one-third of the national fiscal revenue.186 
 
The IEA identifies ten countries in this category but recognises a subset of six as the bedrock 
of global hydrocarbons supply because of their critical role in developing and bringing oil and 
natural gas to the world’s consumers – Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Venezuela.187 This thesis concentrates on these six countries and the second group 
of countries, i.e. six other established petroleum-producing countries outside the IEA 
designation of producer economies. Countries under this second group are diverse, but the 
focus is limited to Brazil, the United States of America (the US), the United Kingdom (UK), 
Canada, China, and Norway. The justification for these countries’ inclusion is to observe 
possible differences between IEA-designated producer economies and other producer 
economies across different geopolitical zones. 
There are further issues to consider in choosing countries. According to the dataset of the 
United States Energy Information Administration (US EIA), some of these countries are the 
top oil producers in the world, with the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Canada and China leading 
respectively as first to fifth largest oil producers as of 2019.188 In the same year (2019), total 
world oil production averaged 80 million barrels per day, with the top 10 producers and OPEC 
members accounting for 68% and 44%, respectively.189 In addition, almost all IEA-designated 
producer economies are members of OPEC.190 OPEC Member-Countries collectively held 
81.89% share of world crude reserves as of 2017.191 Apart from known production and net 
income estimates, there is a possibility of further drilling and production activities in these 
countries, especially as oil may remain relevant for decades to come. Further, some of these 
countries have been the top gas flaring countries in the world for the last decade. Russia, Iraq, 
Iran, the United States, Algeria, Venezuela and Nigeria produce 40% of the world’s oil each 
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year and account for two-thirds (65%) of global gas flaring.192 The choice to limit the study to 
the selected countries becomes apparent. However, this thesis is not an encyclopaedia or global 
survey of energy-climate and GHG emission reduction regulations. Although the country 
selection may seem diverse and broad, the scope of examination is narrow to the extent of 
explicitly considering key legislation and regulations for abating upstream emissions, focusing 
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 Conceptual Framework   
 
This chapter draws on the theory of regulation to provide a conceptual context for what 
regulators in different jurisdictions may be seeking to accomplish. While some relationships 
between the theory and upstream GHG emissions may show in this chapter, subsequent 
chapters will reveal connections that are more direct in national and industry-specific regimes 
to reduce flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions.  
 The Theory of Regulation 
Morgan and Yeung define the theory of regulation as “…a set of propositions or hypotheses 
about why regulation emerges, which actors contribute to that emergence and typical patterns 
of interaction between regulatory actors.”193 This complex phenomenon has received scholarly 
attention at an interdisciplinary level comprising law, economics, politics, and sociology.194 
The theory also applies to the governance of energy and natural resources and their 
environmental implications.195 This brief discussion focuses on the meaning, elements, and 
kinds of regulation; and makes connections with the central objective of this thesis. 
 Meaning and elements of regulation 
Theoretical analyses on regulation are yet to produce a particular definition of the term.196 
Daintith provides a generic meaning of the term as “…all acts of controlling, directing or 
governing according to a rule, principle or system.”197 This generic context comprises three key 
elements – rules/standards, monitoring/compliance, and enforcement mechanism. However, 
this standard framing leaves out other key features such as decision-making on rules/standards 
and specialist decision-making agencies’ activities. For example, in different petroleum-
producing countries, the relevant petroleum legislation vests discretionary powers in the 
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minister of petroleum to grant or refuse applications for various upstream activities, including 
permit applications for flaring and venting. This point will show clearly in Chapter 3. 
Daintith also provides three distinctive insights on regulation’s possible meanings – as 
systematic control, as opposition to markets, and as a policy instrument.198 Two strands of this 
distinction may be helpful for purposes of upstream GHG emissions reduction. These are the 
perspectives of control (controlling upstream emissions) and a policy instrument (strategy for 
addressing upstream emissions).    
Prosser defines regulation as “…the legal rules and other measures which express such 
command-and-control arrangements, contrasted with other forms of law such as criminal and 
contract law.”199 In this context, legal rules promulgated through statutory instruments for 
addressing upstream petroleum emissions would qualify as regulation. 
These two extremes – general and specific – may not present a solution to the difficulty of 
defining regulation because of possible over generalisation or limitation. Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge illustrate this problem by examining three varying definitions of the concept: as a 
specific set of commands, as deliberate state influence, and as all forms of social control; and 
argue that these definitions suffer from “under- and over-inclusiveness.”200 Barton also believes 
that it is over-inclusive to define regulation to encompass all kinds of social control and 
influence.201 Prosser says it consists of public interventions that affect the operation of markets 
through command and control.202 Selznick defines the concept as sustained and focused control 
exercised by a public agency over community values.203 Scott defines regulation as “… any 
process or set of processes by which norms are established, … monitored or fed back into the 
regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the behaviour of regulated actors 
within the acceptable limits of the regime (whether by enforcement action or by some other 
mechanism).”204 
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There are also scholarly examples that refer to Julia Black’s work as a good illustration of the 
difficulty in defining regulation205 and an excellent example of a more wide-ranging description 
of the concept. 206  Smith looks positively on Black’s work, saying that Black rose to the 
definition challenge of regulation with “characteristic theoretical depth and conceptual 
clarity.”207 Therefore, it may be helpful to learn about Black’s thinking on regulation. She 
defines regulation as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified 
outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-
gathering and behaviour-modification.”208 She adopts this definition in a later work,209 which 
Smith and Prosser referenced.210 An earlier version of her description that Baldwin, Cave and 
Lodge211 refer to is “the intentional use of authority to affect the behaviour of a different party 
according to set standards, involving instruments of information-gathering and behaviour 
modification.” 212  Barton recognises Black’s work as the best discussion of the definition 
problem, but goes ahead to describe regulation as “…a process intended to alter activity or 
behaviour, or to carry out an ordering, often by restricting behaviour, but at times enabling or 
facilitating behaviour that would otherwise not be possible.”213  
There are valuable insights to draw from the different theories of regulation for application to 
this thesis. First, there is the element of behaviour modification, which can be restrictive or 
facilitative. The objective of regulation would be to alter or modify the practices of oil and gas 
producing operators to reduce GHG emissions traceable to their operations. Second, there is 
the standard-setting element, which means the stipulation of necessary rules or standards for 
emissions control during petroleum production. Third, there is the feature of decision-making, 
which would apply especially for the approval or rejection of permit applications for flaring 
and venting or other operations that would discharge GHGs. The fourth point is about the 
operation of specialist agencies. This element can show in two forms – either as a specialist 
agency of the government (just like the United States Environmental Protection Agency) or as 
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a specialist industry-focused organisation (just like the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative). This 
second strand is a form of self-regulation, which comes up for closer examination in Chapter 
4. The fifth feature is using different mechanisms or instruments and methods for monitoring 
and enforcement to achieve the regulatory objective of reducing flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. Most of these elements will show clearly in different regulatory trends and practices 
as the thesis develops. 
 Kinds of regulation    
This section considers the common types of regulation, their principal characteristics, and 
applications to this thesis. Prosser identifies four regulation models – rule for economic 
efficiency and consumer choice; law to protect rights; regulation for social solidarity; and 
regulation as deliberation. 214  One problem with this formulation is the restricted range of 
activities covered by the models. Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge identify seven kinds of regulatory 
strategies. 215  These are command and control; incentives; market-harnessing controls; 
disclosure; direct action and design solutions; rights and liabilities laws; and public 
compensation (social insurance).216  
Sometimes the classifications by different authors overlap. Sometimes, it is a matter of 
terminology. However, the literature’s common kinds of regulation are two broad 
classifications – conventional regulation and market-based alternatives. There is also the 
understanding that regulatory power spreads across different strata and entities of society, not 
necessarily an exclusive state tool, hence the idea of decentred understandings of regulation. A 
hybrid form of regulation combines different kinds of regulation to achieve regulatory 
objectives. The analyses in subsequent chapters will closely identify the operation of these 
various forms of regulation in the established regimes of petroleum jurisdictions for mitigating 
upstream flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions.  
a) Conventional regulation 
Barton presents a compact summary of conventional regulation, covering rules-based 
regulation; principles-based regulation; light-handed regulation; discretionary regulation; 
contracts; and incentives.217 Nevertheless, the more common types of traditional regulation are 
rules-based and principles-based approaches. As the thesis progresses, one crucial issue for 
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examination is determining conventional regulation forms that have high potential to reduce 
flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. This point will emerge from the analysis of the 
regulatory regimes in the case study countries. 
Rules-based regulation stipulates detailed rules or prescriptions on the regulated issue. It 
prescribes specific actions and prohibits acts. It is also known as prescriptive or command and 
control regulation. It may be suitable for regulating highly contested, unfamiliar, complex, or 
delicate matters, especially in the absence of fixed ideas about effective risk management 
approaches.218 Its key strengths are formality, transparency, predictability, and certainty. Its 
major weakness is its inability or slowness to address new unforeseen issues; thus, it can be 
inflexible in dealing with variety. It can also be a barrier to innovation.219 For upstream GHG 
emissions, rules-based regulation would stipulate rules and prescriptions for industry operators 
to comply with. The study of national regulatory regimes in Chapter 3 will identify jurisdictions 
with prescriptive regulations and contribute to discussing the research’s conceptual relevance 
in Chapter 5. 
The principles-based variant establishes policy goals and allows the regulated entities to decide 
the best approaches to achieve the set goals. It is also known as goals-based, result-oriented, or 
policy-based regulation. The regulation would usually stipulate standards or tests to satisfy 
compliance or show achievement of the set goals. This approach’s primary strength is its 
flexibility, making it most suitable for regulating fast-paced industries that always experience 
innovation.220 However, it may not be suited to address complex and multifaceted issues, nor 
where compliance is a problem. 221  Therefore, the adoption of either a prescriptive or a 
principles-based regulatory regime would depend on the particular set of circumstances and 
the regulated activities.222 In the context of the research inquiry, principles-based regulations 
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would establish goals for GHG emissions reduction and leave industry operators with the 
discretion to implement strategies for achieving the goals. Most regulatory arrangements are a 
hybrid of different approaches. Chapter 5 of this thesis will discuss how petroleum-producing 
jurisdictions can explore a hybrid regulatory model incorporating principles-based and specific 
prescriptions and market-based instruments for mitigating flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions.  
In addition, it is common for a regulatory agency or minister to have power to grant or approve 
certain types of activities or to refuse them, or to allow them subject to conditions. This is called 
discretionary regulation and a type of conventional regulation.223 For example, the Minister of 
Petroleum Resources in a country may have powers to grant flaring permits to operators or 
refuse applications, or grant them subject to conditions. This discretionary power can be 
advantageous in circumstances requiring flexibility, but it can also be unpredictable and lead 
to arbitrariness. It does not also give certainty to the regulated entities. Research has shown 
that such a decision-making process is vital for the optimal governance of natural resources, 
including oil and gas.224 This thesis will identify some petroleum jurisdictions with this kind 
of regulation and analyse the implications for an effective regulatory regime for mitigating 
upstream GHG emissions. 
b) Market-based instruments  
Different texts in the literature have explored the history and adoption of market-based 
instruments (MBIs) as alternatives to conventional state command and control regulation.225 
The MBIs are economic instruments that operate in the form of carbon pricing mechanisms 
(taxes, prices, and charges), subsidies, tradeable emissions rights, and eco-labelling. In addition, 
Ogus observes the potential of two specific instruments – the ‘nudging tax’ and ‘rectificatory 
tax’ – to induce behavioural change as alternatives to conventional regulatory approaches.226  
Some scholars have argued that MBIs overcome the deficiencies of traditional command and 
control regulation. 227  There are also common views on using MBIs to address common 
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environmental concerns228 and transition from oil and fossil fuels to a low-carbon economy.229 
Chapter 3 will identify the MBIs that operate in the case study countries and examine their 
potential to reduce flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. 
c) Decentred understandings   
Julia Black introduced the terms ‘decentring regulation’ and ‘decentred regulation’ to express 
that governments do not have a monopoly on regulation.230 This point means that different 
regulatory relationships occur amongst various societal strata and entities – for example, rules 
for professional organisations, technical committees, and companies.231 Technical competence, 
wealth, information, and organisational capacity are also examples of power sources, apart 
from legal authority.232 
For upstream GHG emissions regulation, decentred understandings can include technical 
industry rules, information, and procedures for mitigating flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. Specialised industry-driven frameworks such as the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative 
(OGCI) and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) are examples of decentred understandings 
on regulation. Chapter 4 will examine these industry-driven regulatory initiatives and the 
internal measures by oil majors to analyse how they encourage upstream GHG emissions 
reduction. 
Responsive regulation and reflexive regulation are common forms of a decentred 
understanding of regulation in the literature.233 The following parts of the chapter will discuss 
them briefly to determine whether they are helpful or irrelevant to the primary inquiry.   
(1) Responsive regulation 
Drawing on Nonet and Selznick’s responsive law concept,234 Ayres and Braithwaite canvass a 
responsive theory of regulation.235 Their central idea is that governments should be responsive 
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to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding the necessity or otherwise of a more 
interventionist response. 236  They suggest that regulation should be responsive to industry 
structure in that different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of 
regulation. They offer two pyramids for governmental response in terms of regulatory 
strategies and punishments for an infraction. For regulatory strategies, they conceptualise a 
system that graduates from self-regulation, enforced self-regulation, command regulation with 
discretionary punishment, and command regulation with nondiscretionary punishment.237 For 
punishments, they suggest persuasion, warning letter, civil penalty, criminal penalty, licence 
suspension, and licence revocation in ascending order depending on the gravity of regulatory 
infraction.238 It is not certain whether this conceptualisation of regulation is useful or even 
occurs in the case study countries’ frameworks for addressing upstream GHG emissions. The 
examination that comes in Chapter 3 will tell. 
(2) Reflexive regulation 
Gunther Teubner built on autopoiesis theory (self-creation and self-organisation), which 
Humberto Maturana, Heinz von Foerster and Niklas Luhmann propounded.239 The central idea 
of Autopoiesis is that, (within systems theory, the biology of cognition and living systems), the 
living being or system can autonomously self-create and self-organise without recourse to 
external intervention.240 Teubner propounds a self-referential system through self-regulation 
and openness to natural forces that systems can adapt to survive.241 He suggests the likelihood 
of regulatory trilemma (or regulatory failures) in circumstances where law acts as an external 
intervention that unsettles self-referential structures’ internal dynamics. These include (a) 
incongruence of law, politics, and society; (b) possible over-regulation of society; and (c) over-
socialisation of law. 242  Braithwaite captures this trilemma in the context of law-corporate 
interaction as follows: 
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[A] law that goes against the grain of business culture risks irrelevance; a law that crushes 
normative systems that naturally emerge in business can destroy virtue; a law that lets business 
norms take it over can destroy its own virtues.243 
Other proponents of reflexive law share Teubner’s views. Habermas construes the 
incongruence between law and the supposed intrinsic internal dynamics of systems to be a 
legitimation crisis and suggests avoiding overburdening social systems through excessive legal 
intervention. 244  Gunningham advocates a regulatory reform that transcends conventional 
command and control. 245  He identifies some reflexive options: process-based and meta-
regulation, information regulation, ecological modernisation, smart regulation, and a new form 
of environmental governance.246 Schutter and Lenoble extensively discuss suitable reflexive 
regulation applications to govern market structures, state institutions, corporate entities, and 
social rights.247  
Vincent-Jones cautions that reflexive frameworks’ success would largely depend on the 
tightness of the law and its manner of interpretation, implementation, and enforcement, 
considering the problem of the regulatory trilemma.248 He advocates regulatory oversight to 
ensure that reflexive systems perform their assigned roles efficiently, effectively, and socially 
accountable.249 However, Picciotto argues that legal rules constitute the order of things, such 
as businesses and markets.250 This point applies explicitly to the establishment of corporate 
forms that determine the order and approaches to issues. In this sense, reflexivity becomes an 
adaptation to established legal rules.251 
The ideas from responsive and reflexive regulation may seem abstract and of little use. Still, 
there are specific consequences of decentred understandings of regulation that are helpful in 
the present inquiry. They are self-regulation, co-regulation, voluntary measures, third party 
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regulation, enforcement measures, and environmental management and audit systems.252 More 
specifically, voluntary actions, self-regulation, and environmental management initiatives of 
petroleum organisations and companies help understand the import of decentred 
understandings of regulation. 
d) Hybrid approach   
It is rare to see a regulatory regime that purely implements only one regulatory approach in 
practice. Instead, a hybrid of different methods is the norm.253 Various scholars have also 
explored hybridity for regulating issues. Riaz examines a combination of state regulation and 
self-regulation for remuneration in Australia.254 Lantz analyses a hybrid of revenue capping 
and incentive regulation to control the profit level of monopolistic firms. 255  Alexius and 
Furusten explore it for governing large hybrid organisations.256 Ewert and Maggetti have also 
investigated hybridisation in transnational environmental governance. 257  There is also 
emerging literature on a hybrid of new environmental management comprising traditional 
regulatory models and public-private collaborations.258 This particular hybrid is an example of 
a smart regulatory model that captures a broad mix of approaches to achieve the ends of 
regulation.259 
However, hybridity is not a guarantee for successful regulation.260 There may be external and 
remote factors for the achievement of regulatory objectives. Sometimes regulatory failure can 
result because of improper controls, low monitoring, and enforcement.261 A lot depends on the 
design of regulatory approaches, as much as on their implementation.262  
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While applying these ideas about regulation to the research inquiry, the objective will be to 
understand how to ensure regulatory effectiveness in achieving upstream GHG emissions 
reduction.  Thus, it is relevant to clarify the meaning of effectiveness in this chapter as part of 
the overarching conceptual framework of this thesis.  
 Regulatory Effectiveness 
The concept of effectiveness in law is controversial and problematic. It can lead to a lengthy 
exposition, but this chapter intends to keep it concise and within the research inquiry’s specific 
context. From a strict jurisprudential perspective, effectiveness can mean the relationship 
between results and the social objects that legal norms set out to achieve.263 Consequently, 
effectiveness relates to legal and regulatory mechanisms’ real-world effects, especially about 
how they alter human behaviour and the physical environment.264 
However, Maljean-Dubois summarises the multiple meanings of the term in three levels: (1) 
legal effectiveness, meaning respect for the law; (2) behavioural effectiveness, meaning 
behavioural modification because of the law; and (3) problem-solving effectiveness, focusing 
on the goals or aims of legal provisions (have they been set too low?) and how they spur action 
towards achieving the goals.265 This third level of effectiveness fits nicely with the objective of 
this study. 
Therefore, the fundamental considerations applicable to this thesis are the goals or aims of 
regulatory provisions in petroleum-producing jurisdictions and the robustness of their methods 
for incentivising operators to reduce upstream GHG emissions, mainly focusing on flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions. For the first test, the key question is whether petroleum-
producing countries have clearly expressed an aim to regulate GHG emissions emanating from 
oil and gas production through the instrumentality of a law or regulation. For the second test, 
the key question is whether the jurisdictions have methods for spurring the regulated entities 
(oil and gas producing companies) to carry out production activities in such a way that they 
reduce GHG emissions. These two tests will underpin the evaluation of national regulatory 
arrangements in Chapter 3.  
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Sometimes it may be desirable for countries to initiate a law reform to reposition their 
governance regimes for effectiveness. This agenda needs to be carried out having regard to 
other essential elements for a good regulatory system. Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge have 
identified five of such criteria. These are legislative mandate, appropriate scheme of 
accountability, fair procedures, accessibility (transparency), sufficient expertise of the 
regulator and efficient action by the regime.266 Legislative mandate is concerned with whether 
the activity of the regulator is sanctioned by law or parliament. This aligns with one of the tests 
established above for assessing effectiveness, i.e., whether the goals or aims of legal provisions 
are clearly spelt out to address problems. Accountability refers to whether there is a system to 
make the regulatory institution accountable for how it exercises powers for achieving 
regulatory goals. Fair and transparent procedures are concerned with whether the regulator 
follows due processes established by law and in a transparent manner that leaves no room for 
uncertainties and capriciousness (unpredictability). This will be a valuable feature to examine 
in countries’ procedures for controlling flaring and venting. Sufficient expertise relates to 
whether the regulator or regulatory institution possesses the skills that are necessary for 
effectively controlling the regulated industry or activity. This is important because certain 
regulatory functions may require the exercise of expert judgement. Efficient action relates to 
whether the regulator adopts methods and measures that help to achieve the regulatory mandate 
set in the applicable law or regulation. This aligns with the second test explained above as to 
whether oil and gas jurisdictions have suitable methods for incentivising operators to reduce 
GHG emissions. All these five criteria have also been recognised by the New Zealand 
Productivity Commission267 and the OECD268 as vital characteristics for a good regulatory 
design. They are valuable and complement the two tests adopted in this thesis for assessing 
effectiveness. Therefore, they will be referred to when considering the materials in Chapters 3 
and 4. The following chapters will provide insights that are more direct and apply these 
regulatory theories to the mitigation of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Chapter 3 will 
examine the applicable regulatory frameworks of the case study countries. Chapter 4 will 
examine decentred understandings of regulation in the context of industry-driven initiatives for 
upstream GHG emissions reduction.  
 
266 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, above n 194, at 26-39. 
267 New Zealand Productivity Commission Regulatory Institutions and Practices (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission Report 30 June 2014) at iv. 
268 OECD and Korea Development Institute Improving Regulatory Governance: Trends, Practices and the Way 
Forward (OECD Publishing 2017). 
40 
 
 National Regulatory Regimes  
 
This chapter will review the regimes applicable to upstream flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions in the case study countries. It will then analyse and compare the interactions between 
different regulatory institutions and laws, objectives, and methods of regulating upstream GHG 
emissions. These exercises will help in identifying some valuable answers to the research 
question. 
 
 Overview of Regulatory Regimes 
 IEA-Designated Producer Economies 
a) Iraq 
The Iraqi Constitution vests powers in the federal government and the legislatures of producing 
governorates and regions to manage petroleum extraction within their territories. 269  The 
Ministry of Oil is the industry regulator. Regarding the present research inquiry, different laws 
and institutions are at play. The constitution is silent on upstream emissions and vests powers 
in both the federal government and regional authorities to formulate environmental policies to 
address pollution.270 The Conservation Law of 1985271 has the principal aim of conserving 
hydrocarbon wealth resources from waste and damage.272 Therefore, it obliges the operator to 
take necessary steps to avoid wastes and prevent any pollution harmful to the environment.273 
It also vests implementation powers in the Ministry of Oil.274 
A draft Iraqi Hydrocarbon Law275 has been in circulation for about 14 years (since 2007) 
without a conclusive parliamentary resolution. The long delay has nothing to do with regulating 
upstream GHG emissions. Instead, it is primarily because of an intense contest between federal 
and regional authorities over managing the country’s petroleum resources and revenue 
sharing.276  There is also a division of interests between the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. While 
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the Kurds prefer a more substantial regional control of petroleum resources by the governorates, 
the Sunnis and Shiites prefer greater control by the federal government.277  
If (and when) the proposed law comes into force, it would vest powers in the Ministry of Oil 
as the competent authority for the governance of petroleum activities in Iraq. 278  It would 
stipulate obligations regarding resource conservation, flaring reduction, and general 
environmental protection. On conservation, it would require the operator to avoid waste, 
including preventing leaks from pipelines and other sources following good oilfield 
practices.279 On gas flaring, the law would permit flaring for installation testing, commissioning, 
and as safety precautions, which must not exceed a maximum period of one year, to allow the 
setting up of utilization measures.280 The general environmental protection provision would 
require companies to carry out operations applying good oilfield practices and other applicable 
Iraqi legislation to prevent the pollution of air, lands, and waters.281 
The Iraqi Environmental Law requires parties involved in oil and gas extraction and production 
to adopt necessary procedures and take precautions to prevent pollution or damage during their 
operations.282 To this extent, the Ministry of Environment in Iraq is one of the government 
institutions working to control upstream emissions. However, it does not play a prominent role 
because oil and gas companies’ requirements are merely part of the environmental law’s 
general provisions to protect the environment. The law does not go beyond those general 
environmental protection provisions. The Environmental Law does not vest powers in the 
Ministry of Environment to regulate flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions.  Therefore, the 
Ministry of Oil prevails over the Ministry of Environment and all other government agencies 
regarding the regulation of petroleum activities and GHG emissions emanating from the sector. 
b) Nigeria 
The Petroleum Act 1969283 is the current principal legislation governing petroleum operations 
in Nigeria over the years. The Act vests regulatory powers in the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources.284 The country’s parliament has deliberated on a proposed law to reform the oil and 
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gas industry – the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill – for about thirteen years (after its 
introduction in 2008). In 2017, the Senate (the upper house of the bicameral legislature) 
initially passed the bill into law, requiring concurrent passage by the House of Representatives 
(the lower house of the legislature) and presidential assent.285 The president did not give his 
consent but returned the bill to the parliament for more deliberations. The long delay in passing 
the bill into law is due to the lack of consensus on the revenue-sharing formula between federal 
and state governments, creation of host communities’ endowment fund, clarifying the corporate 
social responsibility of operators, and ascertaining a framework for reforming the country’s 
national oil company – the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation – for optimal 
performance.286 There is an indication that the Nigerian parliament may pass the bill into law 
before the end of 2021.287 Compared to Iraq’s case, one striking similarity is the tussle between 
federal and provincial governments for a more significant oil revenue share. However, in 
Nigeria’s case, the proposed law says nothing about upstream GHG emissions, unlike the Iraqi 
proposed law that makes applicable provisions on flaring, resource conservation, and 
environmental protection.  
The only scant provision of the Petroleum Act relating to emissions is the obligation on 
licensees to take precautions to prevent pollution and to initiate appropriate controls in the 
event of pollution.288 The Petroleum Production Regulations, pursuant to the Petroleum Act, 
also require the licensee to take precautions to prevent pollution in drilling or production 
activities; and promptly initiate control measures if pollution occurs. 289  Additionally, the 
licensee is required to submit to the Minister of Petroleum Resources, within five years after 
the grant of a petroleum license or lease, a feasibility study, programme and proposals for gas 
utilization to avoid flaring.290 
The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act291 is a specific regulatory mechanism to address gas 
flaring and venting in Nigeria. It requires every oil and gas company to submit detailed plans 
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for the implementation of gas re-injection.292 It initially stipulated 1 January 1984 to end gas 
flaring or continuation of flaring with a monetary penalty payment.293 There is a history around 
the setting and missing of different dates to end flaring in the country.294 For example, the 
Nigerian Energy Policy initially set 2008 as the date to end gas flaring,295 but without success. 
Similarly, the Nigerian Gas Policy stipulated 2020 as the new date to end flaring in Nigeria and 
mandates oil and gas companies to work towards this new date.296 However, operators still flare 
and vent gas in the country. 
Recently, two legal instruments have emerged to strengthen the regulatory regime for 
addressing flaring and venting in Nigeria. The first is the Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and 
Pollution) Regulations 2018,297 promulgated by the Minister of Petroleum Resources pursuant 
to the Petroleum Act and the Associated Gas Re-injection Act. The second is the 2019 flaring 
prohibition legislation.298 These new laws complement the existing legal regime’s relevant 
provisions and prohibit flaring but retain the former laws’ permit and penalty regime. 
The most significant changes that the 2018 regulations introduced are higher flaring penalties 
and a metering system for flare measurement. Unlike the ten Nigerian Naira (N10) for every 
1000 standard cubic feet of flared gas in force since 1998 under the Associated Gas Re-
injection Act, the new regulations stipulate a penalty of USD2 (approximately N724).299 This 
change outweighs the erstwhile insignificant flaring penalty sum of N10. The metering system 
requires all oil and gas lessees or licensees to install metering equipment to quantify the volume 
of flared gas and ensure that operators comply with set flaring limits.300 The new legislation 
also criminalises failure to install metering equipment and failure to furnish correct flaring data. 
Liability for any of these offences attracts a fine of ten million Naira (10,000,000), the 
equivalent of USD 27,570, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.301 
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In addition, Nigeria’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the UNFCCC and 
the Paris Agreement proposes to end flaring by 2030.302 The country’s National Action Plan to 
Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants recently abridged the 2030 flaring target by an 
ambitious plan to achieve 100% flaring elimination by 2020 and a 50% reduction of fugitive 
emissions by 2030.303 However, there is no indication that the 2020 target has materialised. 
The Flare Gas Commercialization Programme,304 established in 2016 by the Minister of State 
for Petroleum Resources, is another recent strategy to support flaring reduction. The 
programme provides a gas monetization framework by implementing a gas-to-power initiative, 
domestic supply obligation, and tax holidays to construct gas utilization infrastructure. 305 
However, these strategies under the Flare Gas Commercialization Programme apply to third 
party investors306 and do not impose an obligation on upstream oil and gas operators to reduce 
emissions.  
Overall, Nigeria’s current regulatory framework emphasizes data collection, monitoring, and a 
clear objective to reduce flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. The regime also suggests a 
tremendous potential for enforcement. Nevertheless, there is presently a lack of data to assess 
whether the legislative and regulatory interventions have yielded emissions reduction ever 
since their introduction. Moreover, it may be too early to judge their efficacy, as the changes 
are still very recent. 
From an environmental law perspective, the country’s environmental regulator – the National 
Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency – has powers to regulate 
effluents and emissions in different industries, excluding emissions from the oil and gas 
sector.307 Therefore, the Ministry of Petroleum Resources is the principal regulatory institution 
regarding upstream GHG emissions. 
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The Russian Subsoil Law308 is the principal legislation governing subsoil rights, including 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources. The Production Sharing Agreement Law 
complements the subsoil legislation by regulating petroleum investments in Russia, essentially 
between international oil companies and the Russian Federation.309 Under the Subsoil Law,310 
the Federal Agency for Subsoil Use – an agency under the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
the Environment – exists as the regulator of petroleum production activities.311 Both the subsoil 
law and the production sharing agreement law are silent about upstream emissions and other 
environmental issues. There is also a lack of regulatory intervention by the industry regulator 
to address upstream emissions. 
In 2009, the Russian Federal Government issued a decree to restrict the volume of oil and gas 
production-related flaring to only 5% of APG. 312  This measure would have potentially 
incentivised large-scale emissions reduction, as operators could have utilized approximately 
95% of APG instead of flaring. However, the Russian Federation abolished the decree in 2016.  
The country’s Environmental Protection Law empowers the Russian Federal Government to 
set rates (fees) for negative impacts on the environment, including gas flaring and other air 
pollutants from the upstream petroleum sector.313 The current rates are 1094.7 Russian Rouble 
(approximately USD15) per ton of carbon dioxide and 108 Russian Rouble (approximately 
USD 1.5) per ton of methane.314 These rates apply to industrial activities and upstream GHG 
emissions, whether through flaring, venting or equipment leaks. They are also like the penalty 
or carbon pricing regime (emission charges or taxes) existing in other jurisdictions for flaring. 
Some Russian legal scholars have argued that the payment for negative impacts on the 
environment represents the polluter pays principle.315 This argument is tenable because the law 
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requires corporate entities to internalise the cost of pollution and wastes, including GHG 
emissions from flaring and venting.  
In addition, the Russian Federation has a general climate doctrine, which has the strategic goal 
of ensuring safe and sustainable development of the country amidst the threat of climate change, 
but underscores the priority of national interest.316 The priority of national interest hinges on 
Russia’s global reputation as an energy superpower, hence its use of energy resources as 
foreign policy tools.317 While the climate doctrine states multiple aspirations and the need to 
adopt preventive measures for climate change mitigation, it imposes no specific obligations on 
business entities or the oil and gas industry to reduce emissions. 
There is a proposed bill for state regulation of greenhouse gases.318 It is unclear what federal 
agency or regulatory institution would implement the proposed legislation, as the bill is silent 
on the issue. Although there is no specific mention of emissions from oil and gas production 
or the petroleum industry, the proposed law intends to set targets for direct GHG emissions in 
general for the entire Russian Federation.319 There is also an objective to set targets for selected 
sectors of the economy.320 It is also unclear what sectors of the economy would eventually 
become subject to such a selective target setting. However, the relevant agency can consider 
setting emissions target for the petroleum industry. Irrespective of the uncertainty, it is possible 
to interpret the law’s general provisions to include oil and gas production activities. The 
proposed law would establish a carbon pricing system for economic activities that result in 
GHG emissions.321 It would require the issuance of emission permits with a stated quota and 
impose monetary fines for all emissions that exceed permit allowance. 322  Oil and gas 
exploration and production are economic activities that cause GHG emissions. If construed 
from this literal perspective, the law captures emissions from the industry, absent direct 
provisions in that respect.  
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d) Saudi Arabia 
The Basic Law of 1992323 is the primary legislation governing oil and gas activities in the 
Islamic State of Saudi Arabia. It vests ownership of the natural resources in the State and 
provides that such resources must be exploited, protected, and developed for the State’s benefit, 
security, and economy.324 The Basic Law does not define an industry regulator, but the Saudi 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources has existed since 1960 as the industry regulator 
before the emergence of the Basic Law. However, in 2000, the Saudi King issued a royal decree 
establishing the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs.325 The Supreme Council 
and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources both exercise oversight and regulatory 
functions over the oil and gas sector in Saudi Arabia. 
There is no specific regulation targeting upstream GHG emissions. The Basic Law is also silent 
on the issue, save the provision that the State shall endeavour to preserve, protect, and improve 
the environment and prevent its pollution.326 However, there are provisions about air quality 
improvements in the country’s environmental legislation – the General Environmental Law of 
2001.327 The law makes some specific prescriptions regarding the oil and gas industry in the 
Environmental Protection Standards328– an annexure to the Law – and read as “ambient air 
quality” and “air pollution source” standards. 329  The Standards cover emissions from 
combustion sources, fluid catalytic cracking units, and fugitive emissions. Oil and gas 
companies are required to utilize appropriate gas cleaning equipment to limit emissions 
(primarily sulphur, nitrous oxide and particulates) to 500 parts per million (ppm). 
Additionally, operators must reduce fugitive emissions by adopting good maintenance and 
inspection procedures and efficient monitoring of volatile organic compounds emission 
points. 330  These provisions empower the Saudi Ministry of Environment, Water and 
Agriculture to play some regulatory roles regarding environmental protection in the oil and gas 
industry. However, the requirements are more downstream-focused and majorly address local 
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air quality improvement and not upstream GHG emissions. There remains an opportunity to 
establish a regulatory regime that specifically targets petroleum production-related GHG 
emissions. 
Nevertheless, the state-owned national oil company – Saudi Aramco – has some valuable 
strategies for abating flaring. The first is a master gas system.331 This is a gas-gathering network 
that helps in optimal gas utilization instead of flaring or venting. It is currently the world’s 
largest single hydrocarbon network and gathers about 100 bcm of APG per annum.332 The 
company utilizes the gathered APG for generating on-site fuel and providing electricity to the 
country. The second is the use of technology to monitor and mitigate flaring in real-time.333 
The third is the implementation of a leak detection and repair programme to complement the 
4IR technology. The fourth is the operation of a flare recovery system. Through these measures, 
Saudi Arabia reduced flaring by about 37% within three years (2018 to 2019).334 The country 
presently has a gas flaring status of less than 1%, compared to other producing countries, and 
aims to achieve zero routine flaring by 2030.335 
e) United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The UAE consists of seven emirates – Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, 
Sharaj and Umm Al Quwain.336 Abu Dhabi accounts for 95% of the proven oil reserves and 
almost all oil exports from the country, with negligible contributions from Dubai and the other 
five emirates.337 The UAE constitution deems all natural resources and wealth, including oil 
and gas, in each emirate to be the public property of that emirate and requires the preservation 
and optimal utilization of all those resources and wealth for the national interest.338 This thesis 
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focuses predominantly on the prevalent regulatory regime in Abu Dhabi, considering the 
emirate’s prominent position as the petroleum hub of the UAE. 
The Petroleum Conservation Law 1978339 and the Gas Law 1976340 constitute the legal regime 
governing oil and gas operations in Abu Dhabi. For regulation purposes, the Supreme 
Petroleum Council exists as the apex institution that oversees the oil and gas industry.341 There 
is also a Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure with a mandate to organize, develop and enhance 
competitiveness in the energy and infrastructure sectors. 
Regarding the regulation of upstream emissions, the Petroleum Conservation Law342 and the 
UAE Environmental Law 343  are at work. The industry regulator and the ministry of the 
environment play complementary roles on the issue. The Petroleum Law requires operators to 
re-inject associated gas or ensure optimum utilization to avoid emissions in the form of flaring 
or venting, and only flare upon written government consent when it is impossible or difficult 
to re-inject or utilize the associated gas.344 This is like other regulatory regimes that permit 
flaring or venting under challenging circumstances. The Environmental Law spells out general 
environmental protection obligations with relevance to oil and gas production-related 
emissions. The law obliges operators to keep emissions related to exploration, digging, 
extraction, and crude oil production within permissible limits.345 It does not state the limits but 
defers the implementation regulation, Cabinet Decree No. 12.346 This Decree stipulates various 
air pollutants’ limits without specifically mentioning flaring, venting, and equipment leaks. 
However, it also sets a blanket limit of 250 milligrams per cubic meter for all visible emissions 
resulting from petroleum operations. 347  Additionally, the Environmental Law requires 
operators to take all precautions to reduce the quantum of pollutants in combustion emissions, 
keep records of such quantity and make efforts to achieve reduction.348  
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Different laws apply to oil and gas exploration and production activities in Venezuela – the 
Constitution,349 the Organic Gaseous Hydrocarbons Law,350 and the Organic Hydrocarbons 
Law.351 The second and third are the primary regulatory instruments for the industry. The 
Organic Gaseous Hydrocarbons Law applies specifically to gas operations, while the Organic 
Hydrocarbons Law applies to oil activities. These two laws recognize the Ministry of Energy 
and Mines as the industry regulator.352 
There are no direct obligations on emissions reduction in the two hydrocarbon laws, except 
general provisions relating to rational use, conservation of resources, preservation, and 
environment protection.353 Despite the absence of specific regulation of emissions emanating 
from oil and gas activities, the Ministry of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources has 
powers to set flaring restrictions and penalties on individual cases under established decrees on 
air quality.354 It is difficult to obtain data on the exact nature of flaring rules and penalties. 
However, the Ministry of Environment plays a more active role in regulating upstream 
emissions in Venezuela, unlike in some other jurisdictions where the ministry of the 
environment plays a complementary and less active role on the issue.  
There is also a corporate criminal dimension to emissions in Venezuela. The Criminal 
Environmental Law355 prohibits emissions that can lead to atmospheric deterioration of the 
environment. Judges have jurisdiction to adjudicate on environmental breaches and impose 
severe penalties, ranging from fines to imprisonment.356 
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 Other Producer Economies 
a) Brazil 
The regulatory framework for oil and gas activities in Brazil consists of the Petroleum Law,357 
Gas Law,358 and Pre-Salt Law.359 The Petroleum Law establishes the National Council for 
Energy Policy under the Ministry of Mines and Energy, with the mandate to formulate national 
policies for the country’s entire energy sector,360 and the National Petroleum, Natural Gas and 
Biofuels Agency as the regulator of the petroleum, natural gas, derivatives, and biofuels 
industry.361 
Regarding the regulation of upstream emissions, there are no specific provisions in the 
legislation. Still, the Petroleum Law requires the implementation of good practices for the 
conservation and rational use of petroleum resources and preserving the environment.362 There 
are similar obligations in the Gas Law requiring the concessionaire to ensure resource 
conservation and environmental protection.363  
In recent times, Brazil has formulated specific regulatory measures to address upstream 
emissions, especially gas flaring. In 2017 and 2019, the National Council for Energy Policy 
issued resolutions that underscore the need to reduce gas flaring in the course of petroleum 
exploration and production activities.364 The National Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels 
Agency issued Resolution No. 806 in January 2020, which establishes new procedures for 
reducing gas flaring and petroleum loss during exploration and production activities.365 The 
Resolution prohibits unapproved gas flaring but empowers the regulator to authorize flaring in 
exceptional cases for safety, emergency, testing, or well cleaning.366 It also sets an allowable 
monthly flaring limit of 15% for operators to achieve an associated gas utilization index of 85% 
per production field.367 The associated gas utilization index is the percentage of associated gas 
volume monetised compared to the total volume of associated gas produced from each reservoir 
or area per month.368  
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However, in the wake of COVID-19, the industry regulator issued Resolutions Nos. 815369 and 
816370 to ease the regulatory burden on operators. Two relevant provisions of Resolution No. 
815 include a one-year extension for the performance of the exploration and production rules 
regarding emissions reduction and specifically a deviation from the set 15% monthly flaring 
limit without justification.371 Therefore, within one year, operators can legally flare gas without 
quantified restrictions. These changes represent specific national regulatory and policy 
measures to support the oil and gas sector in difficult times. Impliedly, the industry regulator 
would revert to enforcing the regular regulatory rules after one year or possibly after the 
pandemic’s effects on the oil and gas sector recede. 
b) United States of America  
The US is an example of deviation from the common practice of federal or central government 
ownership and governance of all the natural resources in a country. 372  Ownership and 
management of resources in federal lands and the outer continental shelf are vested in the 
federal government.373 While this position is rarely the subject of dispute, the common issue 
for determination is usually the applicable law – whether federal or state law – that will govern 
the management of resources on federal public lands. 374  The US Constitution solves this 
problem with the ‘Enclave Clause’ and the ‘Property Clause.’375 The Enclave Clause vests 
exclusive legislative power in Congress to legislate and exercise authority over resources on 
federal public lands in many states,376 which are substantially in the country’s western parts. 
The Property Clause also vests power in Congress to make rules and regulations governing the 
property or territory that falls within the federal government’s ownership. However, states have 
pre-existing rights over resources within their territories. In addition, the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act vests jurisdiction in coastal states to govern offshore oil and gas operations 
within three nautical miles of the seaward boundary of any such coastal states.377 The federal 
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government regulates offshore resource exploitation beyond the three nautical miles of the 
seaward boundary.378 A common consequence of these circumstances is the fragmentation of 
the legal framework governing the exploitation of natural resources in the US, which results in 
diverse legislative frameworks in the country. There is also a high degree of state-level 
regulation on environmental and energy issues. 379  This study restricts its consideration to 
relevant federal laws and laws of selected states – Texas, North Dakota, Alaska, and California. 
The reason for choosing these states is that they are the US’s major oil and gas producing 
regions.380 In 2017, Texas produced 1.28 billion barrels of crude oil; North Dakota, 392 million; 
Alaska, 180 million; California, 174 million.381 
(1) Federal Regulatory Measures 
 
The US has a long history of promulgating policies and legislation on air quality, emissions 
reduction, and environmental protection.382 The first US legislative attempt to regulate GHGs 
at the federal level was arguably the Obama-presidency Clean Power Plan of 2016.383 However, 
this was primarily applicable to emissions from power plants rather than upstream oil and gas 
operations.  
The Clean Air Act addresses pollution prevention and empowers the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) to make relevant subsidiary legislation on air 
quality and emissions reduction. 384  USEPA also administers energy-related environmental 
projects and policy implementation. 385  The Agency promulgated the Emissions Reduction 
Standards for the Oil and Natural Gas Sector to limit flaring and minimize other oil and gas 
industry-related emissions. 386  To reduce gas flaring and venting, the Standards require 
operators to comply with a reduced emissions completion scheme, which means implementing 
any of four stipulated options to minimize emissions. These are (1) routing the recovered gas 
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from the separator into a collection system; or (2) reinjecting the recovered gas into the 
originating production well or another well; or (3) using the recovered gas as an onsite fuel; or 
(4) using the recovered gas for another useful purpose that a purchased fuel or raw material 
would serve. 387  Operators can only flare in circumstances of technical infeasibility. The 
Standards do not strictly limit the definition of technical infeasibility but recognises some 
qualifying instances, which include quality issues such as gas contamination, non-availability 
of gas gathering lines and right of way issues.388  
The Standards also stipulate USEPA’s determined best system of emissions reduction 
(BSER).389 While the BSER cover multiple sources of GHG emission across the upstream and 
downstream sectors, only fugitive emissions and emissions from pneumatic pumps390 at well 
sites relate to upstream emissions. For fugitive emissions, operators must implement a leak 
detection and repair programme and fix leaks within 30 days after discovery.391 For emissions 
from pneumatic pumps, the requirement is a 95% emissions reduction if there is an existing 
control or process on site. This obligation does not apply if (1) the emissions from pneumatic 
pumps are routed to an existing control that achieves less than 95% emissions reduction or (2) 
it is technically infeasible to route to the existing control device or process.392 Operators must 
also comply with recordkeeping and emissions data reporting requirements to ensure 
compliance with the Standards.393 
Additionally, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)394 vests powers 
in the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior to promulgate subsidiary 
legislation for the Act’s successful administration through the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM).395 FLPMA applies only to federally owned oil and gas resources, i.e., resources on 
federal lands. In contrast, USEPA rules apply to both federal and state lands and resources and 
privately-owned resources. Pursuant to section 310 of FLPMA,396 the BLM issued the Waste 
 
387 Ibid, at 35852 and 35935. 
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389 Ibid, at 35826: Table 1–Summary of BSER and Final Subpart 0000a Standards for Emission Sources. 
390 According to USEPA, pneumatic pumps are devices that use gas pressure to drive a fluid by raising or reducing 
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Report for the 2014 Oil and Natural Gas Sector Pneumatic Devices Review Panel, prepared by USEPA, available 
at <https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/epa-devices.pdf>. 
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Prevention Rule of 2016397 and further revised it in 2018.398 The revised 2018 rule requires 
operators on federal lands to equip all flares or combustion devices with automatic ignition 
systems as a control mechanism.399 It recognizes the difficulty in achieving zero emissions and 
pegs the maximum volume-flaring limit at 50 million cubic feet (MMcf) during the initial 
production test of each completed interval in a well.400 These may seem reasonable regulatory 
requirements, but the new rule tends to entrench a weak regime compared to the 2016 rule. The 
2018 rule rescinds useful emissions reduction measures of the previous rule – waste 
minimization plans, well drilling requirements, well completion and related operational 
requirements, storage vessels equipment requirement, comprehensive leak detection and repair 
(LDAR) programme.401 There are three specific examples to illustrate the point. First, while 
the 2016 rule allowed 20 MMcf as the flaring limit during the initial production test,402 the new 
rule allows 50 MMcf. Second, the 2016 rule required the operator to replace pneumatic 
diaphragm pumps with zero emissions pumps or route emissions for capture or low-pressure 
combustion device.403 The 2018 rule rescinded this requirement, citing huge cost implication – 
that the cost of compliance outweighed the value of conservation effects.404 The BLM estimates 
the implementation requirement over ten years (2019-2028) would impose a charge of USD30 
million while only generating between USD15 million to USD19 million as cost-saving from 
product recovery. 
In contrast, a 2014 study commissioned by the Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) observes 
great methane reduction potential using suitable technologies.405 At the time of writing, there 
was no clarity regarding the specific technologies contemplated by the EDF. Additionally, the 
BLM’s cost-benefit analysis may be understating methane’s social cost in favour of oil and gas 
 
397 Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, Final Rule. Federal Register / 
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403 Ibid, s .3179.202. 
404 Waste Prevention Rule 2018, above n 398, s. 3179.202. 
405 ICF International Economic Analysis of Methane Emission Reduction Opportunities in the U.S. Onshore Oil 




companies responsible for GHG emissions.406 Thirdly, the 2018 rule presents similar analyses 
for leak detection and rescinds stringent regulatory requirements on operators for addressing 
fugitive emissions emanating from leaks.407 
The foregoing discussion illustrates a policy drive to remove stringent regulatory requirements 
on oil and gas production companies. More so, the regulatory changes hinge on an Executive 
Order by President Donald Trump for ministries, departments, and agencies of the US Federal 
Government to review, revise, and possibly rescind regulations that present an unnecessary 
burden to domestic energy resources development. 408  Given the Biden administration’s 
promise to tackle climate change and support a low carbon future, one can expect a reversal to 
the Trump-era lax rules on upstream GHG emissions.  
(2) Regulatory Measures of Selected States 
(a) Texas 
The principal governance framework for oil and gas operations on Texas’s state lands is the 
Natural Resources Code (hereafter called the Code).409 The Code vests regulatory powers in 
the Railroad Commission of Texas.410 
Regarding upstream emissions, the Code expresses an intention to prevent waste and conserve 
the state’s natural resources.411 Therefore, there is a general prohibition of waste.412 The Code 
describes waste by multiple instances. However, one is particularly relevant to the current topic 
– the operation of an oil well or wells with an inefficient gas to oil ratio or permitting the 
burning of gas more than the amount necessary for its efficient drilling or operation.413 The 
Code defines inefficient gas to oil ratio as the production of more than 100,000 standard cubic 
feet (scf) of gas to each barrel of crude petroleum oil.414 There are two different options for 
exceeding this limit. One is to put the gas into one of the uses spelt out in the Code or unless 
authorized for cleaning a well of sand or acid following simulation treatment. The other is for 
repairing or modifying a gas-gathering system.415 However, the allowable emission of 100,000 
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scf of gas to each barrel of crude oil is high, considering Masnadi and others have shown that 
the mean average gas to oil ratio is between 1000-2500 scf per barrel.416 Thus, the Texas Code 
points to a lax regime because it allows the emission of a large volume of gas. There remains 
an opportunity here to set lower allowable gas to oil ratios for reducing upstream flaring. 
There is also an express prohibition of flaring from gas wells after ten days from discovery and 
production commencement.417 The exceptions are to flare with the regulator’s authorization, 
where the operator shows the necessity for prolonged flaring, flaring because of well cleaning 
following simulation treatment, and flaring occasioned by repair or modification of a gas-
gathering system.418 In addition to these provisions, the regulator can also make further specific 
rules to restrict flaring.419 There is a subsidiary rule – the State-wide Rule 32420 – governing 
flaring and the regulator’s issuance of flaring permits. State-wide Rule 32 elaborates the 
provisions of the Code relating to flaring, waste, and conservation. Moreover, it addresses the 
detailed specifics regarding the issuance of flaring permits and their extension. For example, 
the regulator can grant a flaring exception for 45 days and more extended periods not exceeding 
180 days, rather than the ten-day flaring allowance that the Code stipulates.421         
From an environmental law perspective, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality has 
powers to make rules relating to environmental protection.422 These rules address air quality 
standards, pollution prevention, and oil and gas production emissions. 423  The rules cover 
volatile organic compounds, sulphur oxide, and particulate matter, but they exclude methane 
and carbon dioxide emissions emanating from the oil and gas sector.424 
Therefore, in terms of institutional arrangement, the Railroad Commission of Texas is the 
principal agency for regulating upstream emissions. Simultaneously, the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality plays minor roles regarding general environmental and air quality 
 
416 Masnadi and others, above n 13, and Supplementary Material at 22. 
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standards. It is also important to restate that all oil and gas operations in Texas – on both state 
and federal lands – are subject to USEPA Standards for mitigating GHG emissions. 
(b) North Dakota 
Chapter 38 of the North Dakota Century Code425 regulates oil and gas activities on state-owned 
land. As afore-highlighted, BLM rules apply only to activities on federal lands, while USEPA 
rules apply both to federal and state lands across the country. The North Dakota Industrial 
Commission is the industry regulator for operations other than on federal lands.426 Recently, 
the Department of Mineral Resources under the North Dakota Industrial Commission has been 
created to manage some oil and gas industry segments. However, the Commission still 
exercises regulatory functions regarding flaring and venting.  
The Century Code allows flaring for one year after first oil production from a well and prohibits 
continuous flaring after the initial one year.427 Instead of continual flaring beyond one year, it 
requires efficient gas to oil ratios, abatement of flaring, 75% utilization for beneficial 
consumption and connection to a gas gathering system.428 Flaring in violation of this provision 
is subject to the operator’s payment of royalty, and the amount shall be equal in value to the 
flared gas.429 
However, connecting the well to a gas gathering system would be termed ‘economically 
infeasible’ when the cost for the connection far exceeds the monetary benefit the operator 
would derive from gas utilization.430 This point is like the economics of flaring contemplated 
under the BLM rules, which apply only to resources on federal lands.431  
Apart from the Century Code, the North Dakota Industrial Commission also makes rules to 
regulate flaring for operations on state-owned lands. Its Gas Capture Policy of 2014 (amended 
in 2018)432 establishes gas capture goals of different percentages for different periods ranging 
from December 2014 to November 2020.433 The objective is to achieve 74% capture from 2014 
and 91% in 2020.434 Operators on state lands are required to submit gas capture plans alongside 
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applications for a drilling permit, report semi-annual improvement plans, review goals annually, 
track flaring, and report capture status in comparison with set goals.435 Strict implementation 
of such flaring regulation in North Dakota can have positive and negative effects. While the 
objective may be to reduce flaring and venting, it may also reduce production and economic 
benefits.436 
(c) Alaska 
The Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Act437 and Alaska Administrative Code438 regulate oil 
and gas operations on state land. The Conservation Act prohibits any waste of oil and gas.439  
More so, it empowers the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to impose a civil 
penalty double the wasted gas’s fair market value.440 Recently, the Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Oil and Gas, has emerged to regulate some oil and gas industry 
segments. Still, the existing Conservation Commission maintains its regulatory powers 
regarding upstream GHG emissions. 
The Administrative Code dedicates a segment to production practices.441 There are diverse 
requirements for oil and gas production, but of relevance to this research are the ones on 
production equipment, notification of the uncontrolled release of oil or gas, and gas disposition. 
The producer or operator must install, operate, and maintain production equipment according 
to good oilfield engineering practices to ensure operational and environmental safety. 442 
Second, the operator must notify the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of any gas 
disposition above one thousand standard cubic feet within five days, detailing responsive 
actions and preventative measures against future occurrence.443 Third, and more directly on 
emissions, the operator is obliged to minimise flared gas volume following good oilfield 
engineering practices and conservation purposes.444 However, planned flaring for operational 
safety is authorised.445  
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The primary legislation for oil and gas regulation in California is the California Public 
Resources Code.446 In 2019, Assembly Bill 1057 introduced amendments to the Resources 
Code, principally changing the industry regulator’s name from the Division of Oil, Gas, and 
Geothermal Resources within the Department of Conservation to the Geologic Energy 
Management Division and a refocused definition of conservation.447The Code provides for 
resource conservation and prohibits emissions. On conservation, it obliges operators to achieve 
ultimate recovery of oil and gas and waste elimination.448 However, the refocussed definition 
of conservation, which Assembly Bill 1057 introduces, is that ‘resource conservation’ includes 
protecting public health and safety and environmental quality and reducing GHG emissions 
associated with the development of hydrocarbon and geothermal resources. 449  This is an 
essential feature in California’s regulatory framework because it expressly captures upstream 
GHG emissions reduction as part of conservation measures, unlike other jurisdictions where 
the term is either narrowly construed from an economic lens or subject to other different 
meanings. The Code expressly prohibits wilful and unnecessary waste of gas in the form of 
flaring and venting. 450  Wilful violation of these provisions constitutes a misdemeanour 
punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one 
year, or both.451  
The rechristened oil and gas regulator was yet to make any specific rules regarding upstream 
GHG emissions mitigation at the time of writing. Still, California has a reputation for ensuring 
sustainability, emissions reduction and air quality improvements through regulation.452 As far 
back as 2006, California already set a state-wide climate target to reduce GHG emissions to 
1990 levels by between 2008 and 2020, being a 15% reduction under a business as usual 
scenario.453 In 2017, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) made regulations specifically 
targeting vented and fugitive methane emissions emanating from oil and gas facilities – Final 
Regulation Order on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
 
446 California Public Resources Code 1939 Division 3 – Oil and Gas (As modified in 2019). 
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Facilities.454 There are detailed standards addressing separator and tanks systems, circulation 
tanks for well stimulation, reciprocating and centrifugal natural gas compressors, natural gas 
pneumatic devices and pumps, and well casing vents. 455 The regulation stipulates using a 
vapour collection system, ensuring critical components’ safety and implementing leak 
detection and repair programmes for fugitive methane emissions. 456  Operators also must 
monitor, keep records of all vented and fugitive emissions and make such document available 
upon request by the CARB to verify compliance.457 
The CARB made multiple complementary and supportive rules on emissions reduction and 
fuel efficiency standards in 2018.458 One such rule is the new Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) 
Regulations, initially promulgated through Executive Order459 and implemented from 2011.460 
The first LCFS regulation intended to cut GHG emissions by reducing California’s 
transportation fuel mix’s carbon intensity and complete fuel cycle.461 While the initial LCFS 
provided a 10% sectoral cut in emissions below 2010 levels from 2011 to 2020, the 2019 
amendment intends to achieve a 20% emissions reduction below 2010 levels by 2030. 462 
Specifically, the carbon intensity benchmarks for fossil fuels and their substitutes should not 
exceed an average of 79.55 grams of CO2e per mega joule (gCO2e/MJ) from the year 2030 and 
beyond. 463  These provisions will incentivise a reduction in upstream GHG emissions in 
California and affect the Albertan oil and gas sector that sends oil to California due to the 
carbon intensity benchmarks for fossil fuels and their substitutes.  This effect on Alberta shows 
how regulatory measures in one jurisdiction can have ramifications in overseas jurisdictions. 
In addition, the LCFS regulation provides technical standards and methodologies for 
implementation. These are primarily a credit trading system, 464  calculation of fuel GHG 
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intensity,465 and a compliance mechanism, which requires mandatory annual reporting.466 The 
CARB also has powers to impose penalties and injunctive reliefs for noncompliance with the 
rules outlined in the regulation.467 
For a big jurisdiction like the USA, it may help to summarise the significant features of the 
applicable regime in the country. There is a fragmentation of regulatory powers between 
federal and state authorities. The BLM rules apply to oil and gas operations on federal lands in 
the country. In contrast, USEPA rules apply to activities on both federal and state lands, 
including privately owned lands. The rules made by these regulatory institutions – BLM and 
USEPA – target the reduction of flaring and venting and the implementation of leak detection 
and repair programmes to reduce fugitive emissions. The states also have similar provisions, 
with higher gas utilization (75%) requirement in North Dakota and new carbon intensity 
requirements in California from 2030. The USEPA plays a huge role in regulating upstream 
GHG emissions in the USA through rule-making. The industry regulators in various states also 
play predominant roles in reducing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions associated with 
operations on state-controlled lands. These characteristics will prove significant in the 
comparative analysis that comes later in this chapter.  
c) Canada 
There are three preliminary points to note about Canada. First, Canada is another example of 
deviation from the common practice of central government ownership and governance of all 
the natural resources. Second, unlike in the USA, there is more concentration of power in the 
provinces in Canada.468 Field469 observes that there has been a departure from the original intent 
of the Canadian constitution of 1867, 470  which established central government 
predominance.471 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a precursor to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, “…interpreted provincial powers generously and federal powers with 
restraint, giving the provinces a much greater share in the balance of power than had been 
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contemplated.”472 Therefore, the federal structure allows provincial governments to implement 
measures for their peculiar circumstances, 473  while the federal government exercises 
jurisdiction over the management of natural resources on federal lands.474 Third, similar to the 
USA, resource conservation is a significant form of regulation in Canada’s legislative 
frameworks.475 
The Canadian Energy Regulator Act,476 in 2019, established the Canadian Energy Regulator as 
federal energy regulator. The Act applies primarily to lands that the federal government 
controls.477 The federal government controls much less land than its American equivalent. In 
the provinces, it controls only small parcels. The Act also applies to inter-provincial facilities 
such as pipelines and power lines. It requires operators to perform oil and gas operations safely, 
securely, and efficiently to protect people, property, and the environment.478 
The Canadian Oil and Gas Operations Act479 is the primary national law directly applicable to 
oil and gas production. The Act applies in respect of the exploration, drilling, production, 
processing, conservation and transportation of oil and gas in areas that fall within the federal 
government’s jurisdiction.480 The Canadian Petroleum Resources Act481 specifically regulates 
interests in petroleum regarding frontier lands. The following sub-sections will discuss specific 
federal and provincial regulatory measures for addressing upstream GHG emissions. 
(1) Federal Regulatory Measures 
The Canadian Oil and Gas Operations Act prohibits waste by individuals and companies.482 It 
defines waste as the escape or flaring of gas that could be economically recovered and 
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processed or economically injected into an underground reservoir. 483 Pursuant to this primary 
legislation,484 the Minister of Natural Resources and Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development jointly promulgated the Drilling and Production Regulations in 2009.485 The 
Regulations expressly prohibit flaring and venting, except under prior authorisation or as a 
safety or emergency measure.486 This second limb of the regulations provides an emissions 
permit system, as is customary with other jurisdictions. 
More direct on upstream GHG emissions is the prescriptive Methane Regulations, 487 
promulgated by the Minister of the Environment, under the Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act.488 The Regulations apply to all operations in Canada whether on federal or provincial lands 
and prescribe different technical requirements for various emissions sources in upstream oil 
and gas operations. Regarding general production-related venting, the limit is 1,250m3 per 
month (15,000m3 annually) for each producing field.489 However, this prescription takes effect 
from 1 January 2023.490 For fugitive emissions, the operator must implement a leak detection 
and repair scheme, conduct a regular inspection for leaks and take corrective measures.491 The 
Regulations also prescribe different limits for emissions from pneumatic devices, compressors 
and well completions for hydraulic fracturing operations.492 
Besides, Canada has initiated two recent climate change measures that are relevant to upstream 
GHG emissions. The first is a target to achieve between 40 to 45% reduction in upstream-
related methane emissions by 2025.493 It intends to achieve this by the serious commitment and 
implementation of the regulations and laws relating to conservation and waste prohibition, 
reducing flaring, venting and fugitive emissions. The second is the enactment of the 
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act.494 The new law applies to provinces in Canada without 
pricing systems that meet federal standards. These provinces include Ontario, New Brunswick, 
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Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Yukon, and Nunavut.495 The Governor in Council can make 
amendments for a broad application throughout Canada or a narrow application by either 
including or deleting provinces in the application schedule.496 
Multiple provinces – especially Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Alberta – contested the 
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act’s constitutionality. The Courts of Appeal in both 
Saskatchewan497 and Ontario498 upheld the law’s constitutional validity, while the Court of 
Appeal in Alberta499 ruled that the law was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Canada 
heard three appeals from Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Alberta in September 2020 and upheld 
the law’s constitutionality in March 2021. 500  The Court underscored the necessity of 
considering the interests that would be harmed – owing to irreversible consequences for the 
environment, for human health and safety and for the economy – if Parliament were unable to 
address the matter at a national level. This ruling can inspire valuable scholarly commentaries 
about countries’ ability to exert national jurisdiction over climate governance matters. One key 
point relevant to this thesis is the need to have an ascertainable benchmark for pricing carbon 
emissions. Canadian provinces can set higher carbon price thresholds, but not below the 
national pricing levels.501     
Two crucial questions are: (1) whether the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act captures 
emissions from oil and gas production processes; and (2) the charge or price it places on these 
emissions. For application purposes, the law covers “…a platform anchored at sea, that is 
located in a province or area that is set out in Part 2 of Schedule 1 and either (a) meets the 
criteria set out in the regulations for that province or area; or (b) is designated by the Minister 
under subsection 172(1).” 502 This provision means that emissions from offshore oil and gas 
operations would be subject to coverage. The other possibility is for the Minister to designate 
places of industrial activities as covered facilities. A third deduction from the statutory 
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provision is for regulations to set out covered facilities expressly. This third option is adopted 
by regulations, as the discussion below shows. 
The law requires a person responsible for a covered facility to apply to the Minister for 
registration in a pricing mechanism.503 There are emission limits, compliance reporting, and 
charges for GHG emissions that exceed the prescribed limit for the covered facilities under this 
mechanism.504 The Output-Based Pricing System Regulations,505 made pursuant to the Act,506 
come more directly on the issue of application. The Regulations subject different emission 
types to quantification and pricing. These include emissions from stationary fuel combustion, 
industrial processes, venting, flaring, leakage, on-site transportation, waste, and wastewater.507 
The Act stipulates charges for emissions that exceed the statutory and regulatory limits for 
covered facilities.508 These charges cover five calendar years – from 2018 to 2022. For 2018, 
the charge is 10 Canadian Dollars (CAD) per CO2e tonne more than the limit. For 2019, 2020, 
2021, and 2022, the charges are CAD20, CAD30, CAD40, and CAD50, respectively.509  
(2) Provincial Regulatory Measures 
There are multiple oil and gas producing provinces in Canada, but this chapter focuses on 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador, and British Columbia. This limited focus 
is because, apart from having the most comprehensive regulations on GHG emissions, these 
four provinces top Canadian crude oil production statistics right from pre-1947 until present 
times, collectively producing almost all of Canada’s oil and gas resources.510 For example, in 
2019, these four provinces’ contributions to the overall Canadian liquid hydrocarbons 
production stood at 99% (80.5% from Alberta, 10.5% from Saskatchewan, 5.6% from 
Newfoundland and Labrador, and 2.4% from British Columbia.511  
 
503 Ibid, s. 171(1). 
504 Ibid, ss. 173, 174, 178, 181(3) and 185. 
505 Output-Based Pricing System Regulations SOR/2019-266. 
506 Above n 494. 
507 Ibid, s. 5(1) and Schedule 3, Parts 1-38. 
508 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act S.C. 2018, c. 12, s. 186, ss. 174(3) (b), 174(5), 178(2), 181(3) and 191, 
Schedule 4. 
509 Ibid. 
510 Cap-Op Energy Inc. “Flaring in Canada: Overview and Strategic Considerations, Part 1” (Cap-Op Energy Inc. 
16 January 2017) <www.capopenergy.com>; Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers Technical Report: 
Statistical Handbook for Canada’s Upstream Petroleum Industry (CAPP October 2017) Canadian Crude Oil 
Production Table 3.1; CAPP Frequently Used Statistics (CAPP July 2019) <www.capp.ca>. See also Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers Technical Report: Statistical Handbook for Canada’s Upstream Petroleum 
Industry (CAPP February 2018) Canadian Crude Oil Production at 60, Table 3.1.  





There are multiple laws – Acts, Regulations and Rules – governing oil and gas activities in 
Alberta. The predominant ones are the Oil and Gas Conservation Act512 with its subsidiary 
Rules,513 the Gas Resources Preservation Act514 with its accompanying Regulation,515 and the 
Oil Sands Conservation Act 516  with its subsidiary Regulation. 517  The Responsible Energy 
Development Act established the Alberta Energy Regulator with a mandate to regulate the 
environmentally responsible development of energy resources and implement all energy 
resource enactments518 (the principal laws identified in the preceding sentence). There are also 
Curtailment Rules519 under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, the Oil Sands Conservation Act, 
and the Responsible Energy Development Act. 
There are requirements for operators to ensure the conservation of oil and gas resources and 
avoid wasteful practices. 520  The Oil and Gas Conservation Rules and the Oil Sands 
Conservation Rules specifically mention flaring as a wasteful practice that operators must 
avoid, except in cases of emergency, well testing and well cleaning and with authorization by 
the regulator.521 The objective of resource conservation set out in the principal legislation and 
the Curtailment Rules is to ensure economic, orderly, efficient, and responsible development 
of Alberta’s oil and gas resources and avoid waste.522  
In addition to conservation laws, Alberta has a dedicated framework for addressing upstream 
GHG emissions – Directive 060.523 The Directive sets a 45% reduction of methane emissions 
from the upstream oil and gas sector by 2025 from 2014 levels.524 It also stipulates a gas flaring 
 
512 Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter O-6. 
513 Oil and Gas Conservation Rules, Alberta Regulation 151/1971 with amendments up to and including Alberta 
Regulation 165/2020. 
514 Gas Resources Preservation Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter G-4. 
515 Gas Resources Preservation Regulation, Alberta Regulation 328/2002 with amendments up to and including 
Alberta Regulation 171/2020. 
516 Oil Sands Conservation Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter O-7. 
517 Oil Sands Conservation Rules, Alberta Regulation 76/1988 with amendments up to and including Alberta 
Regulation 29/2017. 
518 Responsible Energy Development Act, Statutes of Alberta, 2012 Chapter R-17.3, ss. 2-3. 
519 Curtailment Rules, Alberta Regulation 214/2018 with amendments up to and including Alberta Regulation 
198/2020. 
520 Oil and Gas Conservation Act, above n 512, ss. 4, 10 and 38; Oil Sands Conservation Act, above n 516, ss. 3, 
20(g) and (u), 22. 
521 Oil and Gas Conservation Rules, ss. 7.055(1) and 11.135(1); Oil Sands Conservation Rules, above n 517 s. 
11.  
522 Oil and Gas Conservation Act, above n 512, at s.4; Oil Sands Conservation Act, above n 516, at s.3; Curtailment 
Rules, above n 519, at s.2.  
523 The Alberta Energy Regulator Directive 060: Upstream Petroleum Industry Flaring, Incineration, and Venting, 
Released 13 December 2018, Effective from 1 January 2020. 
524 Ibid, 10, 74 and 107. 
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limit of 670 million cubic meters (106 m3) annually until a future review.525 If flaring exceeds 
this limit, the Alberta Energy Regulator can prescribe new maximum limits for all operators to 
maintain the flaring reduction threshold.526 There are also particular requirements to reduce 
fugitive and vented emissions.527 Operators must limit overall venting per field or well to less 
than 15.0 103 m3 of vent gas per month or 9.0 103 kg of methane per month.528 Additionally, 
from 1 January 2022, operators must design and operate sites to limit flaring and venting to 
less than 3.0 103 m3 per site or less than 1.8 103 kg of methane per month for each production 
site.529 The Directive also requires operators to conduct emission surveys using either organic 
vapour analyser, gas imaging camera or any other equipment capable of detecting fugitive 
emissions;530 and repair all detected sources of fugitive emissions.531 
There are also energy efficiency and performance requirements in the Directive. Operators are 
required to ensure efficient use of energy and optimum performance of all upstream oil and gas 
industry systems for burning sour, sweet, and acid gas.532 There are also design and operating 
parameters for incinerators and combustion equipment to reduce GHG emissions from fuel 
combustion. Key examples are proper gas-liquid separation, high-level facility shutdown 
alarms, and backlash control.533   
Directive 060 exempts oil sands mining schemes and operations approved under the relevant 
legislation for oil sands activities.534 However, the Oil Sands Emissions Limit Act535 sets an 
overall GHG emissions limit from all oil sands site at 100 mega tonnes per annum.536 As far as 
emissions reduction in oil sands production are concerned, that is all the Act says. This 
provision is an excellent example of result-oriented legislation. Still, its vagueness is a setback 
to achieving meaningful emissions reduction, especially flaring and venting, from oil sands 
operation. It would be desirable to promulgate schemes, mechanisms, feasible thresholds, and 
measurable indices to achieve the overall emissions limit. 
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530 Ibid, s. 8.10.2.2 
531 Ibid, s. 8.10.4.3. 
532 Ibid, s.7 
533 Ibid, s. 7.1.3. 
534 Directive 060, above n 523, at s.1.1 
535 Oil Sands Emissions Limit Act, Statutes of Alberta, 2016, Chapter O-7.5. 




In Saskatchewan, the provincial Oil and Gas Conservation Act governs oil and gas 
operations. 537  Regulatory powers lie with the Ministry of Energy and Resources. 538  The 
Conservation Act states the objectives of ensuring optimal utilization, protecting and 
conserving Saskatchewan’s oil and gas resources, the environment, property, and public 
safety. 539  The Act also provides that no person shall engage in or commit any wasteful 
operations.540 It defines flaring as one of the circumstances of wasteful operations if, in the 
Minister’s opinion, the gas could be gathered, stored for future marketing or beneficially 
injected into a subsurface formation.541 There are similar provisions on conservation and gas 
utilization in the Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations made pursuant to the Act.542 The Act 
also recognizes the production of associated petroleum gas alongside crude oil and the 
possibility of flaring certain volumes of gas.543 However, flaring must not exceed 900 cubic 
meters per day per production well unless in emergency cases (and operators must take 
precautions to protect human health, public safety, property and the environment) and prevent 
fire or explosion.544 
There are also specific instruments for upstream emissions limits and reduction targets. In 2017, 
the Saskatchewan provincial government adopted a Climate Change Strategy 545  that 
incorporates two broad initiatives to reduce GHG emissions from the upstream oil and gas 
sector – the Methane Action Plan and the Output-Based Performance Standards for industrial 
facilities. The Methane Action Plan requires the provincial government to introduce and 
implement regulations to reduce methane-based emissions by 40 to 45% below 2015 levels by 
2030. Similarly, the Output-Based Performance Standards target a 40% methane reduction 
from upstream oil and gas operations, with stationary fuel combustion accounting for 15% in 
emissions reduction by 2030. 
 
537 Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Chapter O-2 of The Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1978 (As amended by 
the Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1982-1093, c.1 and other successive amendments up till 2019, c.14. 
538 Ibid, ss. 5 and 6; The Ministry of Energy and Resources Regulations, Chapter E-13.1 Reg 9 2018, ss. 2 and 3, 
made pursuant to The Executive Government Administration Act, Chapter E-13.1 of the Statutes of Saskatchewan 
2014 (As amended by the Statutes of Saskatchewan 2019, c.8    
539 Oil and Gas Conservation Act, above n 537, s. 3. 
540 Ibid, s. 54. 
541 Ibid, s. 2(p). 
542  Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations Chapter O-2 Reg 6 (effective April 1, 2012) as amended by 
Saskatchewan Regulations 70/2013, 14/2014, 73/2014, 19/2015, 70/2017 and 65/2018; and by the Statutes of 
Saskatchewan, 2014, c.21. s. 50. 
543 Ibid, s. 51(1). 
544 Ibid. 
545  Prairie Resilience: A Made-in-Saskatchewan Climate Change Strategy, adopted by the Government of 
Saskatchewan, 4 October 2017. 
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In pursuit of the climate goals, there are regulations to address different industrial emitters. The 
Oil and Gas Emissions Management Regulation546 applies particularly to the upstream oil and 
gas sector. Unlike the prescriptive regimes of Alberta and Canadian federal measures, this 
regulation establishes a result-oriented regime, which sets emissions limits on an annual basis 
and requires operators to submit emission reduction plans subject to the Minister’s approval.547 
The Minister has statutory powers to impose administrative penalties for excess emissions by 
any operator.548 There are also reporting requirements for GHGs to ascertain compliance with 
emissions limits.549 
(c) Newfoundland and Labrador 
In Newfoundland and Labrador, oil and gas production is carried out under the Atlantic Accord 
between the Canadian federal government and the Newfoundland and Labrador provincial 
government, 550  and the Atlantic Accord Implementation Act. 551  The Accord and the Act 
established the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board – an 
independent joint resource management team consisting of federal and provincial personnel – 
as the industry’s regulator.552 Similarly, the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board 
regulates petroleum activities offshore Nova Scotia under a federal-provincial arrangement. 
The Atlantic Accord Implementation Act makes provisions requiring resource conservation 
and environmental protection. It prohibits the flaring of gas that could be economically 
recovered and processed or economically injected into an underground reservoir.553 Similar 
complementary provisions require efficient drilling operations and resource conservation in 
both the Petroleum Drilling Regulations554 and the Petroleum Regulations,555 made pursuant to 
the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act.556 
 
546 The Oil and Gas Emissions Management Regulations, Chapter O-2 Reg 7 Effective 1 January 2019. 
547 Ibid, ss. 8 and 11. 
548 Ibid, s. 10. 
549 Ibid, ss. 6 and 8. 
550 The Atlantic Accord: Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of Newfoundland and Labrador on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Management and Revenue Sharing, Dated at 
St. John’s on 11 February, 1985. For a detailed discussion on this, see Alastair R. Lucas and Constance D. Hunt 
Oil and Gas Law in Canada (Carswell 1990) at 70-74. See also an earlier work on the subject: T. R. Carter and 
G. R. Campbell “Oil and Gas Developments in Eastern Canada in 1988” (1989) 73 The American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists Bulletin 45-56. 
551 Canada–Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c.3.  
552 The Atlantic Accord, above n 545, paras 3-20; The Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, ibid, s.9 (1). 
553 The Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, above n 546, ss. 135 and 154 (1) and (2) (f). 
554 Petroleum Drilling Regulations under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, O.C 96-225, ss. 34, 60 and 83. 
555 Petroleum Regulations under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, O.C. 96-935, ss. 41(b) and 44(b). 
556 Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, RSNL1990 Chapter P-10 (As amended in 2019), ss. 9, 17 and 39. 
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In addition, a specific regulatory framework targets upstream GHG emissions emanating from 
petroleum operations offshore Newfoundland and Labrador. It is the Management of 
Greenhouse Gas Act, 557  with its subsidiary legislation, the Greenhouse Gas Management 
Regulations.558 The Act empowers the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to make regulations 
setting annual GHG emissions reduction targets for oil and gas operations facilities that emit 
25,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent or more GHGs per annum.559 The Regulations 
stipulate incremental GHG emissions reduction goals for 2019 (6%), 2020 (8%), 2021 (10%), 
2022 and subsequent years (12%), relative to the baseline emissions intensity of operators.560 
The baseline emissions intensity is a system set by the Regulations to derive the emissions 
intensity of different upstream facilities through mathematical formulae on a case-by-case 
basis.561 Thus, operators could have different emissions intensities. Still, each operator achieves 
the emission reduction targets for the stipulated years relative to its peculiar emissions intensity 
for the preceding year. There are lower targets for newer production fields that started after 
2015 – 2.4% for 2019, 4.8% for 2020, 8% for 2021, and 12% for 2022 and subsequent years.562 
The second feature of the framework is mandatory annual GHG emissions reporting to 
ascertain compliance with emissions reduction targets.563 Third, the Regulations establish a 
GHG emissions reduction system and performance credits to help operators meet their 
emissions reduction goals for each reporting year.564 Fourth, there is a requirement for operators 
to adopt the best available control technologies for addressing emissions.565  There are no 
definite prescriptions of the best available control technologies. Operators can meet the best 
available control technologies requirement where the Lieutenant-Governor in Council is 
satisfied that the machinery and equipment used for production (a) have the most effective 
greenhouse gas emissions control; (b) have proven performance and reliability in comparable 
industrial facilities; (c) are economically feasible, based on consultation with the operator; (d) 
comply with an Act or regulation relating to air pollution, occupational health and safety and 
 
557 Management of Greenhouse Gas Act, SNL2016 Chapter M-1.001 (As Amended by 2018 c40). 
558 Management of Greenhouse Gas Regulations 116/18 under the Management of Greenhouse Gas Act (As 
Amended by 31/19). 
559 Above n 557, at s. 5. 
560 Above n 558, at s.8. 
561 Ibid, ss. 4-6. 
562 Ibid, s. 8(2) and Schedule A. 
563 Above n 557, s. 10; above n 553, ss. 4-7. 
564 Above, n 558, ss. 99 and 10. 
565 Ibid, s. 12. 
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fire and life safety; and (e) are acceptable to the Board – the Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board – as the best available control technologies.566 
(d) British Columbia 
The principal legislation governing petroleum exploration and production in British Columbia 
is the Oil and Gas Activities Act.567 The Act establishes the British Columbia Oil and Gas 
Commission as the industry regulator.568 It also makes general provisions requiring operators 
to ensure environmental protection and petroleum and natural gas resources conservation.569  
The reduction of upstream emissions receives attention in other specific regulatory instruments, 
principally the Drilling and Production Regulation570 and a Flaring and Venting Reduction 
Guideline,571 made under the Act. The Drilling and Production Regulation requires operators 
to use conservation equipment to recover and utilize not less than 95% of natural gas instead 
of flaring at the production phase.572 The regulation allows venting only as a safety mechanism 
or for minimal duration and volume.573 It does not stipulate what the minimum duration and 
volume should be.  
Operators must also comply with the Flaring and Venting Regulation’s overall production 
phase emission limit to ensure a 95% gas utilization and conservation instead of flaring or 
venting. 574  This provision complements a similar requirement under the Drilling and 
Production Regulation. However, operators can apply for an exemption or discontinue 
conservation and utilization where their annual operating costs exceed their annual revenue.575  
There are also requirements for reducing planned flaring and venting. These are different from 
routine production phase emissions but still within upstream operations. For planned flaring 
for less than 4 hours, operators must reduce flaring by 50% of the average daily gas produced 
over 30 days. If the planned flaring exceeds 4 hours, the reduction rate is 75% of the average 
daily gas produced over 30 days. The same limit applies to flaring resulting from plant upset.576 
Operators must not engage in venting as an alternative to flaring but only vent in exceptional 
circumstances while complying with set operational requirements that venting must not 
 
566 Ibid, s.12(5). 
567 Oil and Gas Activities Act, SBC 2008 Chapter 36. 
568 Ibid, ss. 2 and 4. 
569 Ibid, ss. 4 and 103. 
570 Drilling and Production Regulation, B.C. Reg. 282/2010. 
571 BC Oil and Gas Commission Flaring and Venting Reduction Guideline, Version 5.1: May 2018. 
572 Above n 570, s. 52.02. 
573 Ibid, s. 41. 
574 Above n 571, Chapter 1, p. 14. 
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576 Above n 571, Chapter 1.9, Table 1.1. 
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constitute a safety hazard or result in off-site odours.577 There is no exact limit for planned 
venting, but operators must keep the quantity and duration minimal.578   
In addition to flaring and venting limits, operators must develop and implement leak detection 
and repair programmes to address all fugitive emissions sources.579 There are also flaring 
reduction and emissions reporting schemes to monitor compliance.580 Equally important is the 
fact that operators must ensure that combustion systems for all upstream activities function 
efficiently. Flares, incinerators and other combustion systems usually used for production or 
process equipment must be designed, maintained, and operated in such a manner that emissions 
do not exceed the air quality objectives and standards of British Columbia or cause adverse 
impacts to human health and vegetation.581 
d) United Kingdom 
The principal legislation governing oil and gas activities on the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf (UKCS) is the Petroleum Act 1998.582 The Energy Act 1976583 establishes the Oil and 
Gas Authority and states its functions. However, different bodies regulate various aspects of 
onshore and offshore activities.584 
The Petroleum Act requires appropriate arrangements for emissions monitoring and waste 
management plans as part of the environmental impact assessment before issuing licences.585 
The Energy Act requires the consent of the Oil and Gas Authority for flaring and venting.586 In 
line with the Petroleum Act and the Energy Act, the Oil and Gas Authority expresses its 
commitment to eliminate unnecessary emissions from oil and gas operations, whether onshore 
or offshore. Its policy documents for onshore587 and offshore588 activities-related flaring and 
venting require strict flaring and venting consents. Flaring and venting are only allowed where 
they are necessary, for example, as a safety mechanism. Operators must also execute operations 
using good oilfield practices.589 
 
577 Ibid, Chapter 7. 
578 Ibid. 
579 Ibid, Chapter 7.6. 
580 Ibid, Chapters 1.11, 2.9, 3.5 and 10. 
581 Ibid, Chapter 6.1. 
582 Petroleum Act 1998 Chapter 17. 
583 Energy Act 1976 (As amended by the Energy Act 2016) Chapter 20, Part 6 – Final provisions. 
584 United Kingdom Onshore Oil and Gas “Regulation” (UKOOG 2017) <www.ukoog.org.uk>.  
585 Above n 577, s. 4, columns 1 and 2. 
586 Energy Act, above n 583, s. 12A. 
587 UK Oil and Gas Authority Policy on Flaring and Venting during the Production Phase, October 2016. 
588 UK Oil and Gas Authority Policy Position on Offshore Flaring and Venting, 2018. 
589 Ibid, at 2. 
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The Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines Regulation 1999590 specifically regulates 
emissions from offshore petroleum activities and empowers the Offshore Petroleum Regulator 
for Environment and Decommissioning – a section of the UK Department for Business, Energy, 
and Industrial Strategy – to issue notices concerning emissions and discharges. The 2017 
Guidance Note requires offshore operators to obtain a permit from the Offshore Petroleum 
Regulator for Environment and Decommissioning for any emissions to air or discharges to sea 
in the course of offshore exploration and production activities.591 This obligation is in addition 
to the requirement for an environmental statement that must describe the proposed measures to 
eliminate or mitigate potential adverse environmental concerns such as emissions before the 
commencement of operations.592 
The Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment and Decommissioning also implements 
the UK Offshore Combustion Installations Regulations. 593  The Regulations require an 
application for a permit to operate an offshore combustion installation. The application must 
disclose sources of emissions from the installation, the nature and quantities of foreseeable 
emissions, proposed technologies, or best available technology for preventing or reducing 
emissions from the installation.594 The Regulator also has powers to set limits for emissions 
from any combustion installation.595 
The Oil and Gas UK 2018 Environmental Assessment Report on oil and gas operations on the 
UKCS concludes that the industry has improved on environmental performance, production 
efficiency and reduced associated costs such as GHG emissions.596 According to the report, 
production-related energy efficiency improved from 60% in 2012 to 74% in 2017.597 The report 
also recognised the influence of emissions monitoring system and the country’s collective 
climate governance regime.598  
 
 
590 Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines (Assessment of Environmental Effects) Regulations 1999 (As 
Amended), Petroleum Operations Notice No. 16. 
591 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, BEIS Offshore Petroleum Regulator for Environment 
and Decommissioning: The Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines (Assessment of Environmental Effects) 
Regulations 1999 (As Amended) – A Guide, September 2017, at 22. 
592 Ibid, at 42. 
593 The Offshore Combustion Installations (Pollution Prevention and Control) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 
No. 971 of 2013.  
594 Ibid, at s. 4. 
595 Ibid, s. 10. 
596 Oil and Gas UK Environment Report 2018 at 8. 




The United Kingdom’s Climate Change Act sets binding short-term (26% below 1990 levels 
by 2020) and long-term (80% below 1990 levels by 2050) emissions reduction targets.599 In 
addition, the United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS)600 replaced the UK’s 
participation in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS)601 from 1 January 
2021 to continue a carbon pricing policy in the country in support of the country’s climate 
targets. The UK ETS covers GHG emissions from power and heat generation, energy-intensive 
industries and aviation. Refining is one of the regulated activities under energy-intensive 
sectors,602 but there is no mention or coverage of upstream GHG emissions. The consequence 
is that upstream GHG emissions are currently exempted from the UK ETS.  
e) China 
The Mineral Resources Law, Oil and Gas Pipeline Protection Law, and the Atmospheric 
Pollution Prevention and Treatment Law are the primary regulatory frameworks for China’s 
oil and gas activities. However, there are also other laws for matters ancillary to the oil and gas 
industry.603 The National Development and Reform Commission is a powerful institution with 
broad authority over virtually all facets of the country’s economy.604 The National Energy 
Administration and the Ministry of Natural Resources are two departments under the 
Commission that perform regulatory functions over oil and gas activities. The Commission 
requires conservation and comprehensive utilization of resources,605 but it does not provide 
specifics on these requirements. 
The Mineral Resources Law is silent on emissions, except that enterprises involved in mining 
mineral resources (including oil and gas operators) must observe regulatory provisions on 
environmental protection to avoid pollution.606 The Environmental Protection Law allocates 
emissions quota for both GHGs and other pollutants to different provinces and requires 
operators to obtain authorisation to discharge atmospheric emissions. 607  The penalties for 
excess emissions range from production restrictions to suspension of operations for 
 
599 Climate Change Act, Cap 27 2008, s. 5. 
600 The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Order 2020 No. 1265. 
601 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system 
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602 Above n 600, s. 3 and Table C. 
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Research 2019) 56 at 57. 
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607 Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 2014, arts. 44 and 45. 
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rectification.608  These environmental law provisions empower the Ministry of Ecology and 
Environment to play fundamental regulatory roles regarding mitigating upstream emissions.    
There are also emissions reduction targets that are part of general climate governance measures. 
China’s NDCs submitted under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement promise 60 to 65% 
emissions reduction compared to 2005 levels by 2030.609 The Air Pollution Prevention and 
Control Action Plan also complements the 2030 target with a commitment of 15% reduction 
in emissions by 2020 compared with 2015 levels.610 However, the Act covers only sulphur 
dioxide, nitrous oxides and particulate matters. There is nothing said about carbon dioxide and 
methane emissions from upstream oil and gas production. More so, there are no breakdowns 
or allocations to determine how different sectors will contribute to achieving the set target. 
In a virtual broadcast to the United Nations General Assembly Seventy-Fifth Session on 22 
September 2020, the Chinese President pledged China’s carbon neutrality by 2060.611 What 
this goal entails remains unclear. China also needs to clarify this new target’s implications for 
earlier emission reduction goals and the contribution from different carbon-intensive sectors.612 
Some commentators have equally emphasized the necessity of unprecedented massive increase 
in renewables, complete shutdown of fossil fuels production and consumption, and other 
valuable strategies to support China’s energy and climate governance regime.613 More so, there 
is an opportunity for the country to develop measures that target upstream flaring, venting, and 
fugitive emissions as part of the overarching national plan to reduce GHG emissions leading 
to carbon neutrality by 2060.  
China also recently launched its emissions trading scheme – China ETS 614  – after 
experimenting with pilot carbon pricing programmes in multiple provinces from 2013 to 
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2017.615 The Ministry of Ecology and Environment is responsible for establishing a national 
carbon market and defining the scope of GHGs and industries that fall under the ETS.616 
Currently, the programme covers only power generation and the petrochemical industry.617 The 
Ministry has already retrospectively allocated units to over 2225 companies for GHG emissions 
from 2019 to 2020.618 As the China ETS develops, China has an opportunity to capture GHG 
emissions from other energy-intensive industries, including upstream oil and gas operations. 
The IEA suggests that, with good policy design and optimal sectoral coverage, China’s ETS 
can emerge the largest globally and become a valuable tool to incentivise emissions 
reduction.619 
f) Norway 
Norway regulates oil and gas activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf principally with 
the Petroleum Act 1996620 and subsidiary regulations.621 The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
is responsible for the overall governance of all energy resources.  The Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate provides advisory, technical, and administrative support to the Ministry and 
performs the day-to-day regulation of the oil and gas industry. 
The Petroleum Act requires production and management of petroleum resources by operators 
in line with sound technical and economic principles to avoid waste through flaring and 
venting.622 It also stipulates suspension of operations if an operator cannot guarantee prudent 
and safe production.623 However, there is an exception to the rule against flaring and venting. 
The Pollution Control Act requires operators to obtain permits for any flaring or venting during 
operations. 624  The Act empowers the Pollution Control Authority (now merged with the 
 
615 Thomas Stoerk, Daniel J. Dudek and Jia Yang “China’s National Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme: Lessons 
from the Pilot Emission Trading Schemes, Academic Literature, and Known Policy Details” (2019) 19:4 Climate 
Policy 472-486; Yifei Hua and Feng Dong “China’s Carbon Market Development and Carbon Market Connection: 
A Literature Review” (2019) 12:1663 Energies 1-25. 
616 Measures for the Administration of Carbon Emissions Trading, art 4. 
617 MEE Release: Emission Allowances to Start E-Trading Soon, available at 
<http://english.mee.gov.cn/News_service/media_news/202103/t20210302_822946.shtml>.  
618 National Carbon Emissions Trading List of Key Emission Units for Quota Management for 2019-2020, 
available at <http://mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk03/202012/W020201230736907682380.pdf>.  
619 IEA China’s Emissions Trading Scheme: Designing Efficient Allowance Allocation (IEA 2020) at 5, 19, 64, 
78 and 99. 
620 Act 29 November 1996 No. 72 Relating to Petroleum Activities (As Amended by Act 24 June 2011 No 38).  
621 Yngve Bustnesli “Norway” in Christopher B. Strong (ed) The Oil and Gas Review (7th edn Law Business 
Research 2019) 262 at 263. 
622 Act No. 72 Relating to Petroleum Activities 1996 (As amended by Act No. 38 of 2011), ss. 4, 9 and 10. 
623 Ibid, s. 9 
624 Act on Protection against Pollution and on Waste (the Pollution Control Act) of 1983, ss. 11 and 12. 
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Norwegian Environment Agency under the Ministry of Climate and Environment) to issue 
these permits to operators on a case-by-case basis.625  
Norway also simultaneously implements a national carbon tax regime and participates in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). Norway was one of the earliest countries to 
introduce a carbon tax in the early 1990s following an OECD appraisal of market-based policy 
instruments’ efficiency in the mid-1980s and the 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing 
Atmosphere.626 The three other Nordic countries that introduced a carbon tax alongside Norway 
in the 1990s are Finland, Sweden, and Denmark.627 Norway’s approach to carbon tax and 
emissions trading dates to its early history of using economic instruments in environmental 
policy (petroleum tax in 1931, SO2 tax in 1970 and others), high climate awareness of 
Norwegians and the general acceptance of a quota system for emissions control.628 The quota 
system arises from the country’s transposition of the EU-ETS into national regulations that 
capture upstream oil and gas operations. 629  However, one may ponder the difficulties of 
implementing a double emissions taxation regime (national carbon tax and the EU-ETS). This 
dual regime is a unique hallmark of the Norwegian approach to emissions regulation. The 
country has been able to apportion appropriate emissions costs in line with the polluter-pays 
principle and with the aid of sound administrative practice and close monitoring.630  
The Norwegian Carbon Tax Act requires operators to pay a CO2 tax for burning or discharging 
natural gas – through either flaring or venting – in connection with petroleum production and 
transportation.631 The current (2021) rates are as follows: NOK 1.27 per standard cubic meter 
of gas; NOK 543 per tonne of CO2 for combustion from natural gas or its equivalent; and NOK 
8.76 per standard cubic meter for emissions from natural gas.632  
 
625 Ibid. 
626 Mikael Skou Andersen “Environmental and Economic Implications of Taxing and Trading Carbon: Some 
European Experiences” in Janet E. Milne and Jennifer Kuntz (eds) The Reality of Carbon Taxes in the 21st Century 
(Vermont Law School 2008) 61 at 63.   
627 Ibid. 
628 Per Schreiner, ‘The Norwegian Approach to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading’ (2000) 9:3 Review of 
European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 239 at 240 and 251. 
629 Regulations on Quota Duty and Trading of Allowances for Greenhouse Gas Emissions (the Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Regulation) 2004. 
630 Catherine Banet “Effectiveness in Climate Regulation: Simultaneous Application of a Carbon Tax and an 
Emissions Trading Scheme to the Offshore Petroleum Sector in Norway” (2017) 1 Carbon and Climate Law 
Review 25 at 37. 
631 Act No. 72 Relating to Tax on Discharge of CO2 in the Petroleum Activities on the Continental Shelf 1990 
(As amended by Act No. 65 of 2015), s. 2. 





In addition, Norway has short- and long-term statutory emissions reduction targets set by the 
Climate Change Act.633 The short-term target is a 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 
compared to 1990 levels.634 The long-term target is an 80-95% reduction by 2050, thereby 
making the country a low-emissions society.635 Recently, Norway has stepped up its short-term 
target for 2030 to at least 55% reduction in GHG emissions compared to 1990 levels. The 
country announced this upward revision in its updated NDCs submitted to the UNFCCC 
Secretariat on 7 February 2020. 636  However, it becomes necessary to amend the Climate 
Change Act’s provisions to harmonize with the revised target communicated to the UNFCCC. 
While these may seem general targets without direct reference to emissions from oil and gas 
production, the law and the revised NDCs adopt a sectoral emissions trajectory requiring 
contributions from different sectors of the economy, including broad energy production and 
upstream oil and gas emissions.637 By implication, this brings flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions under the purview of Norway’s national climate targets.  
The foregoing review has been a lengthy one, but it has provided a robust information base to 
compare the legal regimes existing in various jurisdictions, especially looking at whether 
countries have good regulatory arrangements that meet the tests and criteria for effectiveness 
discussed in Chapter 2. In other words, the first question to ask is whether each petroleum-
producing jurisdiction has set a clear objective to reduce upstream GHG emissions? The second 
question is whether, by their laws and regulations, they have suitable methods to achieve the 
goal of emissions reduction. Along with these questions, we can also consider whether 
countries, by their arrangements, have incorporated other criteria for effectiveness as 
summarised by Baldwin, Cave and Lodge.638 The next section furthers the analysis to help in 






633 Act Relating to Norway’s Climate Targets (Climate Change Act), Royal Decree of 16 June 2017 No. 7902018, 
Effective from 1 January 2018. 
634 Ibid, s. 3. 
635 Ibid, ss. 4 and 5. 
636 Update of Norway’s Nationally Determined Contribution, available at <https://www4.unfccc.int>.  
637 Climate Change Act, above n 628, s. 6; Updated NDCs, ibid, para 3(a) and (b). 
638 Above n 194. 
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 Comparative Analysis 
The overview of the legal and regulatory regimes in the selected petroleum jurisdictions 
provides raw materials for analysis; and with a view to understand some desirable 
characteristics of an effective governance regime for mitigating flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. In furtherance of the comparative analysis, this section will evaluate the dynamics 
and differences in institutional arrangements, regulatory objectives, and the various methods 
that diverse countries adopt for addressing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. These 
would also be considered alongside the tests and criteria established in Chapter 2 for 
determining an effective regulatory regime for mitigating upstream GHG emissions. Table 1 
presents a quick summary of the circumstances in the case study countries. The table is a good 
way to compare the regimes of different petroleum jurisdictions and helps to distil regulatory 
characteristics that apply to the subject of inquiry easily. It is also a good reference point for 
























Table 1: Summary of regime dynamics in case study countries 
S/N Country  Designation Institutions at Work Dominant 
Institution(s) 
Key Laws and 
Regulations 
Regulatory Objectives Regulatory Methods 
01 Iraq  IEA-Designated 
Producer Economy 
Ministry of Oil. 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Ministry of Oil Conservation Law. 






Flaring prohibition and a permit 
system; 
General obligations on resource 
conservation and waste prevention; 
General obligations on 
environmental protection. 












(Prohibition) Act 2019. 
Flare Gas (Prevention of 
Waste and Pollution) 
Regulations. 






Specific regulation of 
upstream emissions and 
targeting flaring 
reduction and gas 
utilization.  
Flaring prohibition and a permit 
system; 
General obligations on resource 
conservation and waste prevention; 
General obligations on 
environmental protection; 
Flaring limits. 
Pricing mechanism: monetary 
penalty for flaring;  
Metering and quantification. 
Emissions reporting. 
Pricing flared gas. 
03 Russia IEA-Designated 
Producer Economy 
Federal Agency for 
Subsoil Use. 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the 
Environment. 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the 
Environment 
Russian Subsoil Law. 
Production Sharing 
Agreement Law. 





General climate doctrine 




Pricing of environmental 
externalities. 














Basic Law of 1992. 
 
General Environmental 






General obligations on 
environmental protection and 
resource conservation. 
Specific technical requirements on 























Ministry of Energy 
and Infrastructure 


















Associated gas flaring 
reduction and 
utilization. 
Flaring prohibition and a permit 
system. 
Gas re-injection and utilization 
requirements. 
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
06 Venezuela IEA-Designated 
Producer Economy 

























Atmospheric air quality. 
Flaring restriction 
 
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Corporate criminal liability for 
flaring. 





for Energy Policy. 












Resource conservation and 




Natural Gas and 
Biofuels Agency. 
ANP Resolution No. 
806 of 17 January 2020 
on Gas Flaring. 
 
Flaring limitation and 
gas utilization.  
 
Proportional gas utilization per 
production field (85% of associated 




   Institutions at Work Dominant 
Institution(s) 
Key Laws and 
Regulations 
Regulatory Objectives Regulatory Methods 
   Bureau of Land 
Management. 
 








Clean Air Act. 
 
Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act. 
 













specifically targeting air 
quality, flaring, venting, 




Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Emissions limitation. 
Technical specifications/standards on 
components of assets and processes 
of petroleum production. 
Implementation of leak detection and 
repair programmes. 
Gas utilization and reinjection 
obligations. 




 State Dominant 
Institution(s) 
Key Laws and Regulations Regulatory Objectives 
 
Regulatory Methods 




Natural Resources Code, Title 3 Chapter 81. 








standards targeting gas 
flaring and other 
emissions sources.  
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Efficiency in gas to oil ratio. 
Flaring prohibition and a permit 
system. 









North Dakota Century Code, Chapter 38. 









standards targeting gas 
flaring and other 
emissions sources.  
 
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Gas capture. 
Efficient gas to oil rations (75% gas 
utilization). 
Price mechanism: payment of equal 
monetary value for flared gas. 
In addition to USEPA measures. 
 




Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 








standards targeting gas 
flaring and other 
emissions sources  
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
General practice regulation: good 
oilfield practice for asset integrity 
and flaring minimization. 
Price mechanism: double of the fair 
market value for flared gas. 
In addition to USEPA measures 








California Public Resources Code. 
Global Warming Solutions Act. 
Low Carbon Fuel Standard. 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for 








petroleum sector GHG 
emissions. 
Regulation targeting 
vented and fugitive 
emissions. 
USEPA’s elaborate 
standards targeting gas 
flaring and other 
emissions sources.  
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
General and sector-specific climate 
targets. 
Technical standards covering 
processes and installations that are 
sources of GHG emissions. 
Energy intensity and efficiency 
controls. 








Institutions at Work Dominant 
Institution(s) 
Key Laws and 
Regulations 
Regulatory Objectives Regulatory Methods 













Oil and Gas Activities 
Act. 















Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
General and industry-specific 
emission reduction targets. 
Emissions data reporting. 
Pricing mechanism. 





 Province Dominant 
Institution(s) 
Key Laws and Regulations Regulatory Objectives 
 
Regulatory Methods 
9(a) Alberta Alberta Energy 
Regulator 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
Oil and Gas Conservation Rules. 
Alberta Regulation 151/1971. 
Alberta Regulation 165/2020. 
Oil Sands Conservation Act. 
Oil Sands Conservation Rules. 
Oil Sands Emissions Limit Act. 
Responsible Energy Development Act. 







Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Industry-specific emission reduction 
targets. 
Emissions limits and a permit 
system. 
Energy efficiency and performance 
requirements. 
Emissions data reporting. 





9(b) Saskatchewan Ministry of Energy 
and Resources 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations. 
Saskatchewan Greenhouse Gases Act. 
Climate Change Strategy. 
Methane Action Plan. 
Output-Based Performance Standards. 











Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Emissions limit and a permit system. 
Gas utilization and reinjection 
requirements. 
Industry-specific emission reduction 
targets. 
Pricing mechanism in the form of an 
administrative penalty for excess 
emissions; 






The Atlantic Accord. 
The Atlantic Accord Implementation Act. 
Greenhouse Gas Management Act. 
Greenhouse Gas Management Regulations. 
Petroleum Drilling Regulations. 








Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Sector-specific incremental annual 
emissions reduction target – for 2019 
(6%), 2020 (8%), 2021 (10%), 2022 
and subsequent years (12%). 
Mandatory annual GHG emissions 
reporting. 
Emissions reduction and 
performance credit scheme. 
Obligation to adopt best available 
technologies for GHG mitigation. 
 9(d) British Columbia British Columbia 
Oil and Gas 
Commission 
Oil and Gas Activities Act. 
Drilling and Production Regulation. 







Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Optimal gas utilization to flaring 
ratio: obligation to utilize 95% of gas 
in the petroleum recovery process. 
Operational flaring limits. 
Leak detection and repair 
programmes. 
Mandatory emissions reporting. 
Efficiency requirements for 














The Oil and Gas 
Authority for the 










Petroleum Act of 1998. 





The 2017 Guidance 
Note of the Offshore 















regulation of upstream 
GHGs 
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations. 
Emissions prohibition and permit 
system. 
Emissions monitoring and reporting 
schemes. 
Requirement to disclose best 








Ministry of Natural 
Resources. 





Mineral Resources Law. 







Air Pollution Prevention 








Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations; 
Emissions quota system. 


















Petroleum Act 1996. 
Climate Change Act. 
Carbon Tax Act. 
Pollution Control Act. 







General climate goals. 
Regulations targeting 
upstream emissions 
Resource conservation and 
environmental protection obligations; 
Strict carbon pricing schemes 
(national carbon pricing legislation 
and EU-ETS). 
Flaring avoidance obligation and 
emissions permit system. 




Table 1 reveals diverse characteristics relating to the regulation of upstream GHG emissions in 
different petroleum-producing jurisdictions. In all the focus countries, there are different 
institutions at work, although some regulatory agencies wield greater powers regarding the 
control of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. The table also shows the existence of 
multiple laws with different regulatory objectives in the case study countries. These are 
petroleum (oil and gas) laws and regulations, environmental laws, conservation laws, climate 
change laws, and specific laws and regulations that target upstream GHG emissions. The 
analysis that comes later in this part of the chapter will examine these types of laws and 
regulations to understand which ones will be best suitable for incentivising upstream GHG 
emissions reduction. 
What we also see summarily in Table 1 is that countries adopt different methods to control 
upstream GHG emissions, particularly flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. These methods 
are flaring prohibition and permit systems, general obligations on resource conservation, 
environmental protection and waste prevention, pricing mechanisms, metering and emissions 
quantification, proportional gas utilization, technical specifications for emissions control, and 
emissions reduction targets. While these all appear in Table 1, only a few jurisdictions apply 
industry- and issue-specific approaches that go beyond general environmental or petroleum 
regulation provisions for addressing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions particularly. The 
next three sub-sections will present a synthesis of Table 1 and the laws described in Part A of 
this chapter. The analysis will also help to distil the institutional and regulatory arrangements 
and methods that should characterise a good governance regime for effectively reducing 
upstream GHG emissions.  
 Different Institutions at Work 
What we have seen in the foregoing account of the relevant laws of a number of countries is 
that various institutional arrangements exist for governing the oil and gas industry and for 
regulating upstream GHG emissions. The conventional ministries of energy or petroleum, 
environment, and natural resources are at work, with either ministry playing more active roles 
in abating flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Thus, this study identifies three different 
patterns. The first is the category of jurisdictions where the industry regulator – the ministry of 
energy or petroleum – plays a dominant role. The countries that show this pattern are Iraq, 
Nigeria, the UAE, Brazil, the UK, Norway, US states and Canadian provinces. In the second 
pattern, the ministry of the environment plays a more active role. This occurs in Saudi Arabia, 
Venezuela, China, the US, and Canadian federal levels. In the third pattern, which is seen only 
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in Russia, there is a fusion of industry- and environment-centric objectives to create a single 
regulatory institution for addressing upstream GHG emissions. 
A fundamental question for consideration is whether the institutional character prevalent in a 
country determines the effectiveness of the regulatory regime in abating upstream GHG 
emissions. For example, will the industry regulator become industry-friendly and produce a 
bad result? Alternatively, will countries achieve better results if the ministry of environment 
regulates upstream GHGs? The regulation literature suggests that regulatory capture can set in 
when there is a closeness between an industry-centric regulator and the regulated industry.639 
Within this study’s context, it can be a close relationship between the ministry of energy or 
petroleum and the oil and gas industry. Carpenter and Moss have defined regulatory capture as 
“...the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly 
directed away from the public interest and toward the interest of the regulated industry, by the 
intent and action of the industry itself.”640 The implication is that the oil and gas industry may 
get away with breaches to set standards or even operate in an atmosphere of lax rules because 
of a friendly regulator.641 However, that is not always the case. For example, the industry-
centric regulators in Norway, US states, and Canadian provinces have formulated more robust 
and suitable regulatory measures for addressing upstream GHG emissions than those in Iraq, 
Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Venezuela. This fact suggests the need to look 
closely at regulatory objectives in the case study countries because the regulatory institutions 
merely perform responsibilities and exercise powers set out in their establishing legislation or 
relevant statutory instruments. Hence, there is a nexus between regulatory performance and 
regulatory objectives. 
 Different Regulatory Objectives 
The case study countries have varied regulatory objectives regarding the governance of the oil 
and gas industry. Even within a country, there are also multiple regulatory purposes. One 
central question is whether regulatory and statutory instruments clearly define the goals for 
which the relevant institutions should exercise regulatory powers. A corollary task is to 
 
639 Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite, ‘In and Out the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture’ 
(1992) 12:1 Journal of Public Policy 61. 
640 Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and 
How to Limit It (Cambridge University Press 2013) at 13. 
641 Marshall B. Clinard and Peter C. Yeager Corporate Crime (Routledge 2017) at 106; Fiona Haines, The 
Paradox of Regulation: What Regulation Can Achieve and What it Cannot (Edward Elgar 2011) at 19. 
91 
 
examine the policy rationales behind different regulatory regimes and their limitations. These 
could explain the circumstances and performance of institutions across the case study countries. 
From the overview of regimes above, the principal regulatory objectives across petroleum 
jurisdictions include resource conservation; general industry governance; environmental 
protection; climate change governance; health, safety, and asset integrity controls. Some 
regulations particularly target air quality improvements, flaring, and other upstream-specific 
GHG emissions. This present analysis will identify suitable regulatory approaches for the 
research inquiry.  
a) Resource conservation 
Resource conservation embodies the core themes of maintenance, waste avoidance, 
preservation, and sustainable natural resources utilization.642 From a legal perspective, there 
can be legislative and regulatory frameworks for conserving natural resources broadly – for 
plants, energy, animals, aquatic and wildlife species, birds, natural habitats, and the natural 
environment.643 However, the term’s contextual use here is the conservation of oil and gas 
resources and conservation legislation or regulation as a tool for reducing upstream petroleum 
emissions. In addition, we may usefully ask what regulatory theories become clear in the 
adoption and practice of resource conservation legislation? 
In multiple oil and gas producing jurisdictions, the regulatory objective of conserving resources 
shows in different ways – sometimes directly as resource conservation, sometimes indirectly 
as waste prevention, resource preservation, optimal utilization, and sustainable development. 
Part A of this chapter drew attention to the prevalence and history of resource conservation as 
a significant form of regulation in Canada and the US’s legislative frameworks. A historical 
context may provide a better understanding because of the connection between oil and gas 
conservation legislation and the petroleum industry’s history. There is disagreement over the 
industry’s commencement date, as the accounts of Saltzman 644  and Habashi 645  reveal. 646 
 
642  IUCN (ed) World Conservation Strategy: Living Resources Conservation for Sustainable Development 
(IUCN-UNEP-WWF 1980) at 1; Anil Markandya and others Dictionary of Environmental Economics (Earthscan, 
London 2001) at 45-46; Chris Park and Michael Allaby A Dictionary of Environment and Conservation (3rd edn 
OUP Online 2017 eISBN: 9780191826320) available at <https://www-oxfordreference-com>.   
643 Christopher P. Rodgers The Law of Nature Conservation (OUP 2013) 1-32. 
644 Martin D. Saltzman “The Art of Distillation and the Dawn of the Hydrocarbon Society” (1999) 24 Bulletin 
for History of Chemistry 53. 
645 Fathi Habashi “The First Oil Well in the World” (2000) 25:1 Bulletin for History of Chemistry 64. 
646 This disagreement appears in two different accounts published by the Bulletin for History of Chemistry. 
Saltzman (above n 644) accounts that the oil industry began when Edwin L. Drake (1819-1880) drilled the first 
well that produced crude at Titusville, Pennsylvania on 27 August 1859. Habashi’s (above n 645) contrary account 
is that “the oil industry actually began one year earlier in 1858 when the Canadian entrepreneur James Miller 
Williams (1818-1890) drilled and successfully produced oil in the township of Enniskillen between Lake Erie and 
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However, this examination draws from Daintith’s comprehensive text on the rule of capture 
and its resource conservation implications,647 the works of Weaver and Asmus,648 and other 
scholars in the field of petroleum law. 
After the commercial discovery in Pennsylvania, crude oil production spread across 11 
American states in the nineteenth century when the industry was largely unregulated.649 The 
common law rule of capture governed production. The rule simply means that a landowner can 
collect crude resources flowing through or underneath his or her land. Daintith650 refers to 
Hardwicke’s framing of the principle, as it applies to petroleum resources, as a suitable 
description: 
The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from wells drilled 
thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands.651 
In principle and fact, this migration of crude oil happens due to the reservoir rock’s 
permeability and porosity. The rule of capture encouraged rapid and indiscriminate drilling by 
developers and landowners, who drilled within the confines of their surface and subsurface 
rights to properties.652 This problem was not peculiar to the United States and featured in 
several countries where oil development was contemporary with that in the United States: 
Russia, Romania, and Austrian Galicia.653 Williams captures the result of the drilling rush as 
“profligate drilling and tremendous physical waste”, necessitating state legislation targeting 
wasteful drilling in Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Arkansas.654 Other American states began to 
enact conservation statutes for waste prevention and flaring prohibition. 655  Subsequently, 
legislation stipulated prorationing, well spacing, and compulsory pooling and unitization by 
 
Lake Huron near the town later named Oil Springs in what is now Southwest Ontario.” Whichever the case, it is 
clear that the industry began in the nineteenth century. 
647 Terence Daintith Finders Keepers? How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil Industry (Routledge 2010). 
648 Jacqueline Lang Weaver and David F. Asmus “Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around the World: A Comparative 
Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts” (2006) 28:1 Houston Journal of International Law 3-197. 
649 Daintith, above n 642, at 171. See also Samuel D. Myres The Permian Basin: Petroleum Empire of the 
Southwest: Era of Advancement, from the Depression to the Present (1977 El Paso: Permian Press) at 51-53. 
650 Daintith, above n 647, at 7. 
651 Robert E. Hardwicke “Rule of Capture and its Implications As Applied to Oil and Gas” (1935) 13 Texas Law 
Review 391 at 393. 
652  Owen L. Anderson “Foreword: The Evolution of Oil and Gas Conservation Law and the Rise of 
Unconventional Hydrocarbon Production” (2015) 68 Arkansas Law Review 231 at 232-233. 
653 Terence Daintith "The Rule of Capture: The Least Worst Property Rule for Oil and Gas" in Aileen McHarg 
and others Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (OUP 2010) 140 at 143.  
654 Howard R. Williams “Conservation of Oil and Gas” (1952) 65:7 Harvard Law Review 1156 at 1159. 
655 Laura H. Burney “A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence” 
(1996) 16: 1 Journal of Energy, Natural Resources, and Environmental Law 1 at 21. 
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operators. 656  Prorationing means setting production limits and the allocating of permitted 
production among different producers.657 Well spacing requires the drilling of oil wells within 
set parameters. For example, in Oklahoma, the spacing rule prohibited drilling within 300 feet 
of a property line.658 Pooling and unitization rules require multiple operators to pool acreage 
and resources to produce as a unit instead of indiscriminate drilling practices that brought 
derricks very close to each other. 659   These regulatory practices are like developments in 
Canada, leading up to the enactment of Canadian conservation legislation.660  
An important question to ask, within the scope of this thesis, is whether the resource 
conservation objective (and by extension resource conservation legislation or regulation) is 
suitable to address upstream GHG emissions? As the history of conservation in the petroleum 
industry shows, conservation measures initially emerged to solve the problems associated with 
the rule of capture – indiscriminate drilling and waste. In the US, the nineteenth century’s 
conservation movement argued the likelihood of economic problems if indiscriminate drilling 
and waste continued unabated. 661  One commentator observes that the original purpose of 
conservation legislation was “to protect the producers’ correlative rights and maintain the 
health of the industry by prevention of waste and to seek the greatest ultimate recovery of the 
resource.”662 
There is some logic in the possibility of minimizing the environmental impacts of petroleum 
production through efficient conservation measures. 663  The identified core themes of 
conservation – resource maintenance, resource preservation, and sustainable utilization of 
resources – may help. Suppose a piece of legislation or regulation sets rules for the optimal 
maintenance, preservation and utilization of resources. In that case, oil producers may reduce 
 
656 For a comprehensive historical account on the history of legislative and regulatory solution to the rule of 
capture, indiscriminate drilling and waste, see Daintith Finders Keepers, above n 647, at 245-280; Anderson, 
above n 652. See also Williams, above n 654, at 1159; Gary D. Libecap and James L. Smith “Regulatory Remedies 
to the Common Pool: The Limits to Oil Field Unitization” (2001) 22:1 The Energy Journal 1-26. 
657 Daintith ibid, at 238. 
658 Ibid, at 259. 
659 Ibid, at 268-276. 
660 Nigel Bankes “Compulsory Pooling under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of Alberta” (1996) 35 Alberta 
Law Review 945-1012. See also Greg Moores, Mark Andrews and Amanda Whitehead “Waste Not, Want Not: 
Waste as a Tool of Resource Conservation in the Atlantic Canadian Offshore” (2018) 56 Atlanta Law Review 
315. 
661 Wm E. Colby “The Law of Oil and Gas: With Special Reference to the Public Domain and Conservation” 
(1942) 30:3 California Law Review 245 at 267. 
662 Thomas A. Mitchell “The Future of Oil and Gas Conservation Jurisprudence: Past as Prologue” (2010) 49 
Washburn Law Journal 379 at 422. 
663  David E. Pierce “Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development by Maximizing 
Production Conservation” (2009) 85:4 North Dakota Law Review 759. 
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the extent of environmental effects associated with oil production. However, most jurisdictions 
use conservation for maximum resource exploitation for economic benefit and a general sense 
of environmental protection, without a clear target to reduce GHG emissions. This is the case 
in the conservation laws of Venezuela, Brazil, the US, and Canada.  
 
The US state of California provides an excellent example of how resource conservation 
legislation may address upstream GHG emissions and give regulators more clarity for 
exercising powers. The refocused definition of resource conservation in California captures 
GHG emissions associated with the development of hydrocarbon and geothermal resources.664 
This notable redefinition is relevant for addressing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions 
under conservation legislation. It clarifies the purposes for which regulators can exercise power 
to conserve resources. Other jurisdictions could adopt the California example to improve their 
regulatory regimes. Thus, regulators and legislatures can draft conservation legislation or 
regulation to be more comprehensive and specific in their coverage. The law can be 
comprehensive to the extent that it captures different implications of resource conservation and 
economic objectives. It can then be specific to the extent that it captures practicable 
requirements and approaches to reducing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions in upstream 
petroleum operations.  
b) General petroleum governance and environmental regulation 
In addition to the general purpose of conservation, many petroleum jurisdictions have the 
predominant objective of providing general petroleum industry governance and environmental 
protection. These frameworks attempt to strike a balance between economic interests and 
environmental or climate change concerns. The quest for this balance has been more important 
in recent years because of heightened climate change concerns, the interconnection between 
energy and the environment, and the energy sector’s importance to all of humanity.665 These 
regimes express notions of conservation and waste avoidance as provisions in conventional 
petroleum and environmental laws. These laws oblige producers to reduce associated 
environmental issues in oil and gas upstream activities such as flaring, oil spills and black 
carbon emissions. Some expressly prohibit flaring. Some others capture emissions control 
under blanket requirements such as prevention, remediation, precaution, the polluter-pays 
 
664 Assembly Bill No. 1057, above n 447, at s. 9 amending s 3011 of the California Public Resources Code. 
665 Robert Falkner “Global environmental Politics and Energy: Mapping the Research Agenda” (2014) 1 Energy 
Research and Social Science 188-197. 
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principle, environmental responsibility, public participation, and environmental impact 
assessment. 
As the regulatory overview above shows, these general frameworks are prevalent in Iraq, 
Russia, Brazil, China, Venezuela, the UAE, and Nigeria. Therefore, almost all IEA-designated 
producer economies have the objectives of general petroleum industry governance and 
environmental controls. However, Nigeria has recently shifted from these general frameworks 
by enacting regulations specifically targeting flaring and venting. There is more to say about 
this in subsequent sections of this chapter. These general objectives and frameworks also exist 
in other case study countries. While they are more predominant in IEA-designated producer 
economies, some non-IEA-designated producer economies, such as the US, Canada, and 
Norway, go beyond generalities to provide sector-specific regulatory interventions for 
mitigating flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. 
Environmental laws that exclude upstream emissions do not help incentivize concrete actions 
to reduce flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. There is undoubtedly a relationship between 
general environmental controls and upstream GHGs to the extent that upstream emissions 
constitute an environmental menace in need of regulatory intervention. Apart from the skeletal 
reference to flaring and the general obligation to protect the environment, these environmental 
controls do not encourage the large-scale reduction of upstream GHG emissions. For example, 
in Nigeria, the environmental law regulates effluents and air emissions, excluding emissions 
from the oil and gas sector. 666  This is a clear case where more sector-specific regulatory 
interventions are necessary, despite the relationships between general environmental controls 
and upstream GHG emissions. Thus, upstream decarbonisation will need regulatory and policy 
frameworks that build on general environmental law principles.667 In addition to building on 
these principles, such coordinated frameworks would reflect concrete and tailored measures in 
the context of upstream emissions. Specific prescriptive rules-based regimes may be more 
suitable for this purpose. The countries with more robust legal frameworks (summarized in 
 
666 Above n 307. 
667 Commission of the European Communities Strategy Paper for Reducing Methane Emissions (Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament) Brussels, 15 January 1996 COM (96) 557 
Final; James Bradbury and others Clearing the Air: Reducing Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. 
Natural Gas Systems (World Resources Institute Policy Paper, April 2013); Suzi Kerr and Vicki Duscha Going 
to the Source: Using an Upstream Point of Regulation for Energy in a National Chinese Emissions Trading System 
(Motu Working Paper 14-09, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, September 2014); Maria Olczak and 
Andris Piebalgs How Far Should the New EU Methane Strategy Go? (Florence School of Regulation Policy Brief, 
Issue 2019/07 April 2019). 
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Table 1) – especially the US and Canada – have clearly defined regulatory arrangements that 
go beyond general environmental principles and objectives to provide sector-specific technical 
requirements for addressing upstream GHG emissions.  
c) Health, safety, and asset integrity 
Like general environmental controls, all petroleum-producing jurisdictions have a regulatory 
objective to ensure health and safety in oil and gas operations as part of their overall industry 
governance framework. There is also some relationship between health, safety, and 
environmental (HSE) concerns and upstream GHG emissions, to the extent that emissions 
could occur because of breaching industry HSE standards for operations and production 
facilities. This can also have health implications for industry workers and inhabitants of the 
immediate environment surrounding production facilities. These are also the underlying 
rationales for avoiding oil spills, leaks, and catastrophic accidents such as the Piper Alpha 
explosion and the Deep-Water Horizon oil spill.    
Consequently, upstream GHGs are almost certainly a HSE issue, but there is more to do beyond 
general health and safety obligations. Some jurisdictions ensure asset integrity of oil and gas 
production facilities and installations to avoid leaks (fugitive emissions). As Section A above 
revealed, we find such provisions and practices such as leak detection and repair obligations in 
the US and Canada. Other countries can follow the American and Canadian examples.  
d) Specific upstream emissions regulation 
There are also petroleum jurisdictions that set out to regulate upstream GHG emissions through 
specific binding rules, in addition to general industry governance, resource conservation and 
environmental protection. A measure of prescription in national legal regimes that seek to 
achieve emissions reduction in the upstream petroleum industry can incentivise good 
practices. 668  In addition, Warnock provides some useful insights about context from an 
environmental law perspective, when she argued that the inherent structural features of 
environmental problems cause environmental laws to be written in a particular way.669 Given 
that upstream GHG emissions – flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions particularly – are part 
of contemporary environmental problems, it is important for countries to enact context-specific 
laws and regulations. It may be possible to repurpose environmental laws to clearly capture 
flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions or make new laws that are suitable. The latter part of 
 
668 Chris Malins and others Reduction of Upstream Greenhouse gas Emissions from Flaring and Venting (Report 
of the International Council on Clean Transportation 2014). 
669 Ceri Warnock “Environment and the Law: The Normative Force of Context and Constitutional Challenges” 
(2020) 32 Journal of Environmental Law 365-389. 
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this chapter will revisit this issue to provide more insights after a comprehensive analysis of 
related and relevant issues. 
Regulators have an opportunity to design well-tailored frameworks for the industry. The 
targeted measures that the United Nations Environment Programme for mitigating upstream 
GHG emissions – efficient gas recovery and utilization and addressing fugitive emissions 
through the implementation of leak detection and repair programmes670 – can be included in 
specific regulatory instruments that target flaring, venting and equipment leaks. Some other 
good design examples are evident in the regulatory regimes of different petroleum jurisdictions 
above. These are emissions reduction targets, flare prohibition and stringent permit systems, 
carbon pricing (taxes and emissions trading schemes), compliance reporting and monitoring. 
These, unlike general abstract environmental law principles, provide industry-specific 
solutions for reducing upstream flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. They will receive 
detailed attention in the next section as specific regulatory methods.   
The regulatory review in section A of this chapter reveals the US, Canada, the UK, Nigeria, 
and Norway as examples of petroleum-producing jurisdictions with an objective specifically 
to regulate upstream GHG emissions. While Nigeria’s regulatory framework is emerging, in 
the recent effort to target gas flaring, the US, Canada, the UK, and Norway have more robust 
and comprehensive measures that address upstream GHG emissions. Two key elements in 
these countries’ regulatory frameworks (especially in the US, Canada, the UK, and Norway) 
are specificity and prescription. Specificity means that there is a particular regulation for 
addressing upstream emissions. Prescription means that law stipulates rules that operators must 
comply with or implement to reduce upstream GHG emissions. There is an element of 
specificity in Saudi Arabia, but the focus is on air quality improvements and not upstream 
GHGs.671 Apart from Nigeria, no other IEA-designated producer economies in this study target 
upstream GHG emissions, other than the skeletal reference to flaring. This observation is a 
clear contrast between IEA-designated producer economies and other leading producer 
economies. However, IEA-designated producer countries’ economic peculiarities, highlighted 
in Chapter 1, do not exist in the jurisdictions with more structured and robust regulatory 
regimes. A significant positive impact for targeting upstream emissions with specific and 
prescriptive regimes is that they have a comparatively higher potential to influence emissions 
abatement. The reason is the use of well-structured requirements and strategies that are issue- 
 
670 UNEP, above n 131, at 5, 9, 10, 13 and 15. 
671 As seen in Part A, Section 1, sub-section (d) of this chapter. 
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and sector-specific, unlike the conventional provisions of petroleum legislation and general 
principles of environmental law. 
e) General principle regulation: Good oilfield practice 
A common feature in most petroleum-producing countries is to require operators to adopt ‘good 
oilfield practice’ while carrying out industry operations. This general principle has received 
attention in the literature, both in energy and petroleum law regulation672 and commercial 
transactions between companies, for example, in joint venture arbitrations.673 There is also a 
theory that this common requirement is a form of transnational petroleum law.674 It appears as 
part of regulatory requirements on environmental protection in oil and gas activities in many 
countries’ legal regimes, such as Iraq, the US, and the UK. 675  There are other common 
environmental jurisprudence concepts used interchangeably with good oilfield practice to 
express the idea of environmental safety in oil and gas operations. Some of them that recur in 
the literature are proper and workmanlike manner, best available control technology, good 
production practice, diligent and prudent operations. 676  The Association of International 
Petroleum Negotiators model for joint operating agreements recognises ‘good and prudent 
industry practice.’ 677  Besides, different industries have similar general practice regulation 
phrases. For example, a construction or engineering contract usually requires the contractor to 
execute the job in a good workmanlike manner, using best trade or industry practice.678 
For present purposes, the focus is limited to ‘good oilfield practice’ regarding the oil and gas 
industry. What does it mean? What is its efficacy for incentivising upstream GHG emissions 
 
672 John A.P. Chandler Petroleum Resource Management: How Governments Manage Their Offshore Petroleum 
Resources (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018) 163 at 185-195. 
673 Martin Hunter and Anthony C. Sinclair “Aminoil Revisited: Reflections on a Story of Changing Circumstances” 
in Todd Weiler (ed) International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, 
Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron 2005) 347-381. 
674 Alfredo De Jesús O. The Prodigious Story of the Lex Petrolea and the Rhinoceros: Philosophical Aspects of 
the Transnational Legal Order of the Petroleum Society (Transnational Petroleum Law Institute Series on 
Transnational Petroleum Law Vol. 1 No. 1 2012) at 23; John P. Bowman “Lex petrolea: Sources and Successes 
of International Petroleum Law” (2015) 39 Texas State Bar Oil, Gas & Energy Res. L. Sec. Rep. 81; Alex Wawryk 
“Petroleum Regulation in an International Context: The Universality of Petroleum Regulation and the Concept of 
Lex Petrolea” in Tina Hunter (ed) Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector: A Comparative Study of 
Licensing and Concession Systems (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 3 at 32; Terence Daintith “Against ‘Lex 
Petrolea’” (2017) 10 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 1 at 8-10. 
675 As identified in Part A of this chapter. 
676  Ibiba Lucky Worika “Environmental Concepts and terms in Petroleum Legislation and Contracts: A 
Preliminary Study” in Chih-kuo Kao and Zhiguo Gao (eds) Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas (Kluwer 
Law International 1998) 393 at 395-403; Nicholas P. Cheremisinoff and Paul Rosenfeld Handbook of Pollution 
Prevention and Cleaner Production – Best Practices in the Petroleum Industry (Elsevier 2010) 121-177 and 179-
225. 
677 AIPN Model Joint Operating Agreement 2012 Version, available at <www.aipn.org>.   
678 Axel-Volkmar Jaeger and Götz-Sebastian Hök FIDIC: A Guide for Practitioners (Springer, Berlin, 
Heidelberg 2010) at 46, 100, 192, 198-213. 
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reduction? For meaning, it qualifies as one of those fluid terminologies amenable to different 
interpretations by lawyers, academics, engineers and economists.679 It is not a fixed standard 
but rather a good example of general principle phrases that engender technical and 
environmental standards in petroleum law and contracts.680 Daintith and Willoughby define it 
as a term of art that describes objective standards for conducting oil and gas operations.681 
Ajuomo views it as the importation of the common law duty of care into petroleum industry 
regulation.682  Tienhaara notes that it collectively captures practices and procedures adopted in 
the industry worldwide by prudent and diligent operators.683 Bunter construes it as ‘an evolving 
process of self-regulation by skilled men.’684 
One problem with ‘good oilfield practice’ is the uncertainty about what constitutes an objective 
standard for oil and gas operations. The term is vague and sometimes problematic in practice.685 
What constitutes good oilfield practice will depend on different circumstances and may change 
as technology changes. 686  Industry operators and multiple jurisdictions may also construe 
things slightly differently and have their peculiarities. Chandler restates the divergence of 
meanings, especially in Australia, Norway and the UK.687 The International Association of 
Drilling Contractors defines the term as all those things that are accepted as good and safe in 
the carrying on of petroleum exploration and production operations. 688  In Norway, the 
Petroleum Act requires operators and licensees to ensure prudent production. 689  The 
Norwegian Petroleum Act does not define the term. Still, it hints at its requirement that 
 
679 Alex Wawryk “Petroleum Regulation in an International Context: The Universality of Petroleum Regulation 
and the Concept of Lex Petrolea” in Tina Hunter (ed) Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector: A 
Comparative Study of Licensing and Concession Systems (Elgar Publishing 2015) 3 at 33. 
680 Alexandra S. Wawryk “Adoption of International Environmental Standards by Transnational Oil Companies: 
Reducing the Impact of Oil Operations in Emerging Economies” (2002) 20:4 Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 402 at 431. 
681 Terence Daintith and Geoffrey Willoughby (eds) Manual of United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law (2nd edn. Sweet 
and Maxwell, London 1984) at 99. 
682 M.A. Ajuomo “An Examination of Federal Environmental Laws in Nigeria” in M.A. Ajuomo and Omobatoji 
Adewale (eds) Environmental Law and Sustainable Development in Nigeria (Nigerian Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies and the British Council 1994) at 20. 
683 Kyla Tienhaara “Environmental Aspects of Host Government Contracts in the Upstream Oil and Gas Sector” 
(2010) 8:3 Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 1 at 5 and 6. 
684 Mike Bunter “World-Wide Standards of Good Oilfield Practice – the Impact of the Blow-out, Deaths and Spill 
at the BP Macondo Well, MC252/1-01, US Gulf of Mexico” (2013) 11:2 OGEL <www.ogel.org> at 3. 
685 Simon Warikiyei Amaduobogha “The Legal Regime for Petroleum Activities in Nigeria” in Tina Hunter (ed) 
Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector: A Comparative Study of Licensing and Concession Systems 
(Edward Elgar 2015) 263 at 282. 
686 Scott C. Styles “Joint Operating Agreements” in Greg Gordon, John Paterson and Emre Üşenmez (eds) Oil 
and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends (2nd edn Dundee University Press 2011) 359 at 377. 
687 Chandler above n 672 at 163, 185-195. 
688 IADC “Good Oilfield Practice” (IADC Lexicon) <www.iadclexicon.org>.  
689 Act No. 72 Relating to Petroleum Activities 1996 (As amended by Act No. 38 of 2011), s. 4-1. See also 
Chandler, above n 672, at 191-193. 
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“production shall take place in accordance with prudent technical and sound economic 
principles and in such a manner that waste of petroleum or reservoir energy is avoided.”690 In 
the UK, Model Clause 21 requires licensees to “execute all operations in or in connection with 
the licensed area in a proper and workmanlike manner in accordance with methods and practice 
customarily used in good oilfield practice.”691 The law does not define the term. However, the 
defunct United Kingdom Department of Energy and Climate Change (superseded by the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in 2016) described it as “largely 
technical matters within the disciplines of geology and reservoir engineering, petroleum 
engineering and facilities engineering and to the impact of the development on the 
environment.”692 
The above definitions and descriptions further show the fluidity of the terminology. It is also 
appropriate to construe standards set by international petroleum industry organisations as good 
oilfield practice for different activities, as Daintith suggests.693 These could include standards 
of the American Petroleum Institute and the Oil and Gas Producers Association. 
As for relevance and efficacy, the proliferation of the terminology and similar environmental 
concepts evidences the influence of international industry standards on petroleum activities 
across multiple jurisdictions.694 Nonetheless, its fluidity suggests an unsuitable regulatory use 
for upstream emissions reduction. According to the International Association of Oil and Gas 
Producers “…there is no agreed international definition, and hence their interpretation is up to 
the users at any time to select the codes and standards and good engineering practice that it is 
(sic) considered relevant to use for the task in question.”695 
The term qualifies as a general standard, just like reasonableness in tort. General standards 
may be suitable for some things, but not all things. The fluidity of ‘good oilfield practice’ may 
not effectively facilitate behavioural modification, leading to upstream emissions reduction. 
This is because of the ambiguity in standard-setting and decision-making, which are some core 
elements of regulation identified in Chapter 2. Suppose there are no ascertainable standards or 
rules for assessing good oilfield practice. In that case, it becomes difficult for regulators and 
 
690 Ibid.  
691 The Petroleum (Current Model Clauses) Order 1999, clause 21. 
692 DECC Guidance Note on the Content of Offshore Oil and Gas Field Development Plans, s 3.  This captures 
the description of the withdrawn Chandler, above n 682, at 191.  
693 Daintith “Against ‘lex petrolea’” above n 669, at 8, especially at note 52 of the article. 
694 Kim Talus “Oil and Gas: International Petroleum Regulation” in Elisa Morgera and Kati Kulovesi (eds) 
Research Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) 243 at 255. 
695 IOGP Regulators’ Use of Standards (IOGP Report No. 426 of March 2010) at 61. 
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decision-makers to ensure certainty in the regulatory regime, hence leaving room for the 
exercise of discretion and the risk of arbitrariness. Further, this study did not find a law or 
commentary suggesting that the term includes restrictions or moderation in flaring, venting, 
and fugitive emissions. 
The use of general principle regulation such as good oilfield practice for addressing upstream 
GHG emissions is akin to general petroleum industry governance and environmental controls. 
It is unsuitable to rely on a general practice regulation that does not provide objective and 
tangible parameters and requirements for the regulated entities. For example, the jurisdictions 
that stipulate the adoption of good oilfield practice during oil and gas operations do not provide 
specifics on regulatory requirements for addressing emissions. This leaves room for 
uncertainties and renders such general practice regulation ineffective for incentivising 
upstream GHG emissions reduction. Therefore, regulators need to go beyond industry 
standards’ generalisation and be precise in defining regulatory requirements. Leaving it to 
ambiguous phrases subject to multiple interpretations may achieve little or no results as far as 
GHG regulation goes. What constitutes good oilfield practice for reducing upstream emissions? 
What specific measures or initiatives represent international petroleum industry practice for 
mitigating climate change in oil and gas production? These are some examples of the specifics 
that regulators may need to address.  
f) Climate change governance 
Countries worldwide have been responding to climate change by enacting laws, promulgating 
mitigation and adaptation policies. There has been an increase of climate governance laws and 
policies from 60 in 1997 to over 1200 in 2017, covering over 164 countries.696 The common 
themes that run through countries’ various climate laws include setting emissions reduction 
goals, carbon pricing and budgeting, and establishing a climate change commission (especially 
in the UK, Germany and New Zealand). Table 2 below summarises these and other elements 
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Table 2: Elements of good climate governance law and policy 
Sources  Elements 
Barton and Campion (2018)697 Target-setting; early action; policies/measures for reaching targets; multi-
sectoral effect; rules for information base (monitoring and evaluation). 
Manguiat and Raine (2018)698 
 
Target-setting, oversight body, public access to information, access to justice, 
gender consideration, renewable energy promotion, integration with sustainable 
development goals, environmental impact assessment, monitoring and review of 
targets, carbon taxes. 
Fankhauser, Averchenkova and 
Finnegan (2018)699 
Emissions target, carbon budgets, independent advisory board, continual 
mitigation/adaptation planning, mandatory progress monitoring and 
accountability. 
Weil (2012)700 Carbon (and other emissions) pricing, structured targeting (tailoring 
regulation/policy towards specific areas for emissions reduction), 
implementation/enforcement. 
McHarg (2011)701 Urgent action, compulsion, public participation, access to justice, precautionary 
principle, polluter-pays principle, high-level environmental protection. 
Carlarne (2008)702 Breadth, consistency, functionality, clarity, the balance of economic and 
environmental interests. 
OECD (2008)703 Comprehensiveness, urgency, credibility, and flexibility.  
Solomon and Hughey –Delphi 
Study (2007)704; Guglyuyatyy 
(2010)705 
environmental effectiveness; transparency; minimising rent-seeking; correct 
price signal; policy flexibility; GHG emission minimisation; public 
acceptability; political acceptability/feasibility, predictability/regulatory 
certainty, polluter-pays principle; effect on technology development; cost-
effectiveness; distribution of benefits and costs across generations; compliance 
costs; distribution of benefits and costs across income groups; competitiveness 
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Away” (2008) 30 Law and Policy 450 at 455. 
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704 D. S. Solomon and K. Hughey “A Proposed Multi Criteria Analysis Decision Support Tool for International 
Environmental Policy Issues: A Pilot Application to Emissions Control in the International Aviation Sector” (2007) 
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Recently, it has become apparent that climate laws help to reduce emissions.706 Eskander and 
Fankhauser suggest that the emergence and development of climate change laws and policies 
and their implementation contributed to a cumulative emissions savings of 38 gigatonnes of 
CO2 (GtCO2) from 1999 to 2016.707 However, countries need to promulgate measures for 
achieving the overarching goals set by legislation or national policies on mitigation and 
adaptation. This is where sector-specific regulatory rules will help address flaring, venting, and 
fugitive emissions in the upstream oil and gas sector.  
g) Working for new purposes 
Despite the backgrounds and heritages of the various regulatory arrangements and objectives 
in the case study countries, there is an opportunity to make different types of laws and 
regulations to work for new purposes, including reducing flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. In legal history, some doctrines and concepts have developed from their narrow 
scope to broader contexts for wider application.708 For example, the English law doctrine of 
fee simple was created originally for taxation, but it is currently used to describe an estate in 
land or a form of freehold ownership.709   
As the preceding analysis has shown, there are close relationships between resource 
conservation, regular environmental needs, health and safety concerns, climate change and 
upstream GHG emissions. Despite the relationships, the different laws do not provide a solid 
foundation to address petroleum upstream GHG emissions, apart from the specific rules and 
regulatory measures set out for that purpose. Most regulatory regimes predated the topical issue 
of climate change. Countries can improve and modify their laws to provide more relevant 
mitigation solutions for current times and work for new purposes. 
Politically, it may be easier to modify or repurpose existing laws to address problems. For 
example, the Clean Air Act of the USA was enacted in the 1960s without a specific mandate 
to govern climate change. The country’s legislature has not enacted new climate laws but the 
Clean Air Act is used to authorize USEPA to make rules to mitigate GHG emissions. Another 
valuable illustration is the refocused definition of resource conservation in California to capture 
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the reduction of GHG emissions associated with the development of hydrocarbon and 
geothermal resources.710 This expanded definition makes California’s resource conservation 
laws work for the new purpose of abating upstream GHG emissions. Arguably, other states and 
countries can make similar amendments, thereby repositioning and refocussing regulatory 
regimes. 
However, countries may not need to overhaul their entire regulatory regimes because of the 
need to address a new problem. Existing laws are already addressing other issues. Even if there 
could be slight modifications to avoid conflict of laws, a more sensible option may be to 
promulgate new regulations designed to address the problem of upstream GHG emissions. As 
the analysis reveals, the US, Canada, the UK, and Norway adopt this approach (Table 1). While 
the HSE, general industry governance and conservation laws of these countries have close 
relationships with upstream GHG emissions, they also have specific regulations dedicated to 
targeting upstream emissions. This approach also allows countries to develop innovative 
methods of regulating upstream GHGs without necessarily unsettling or overhauling existing 
laws set up for different purposes.   
Thus, clarity of regulatory objective/purpose emerges as a fundamental character of an 
effective regime that can drive upstream emissions reduction. The analysis also reveals that 
different legal and regulatory instruments often exist in petroleum-producing jurisdictions, but 
sometimes without precision about the specific objective of really achieving large-scale 
upstream GHG emissions reduction. Existing regulatory institutions exercise powers within the 
limits of legislative and regulatory provisions. Suppose the relevant laws and regulations 
clearly express an intention to regulate the upstream petroleum industry for GHGs. In that case, 
the applicable regulatory agencies will have the requisite mandate or authority to discharge 
their functions accordingly. 
As the analysis reveals, the non-IEA-designated producer economies – the USA, Canada, the 
UK, and Norway – state a clear intention to regulate upstream GHGs in their respective 
regulatory frameworks. Among IEA-designated producer economies, Nigeria emerges as a 
jurisdiction that targets upstream emissions, especially gas flaring and venting, by the recent 
regulatory changes. Other IEA-designated producer economies have an opportunity to 
undertake suitable legal reforms in this respect.  
 
710 Assembly Bill No. 1057, above n 447, at s. 9 amending s 3011 of the California Public Resources Code. 
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Furthermore, it is clear that multiple legal and regulatory instruments exist in petroleum-
producing jurisdictions for achieving set objectives. These are resource conservation laws, 
general industry governance legislation, general principle regulation, climate governance laws, 
HSE regulations and specific regulations that target upstream emissions. These all have close 
connections with the issue of upstream GHGs. They can also potentially work for new purposes. 
However, Canada, the US, the UK and Norway show that it may be more suitable to dedicate 
a specific and well-tailored regulation to address upstream emissions. This approach is better 
than leaving the issue to general industry or environmental governance measures that do not 
pay close attention to a particular industry problem. 
The idea of specificity is to focus regulatory attention on upstream GHG emissions with 
comprehensive details that show a serious commitment to providing a dedicated framework for 
mitigation. For example, most of the relevant regulations in American and Canadian 
jurisdictions are resource conservation laws and waste prevention rules. However, regulatory 
instruments capture ‘gas flaring’ or ‘methane’ as part of their titles. Such titles can help to 
clarify the principal objective of the regulation, but the more important point is the focus of 
their substantive provisions. 
This study shows that different laws and regulatory instruments exist in countries’ legal 
systems to govern various societal affairs. Recently, policymakers are formulating new 
measures to address novel problems. More nations are equally initiating mitigation strategies. 
Addressing upstream GHG emissions also necessitates the emergence of dedicated regulatory 
measures, requiring the promulgation of issue-specific and industry-specific instruments or 
reforming existing standards to work for new purposes. The implication for petroleum-
producing countries is to ensure the enactment of well-tailored regulations that encourage the 
reduction of gas flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. These considerations will be referred 
to in answering how petroleum-producing jurisdictions can satisfy the tests for regulatory 
effectiveness established in Chapter 2. However, the nature of comparative analysis in this 
section relates more to the first test as to whether countries have stated a clear aim or objective 
to regulate or reduce upstream GHG emissions. The analysis in the next section will point to 
the second test and other criteria for effectiveness.   
 Different Regulatory Methods 
The study reveals different methods for regulating upstream GHG emissions in various 
jurisdictions. These are flaring permit systems and pricing mechanisms (carbon taxes, fines, 
charges, and emissions trading schemes), emissions reduction targets and budgeting, 
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monitoring, and data collection (metering and quantification, leak detection and repair 
programmes). These are in addition to general obligations on resource conservation, waste 
prevention, and environmental protection. 
a) Flaring permit systems and price mechanisms 
Virtually all the case study countries prohibit flaring and venting without authorisation from 
the appropriate authority. Regulators impose monetary fines and taxes for excess flaring or 
flaring without the grant of a permit. Some jurisdictions such as Norway, the UK, and China 
implement emissions trading schemes (ETS). Fines, taxes, and mainstream ETS all operate as 
market-based instruments (MBIs) or price mechanisms in different regulatory regimes with 
various objectives, whether for resource conservation or general industry governance or 
specific measures targeting upstream GHG emissions. 
Permit systems can help to reduce emissions, but a lot depends on their structuring and 
decision-making process. The practice of allowing flaring and venting on the payment of small 
penalties, as Section A of this chapter shows, does not help much to mitigate upstream GHG 
emissions. This is precisely the experience of some oil and gas-producing countries where 
flaring fines are insignificant compared to the commercial value of flared and vented gas.711 A 
good example is Nigeria, where the law allows operators to flare over the volume stipulated by 
a permit on monetary penalty payment.712 The penalty regime may be a revenue spinner for the 
government, to the extent that operators are willing to make financial payments to continue 
flaring. The reality is that the accrued revenue from penalties falls short of flared gas’s actual 
economic value in the country. For example, according to the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation and the Nigerian National Assembly’s findings, Nigeria loses two billion US 
dollars annually to flaring but it only extracts three billion Naira (slightly over 8 million US 
dollars) in penalties.713 It is indeed a pure waste of natural resources.   
What then should be a better permit system? A helpful approach could be to set significant 
flaring penalties. There is evidence to show that the flaring penalty level can influence the 
volume of flaring by operators.714 In Nigeria, for example, the volume of gas flaring reduced 
 
711 World Bank Regulation of Associated Gas Flaring and Venting: A Global Overview and Lessons (World 
Bank 2016) at 18 and 73. 
712 As identified in Part A of Chapter 3. 
713 NNPC Nigeria Gas Flared and Cost Implication (NNPC 30 July 2014); National Assembly Senate Committee 
on Gas Report on A Bill for An Act to Prohibit Gas Flaring in Nigeria and Prescribe Appropriate Penalties and 
for Related Matters (October 2018) at 3. 
714 Ladeinde Ayodeji Olaoluwa and Laniran Temitope Joseph “The Impact of Fines on the Volume of Gas 
Flared in Nigeria” (paper presented to the NAEE/IAEE International Conference, Nigeria, April 2015).  
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by 1% after the flaring penalty increased from USD0.03 per thousand cubic feet of flared gas 
in 1984 to USD3.50 in 2008.715 This is not much of a reduction but the finding suggests the 
probability of abating flaring with an increment in penalty. Oil and gas companies would prefer 
to flare gas and pay fines because the cost of re-injection or utilization is higher than the penalty 
for flaring, especially at sites where re-injection may be limited by well pressure and safety 
issues. In addition, Nigeria suffers from the issues of insufficient gas markets and the necessary 
infrastructure for optimal gas utilization.716 However, if regulators structure the system so that 
the penalty cost increases annually, companies may invest more in energy efficiency measures 
and gas utilization. Therefore, while other regulatory efforts targeting emissions abatement 
continue, regulators can also consider adopting more stringent permit terms and conditions that 
can influence the rate at which flaring and venting occur in the industry. Aside from the 
exceptions to flare or vent gas as part of emergency measures or other unplanned occurrences, 
regulators may stipulate technical standards for operators to satisfy before issuing flaring 
permits. Some specific examples from Canadian and American regimes are the requirements 
to route the recovered gas to a collection system, re-inject the recovered gas, or use the 
recovered gas as an onsite fuel or raw material. Regulators in other countries can consider 
incorporating these technical requirements and reduce the volume of GHG emissions that occur 
through flaring and venting.   
 
Other carbon pricing tools such as taxes, charges, and ETS are familiar MBIs that can 
incentivise energy efficiency and GHG emissions reduction. 717  They are market-oriented, 
unlike traditional command and control regulation and industry-oriented technical measures 
such as good oilfield practice. The EU, UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Norway 
were the earliest countries to implement emissions trading in the late 1990s and early 2000s.718 
In contemporary times, different jurisdictions may have varied forms of carbon tax and 
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emissions trading schemes. Norway stands out amongst all the countries under the study. It 
simultaneously implements carbon tax and emissions trading to address climate change in its 
oil and gas industry.719  
Hood has argued for packages of complementary energy and climate policies, whereby carbon 
pricing can co-exist with other governance measures.720 Besides, research shows that multiple 
jurisdictions that implement carbon pricing or other MBIs also operate other regulatory 
mechanisms. 721  This policy and regulatory complementarity can address the diverse 
dimensions of climate change mitigation and the need to design sector-specific measures 
carefully.722 Therefore, it is valuable to try a mix of different measures comprising social, legal, 
and market-based instruments while avoiding path dependencies for deep decarbonization.723  
Nonetheless, carbon pricing schemes face serious ideological opposition and have 
shortcomings in changing behaviour.724 Two key examples are the inertia of a fossil fuel-
dominated economy and the risk of being regressive. It is true that the global economy presently 
relies mainly on fossil fuel sources, irrespective of measurable gains from renewables and other 
sources of clean energy.725 On the other hand, internalizing the monetary cost of emissions, if 
a price signal is used, increases the price of petroleum products, goods, transportation, and 
social services. The high, middle-class, and low-income earners will feel the effects of carbon 
pricing differently, with the worst affected low-income earners. This explains the regressive 
nature of carbon pricing. 726  This regressive character makes it difficult to alter behaviour 
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through carbon pricing. Instead of behavioural change, there is the danger of social reaction 
and resistance to unfair policy measures. The recent French gilets jaunes (yellow vests) fuel 
tax protest is a perfect example in this respect.727 Recycling revenues from carbon pricing – 
through carbon dividend payment and revenue neutrality – can help avoid carbon pricing’s 
regressive effect.728 Another solution, which Hood proposes, is using revenues generated from 
carbon pricing to stimulate the economy in different ways.729  
An important consideration is how carbon pricing measures such as emissions trading schemes 
affect upstream GHG emissions. Do they cover upstream emissions? Do they send strong price 
signals that can incentivise a noticeable reduction in emissions? Emissions trading schemes 
can be spotty in their coverage. The World Bank Annual Carbon Pricing Trends Report 2019730 
finds that, as of 2019, there were 57 carbon pricing schemes around the world – 28 emissions 
trading systems and 29 carbon taxes. At this global level, these pricing initiatives, according to 
the report, cover only 11 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e), about 20% of 
global GHG emissions.731 The report also observes the insufficiency of coverage and price 
levels of carbon pricing initiatives.732 The targeted sectors are majorly electricity, transport, 
aviation, buildings, waste, forestry, agriculture, fossil fuels, and shipping; but pricing initiatives 
in countries do not cover all these areas collectively. 733  Similarly, the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report 2019 finds that, as of 2019, no 
country had ambitious, comprehensive CO2 pricing in all sectors of the economy.734 These 
reports show that pricing schemes are selective in their scope of coverage. In fact, as the 
regulatory overview shows, upstream oil and gas emissions are rarely included in countries’ 
emissions trading schemes. 
For price signals, the IPCC suggests that, by 2030, countries should charge at least US$135 per 
tonne of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) of GHG emissions and increase the sum annually, leading to 
a minimum of US$690 per tCO2e at the end of the 21
st century for a 50-66% probability of 
 
727 The Yellow Vests Movement all started in October 2018 when French President Emmanuel Macron proposed 
hike in fuel tax, specifically diesel tax. Majority of French citizens rejected the proposed hike and protested 
through street riots. 
728 Barry Barton and Jennifer Campion “Energy Justice and the Design of Climate Change Legislation: Avoiding 
Regressive Measures” in Iñigo del Guayo and others (eds) Energy Justice and Energy Law (OUP 2020) 203 at 
208-209. 
729 Hood, above n 720, at 25. 
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keeping peak temperature below 1.5°C.735 The World Bank Carbon Pricing Trends Report also 
finds that initiatives worldwide fall short of the IPCC’s estimates.736 These findings show that 
current carbon pricing measures have insufficient price signals for climate change mitigation. 
At country-specific levels, some of the case study jurisdictions adopt price mechanisms as part 
of their regulatory methods to abate upstream GHG emissions, either in the form of 
direct/indirect climate charges and carbon taxes based on resource value. However, these 
countries’ carbon prices fall short of IPCC’s stipulated price level for real pressure.  
The US states of North Dakota and Alaska provide examples of a good carbon pricing 
arrangement. In North Dakota, the law stipulates the payment of equal monetary value for 
flared gas.737 In Alaska, the legal requirement is for operators to pay double the fair market 
value for flared gas. 738  Regulators can think along these lines when structuring monetary 
measures that can incentivise upstream GHG emissions reduction. This may require relevant 
research and modelling efforts to form an evidence base for ascertaining suitable prices. Thus, 
an appropriate carbon price or flaring penalty that outweighs the gas utilization cost may 
produce real pressure on companies to adopt better operational practices to mitigate emissions. 
It is equally necessary for countries to structure pricing mechanisms in ways that avoid social 
inequalities.739  Periodic reviews may help regulators ascertain feasible price thresholds to 
incentivise emissions reduction and avoid regressive pricing measures. Countries can also 
ensure good interaction between carbon pricing and other measures to promote 
complementarity and efficacy.740 
b) Intensity requirements proportional to resource output 
The stipulation of different intensity requirements per production well/field proportional to oil 
and gas output is a robust method for reducing the volume of flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions expended during oil and gas production. This is how energy efficiency measures can 
address the GHG emissions implications of the EROI concept. Intensity and efficiency 
requirements are more pronounced in the US and Canada. For example, in North Dakota, the 
law requires operators to utilize 75% of associated gas per field for beneficial consumption and 
 
735 IPCC Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global 
response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty; report 
available at https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/, at 152. 
736 World Bank, above n 730. 
737 See Part A, Section 2(b) of this chapter. 
738 See Part A, Section 2(c) of this chapter. 
739 Barton and Campion, above n 728. 
740 Hood, above n 720, at 20-25 
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connection to a gas gathering system.741 In California, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard requires 
that the carbon intensity benchmarks for fossil fuels and their substitutes should not exceed an 
average of 79.55 grams of CO2e per mega joule (gCO2e/MJ) from the year 2030 and beyond.742 
This requirement will eventually affect the carbon intensity of upstream GHG emissions.743 
However, the regulation is silent addressing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions 
particularly. There is an opportunity here for regulatory amendments to capture these types of 
emissions, which also account for the carbon intensity of fossil fuels that the law sets out to 
reduce. 
There are technical requirements for upstream GHG emission sources at the federal level in 
Canada. In respect of general production-related flaring, the intensity requirement is a limit of 
1,250m3 per month (that is 15,000m3 annually) for each producing field.744 However, as earlier 
highlighted, this stipulation takes effect from 1 January 2023.745 The provinces of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and British Columbia also have different intensity requirements. In Alberta, 
operators must collectively keep GHG emissions emanating from oil sands operations at a 
maximum of 100 mega tonnes of CO2 equivalent per annum.746 There are no field-by-field 
intensity requirements. There is an opportunity to stipulate proportionate intensity 
requirements at a field level to contribute to the general oil sands industry requirement. In 
Saskatchewan, production-related emission of APG must stay below 900 cubic meters per day 
per production well unless in emergency cases and to prevent fire or explosion.747 In British 
Columbia, operators’ obligation to utilize not less than 95% of natural gas per field instead of 
flaring or venting is another excellent example of intensity requirement proportional to 
resource output.748  
Similarly, Brazil provides another example of a flaring intensity requirement proportional to 
resource output. The applicable regulation limits flaring to 15% per production field and 
requires operators to utilize 85% of associated gas for beneficial purposes.749 This is what the 
 
741 See Part A, Section 2(b) of this chapter. 
742 Ibid, Table 1: LCFS Carbon Intensity Benchmarks for 2001 to 2030 for Gasoline and Fuels Used as a Substitute 
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law refers to as the associated gas utilization index.750 Similarly, in Nigeria, the new gas flaring 
regulation defines the associated gas utilization factor as “…the volume of associated gas 
utilized as a function of the total associated gas production volumes.”751 This definition implies 
a regulatory intention to make operators observe intensity requirements, but the law is silent as 
to the specifics. Instead, it obliges the Department of Petroleum Resources under the Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources to release publicly the associated gas produced in association with 
crude oil to calculate the gas to oil ratio for the preceding two years.752  
The preceding analysis suggests that some case study countries provide better examples of 
intensity requirements proportional to produced oil and gas. These include Brazil (requiring 
85% gas utilization per field), the Canadian province of British Columbia (requiring 95% gas 
utilization per field) and the American state of North Dakota (requiring 75% of gas utilization 
per field). Regulators in other jurisdictions can learn from the Canadian, Brazilian, and 
American examples. They can also stipulate annual incremental resource output proportional 
to emissions intensity so that the volume of resource output increases while the rate of gas 
flaring and venting reduces until near-zero over time.  
Nevertheless, these carbon intensity requirements are insufficient on their own to drive large-
scale decarbonisation without sufficient gas utilization infrastructure. The state of the local gas 
market needs to improve to support the commercialization of gas, as companies would want to 
derive economic benefits from the gas that they produce along with oil. For example, Texas 
has many interstate gas pipelines that help in utilizing gas,753 which is not the case in many 
other states. Nigeria’s recent Gas Commercialization Programme754 is ambitious but also a 
positive strategy for reducing flaring and venting. Saudi Aramco has a vast gas-gathering 
network of pipelines that helps in optimal gas utilization and drastically reducing flaring and 
venting, and helping Saudi Arabia to maintain a global gas flaring status of less than 1%, 
compared to other producing countries.755 Other jurisdictions can also support low carbon-
intensity requirements proportional to resource output by building gas pipeline networks or 
formulating policies that incentivise investors to embark on such projects. Equally, countries 
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will need to address institutional and political bottlenecks hampering the construction of cross-
border pipeline networks for transporting gas to international markets. 
c) Emissions reduction targets and budgeting 
One of the contemporary climate governance trends worldwide is the setting of emissions 
reduction targets. A corollary practice is emissions budgeting. At the international level, the 
Paris Agreement aims to limit temperature increase below 2°C and possibly further limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.756 A key regional example is the 
EU’s proposed 55% GHG emissions reduction, in addition to a 32.5% improvement in energy 
efficiency by 2030.757 Multiple countries have also committed to GHG emissions reduction 
with short-term and long-term goals. Sometimes these are through legislation and official state 
policies on climate change mitigation. Sometimes they are in countries’ communications in the 
form of NDCs under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. It makes sense for countries’ 
climate governance regimes to set emission reduction goals. However, it is also desirable to 
cover different emissions sources through sector-specific targets, which would be sectoral 
contributions for achieving the overall mitigation target set by policy or legislation.  
Target setting is apparent in some of the countries in this study. For example, while the UK, 
Nigeria, Canada, and Norway set general emission reduction targets, only Canada, Nigeria, and 
Saudi Arabia set specific emission reduction targets for the upstream petroleum sector. See 
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emissions reduction target 
UK 26% by 2020 80% by 2050 None 
Canada N/A 40-45% by 2025 Yes, 40-45% methane reduction 
Norway 40% by 2030 80-95% by 2050 None 
Nigeria N/A 45% by 2030 Yes, 100% flaring elimination by 
2030 
Saudi Arabia N/A N/A Zero routine flaring by 2030 
 
As part of specific regulatory measures, countries will need to set emissions reduction targets 
for the upstream petroleum sector to promote feasibility (realistically achievable) and equity 
(fairness to all parties). Setting very ambitious targets for a short period may be unrealistic and 
work to the operators’ unfair disadvantage. For example, requiring oil and gas companies to 
reduce emissions by 80% within an interval of two or three years may be unrealistic and unfair, 
considering the industry peculiarities, the dynamics surrounding upstream GHGs and the 
relatively short span of years. Some fundamental constraints are constructing the required 
equipment for gas utilization, the time and financial implications for designing and installing 
the equipment and the huge logistics involved in the entire process. 
A feasible and fair approach may be to set sector-specific incremental emissions reduction 
goals over a reasonable period. As Table 3 shows, Canada, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia are good 
examples of countries with sector-specific targets to reduce upstream GHG emissions, 
especially flaring. More so, the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador points to 
what an incremental emissions reduction target may look like. The province’s Management of 
Greenhouse Gas Regulations stipulate upstream sector-specific GHG emissions reduction 
goals for different years, beginning from 2019, as seen earlier in the chapter. Regulators in 
other jurisdictions may profit from using energy modelling results to determine the level of 
annual incremental upstream emissions reduction targets that will be necessary for achieving a 
set climate goals for the industry within a given period. The general idea of using modelling 
results to set emissions reduction targets is an emerging policy approach for climate change 
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mitigation.758  Perhaps, the model would consider factors that may influence the emission 
reduction potential for different onshore and offshore production sites, some of which are the 
required carbon abatement cost, time, technical feasibility for emissions savings, and efficiency 
measures.759 These can help in setting viable targets and avoid putting a huge compliance 
burden on industry operators.    
Besides, science-based climate targets and emissions budgeting serve as yardsticks to measure 
mitigation progress. They also help in instilling the consciousness of responsibility, acting, and 
striving for environmental leadership.760 More so, they are valuable elements that receive wide 
support in the climate law literature.761 While complementing general climate goals, specific 
sectoral targets would also help to capture and reduce upstream GHG emissions. 
The idea of setting emissions reduction targets has close connections with carbon budgeting. 
The concept ‘carbon budget’ is central in the climate science and policy literature. Its use here 
is in two contexts. The first relates to its global description as the cumulative amount of 
allowable carbon emissions to achieve global emissions reduction and temperature target.762 
Within this context, its relevance hinges on one logic – “precisely quantifying the fate of man-
made carbon dioxide is vital for reliably estimating future atmospheric CO2 levels and the 
contribution of this greenhouse gas to global climatic change.”763 It is common knowledge that 
global warming is proportionate to the quantum of GHGs released into the atmosphere.764 It 
becomes logical to set emissions reduction targets to reflect the balance in the global carbon 
budget.765 
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The second and immediate context of using the carbon budget is for regulatory and policy 
purposes at the national level to avoid the risk of setting climate targets that either 
underestimate or overestimate emission reduction limits and not knowing the true global 
warming implication of allowable emissions.766 Countries need to set budgets for different 
periods and ascertain how sectors or industries will contribute towards staying within the 
budget. In this context, there could be a particular allocation to the upstream petroleum sector 
to control the volume of GHG emissions emanating from oil and gas production. 
Among the case study countries, only the UK is a good example where climate policy 
frameworks require carbon budgeting, which covers successive periods of five years, beginning 
from 2008 to 2012, 2013 to 2017, and 2018 to 2022.767 Yet, there remains a need to determine 
how the upstream petroleum sector will contribute to staying within the budget to reduce flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions.  
d) Process and outcome measures 
There are varying degrees of procedural and technical requirements to control emissions across 
the case study countries. From the regulatory overview above, the most striking examples 
include plans for flaring and venting; monitoring, data collection and asset integrity 
management; and emissions quantity disclosure through a periodic reporting scheme. A 
comparative analysis of these measures across the case study countries will probably reveal 
good practices for regulatory purposes.    
(1) Plans for flaring and venting 
The case study countries collectively reveal two different approaches to planning to manage 
flaring and venting. The regulatory regimes in some jurisdictions provide no express plans or 
even requirements for the grant of a flaring or venting permit. Instead, there is room for the 
exercise of discretion by the regulator or the minister while issuing flaring and venting permits 
on a case-by-case basis.  
We can briefly consider the nature of discretion and ascertain how it can promote or hamper 
better outcomes in the regulation of upstream GHG emissions, especially in relation to granting 
permits for flaring and venting. Administrative law reveals that discretionary powers must be 
exercised reasonably and in good faith, and on proper grounds – in other words, they must not 
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be abused.768 It has also been argued that unchecked discretion can create opportunities for 
corruption and discrimination and open the regulatory agency to capture by the regulated 
entities.769  These can be avoided where the exercise of discretion is governed by certain 
principles – legality, consistency, proportionality, non-discrimination, due process, 
transparency and accessibility, efficiency, and expertise.770 By legality, there is a clear legal 
rationale for the exercise of discretion. Consistency requires that the regulator or institution 
exercising discretionary powers applies similar standards to similar cases. The applicable 
processes and requirements must also be in the public domain and accessible to the regulated 
entities. The regulator also needs to possess the requisite expertise to exercise reasonable 
judgement on the subject-matter in question.    
When applying these considerations to the grant of flaring and venting permits, the major 
concern is whether countries’ regulatory regimes provide enough information about the 
processes and requirements or standards that oil and gas operators must satisfy before being 
granted authorisation to flare or vent gas. This is a missing element in the legal regimes of most 
countries examined in this chapter, where the law vests discretionary powers on the minister 
of petroleum resources or any other applicable regulator to grant flaring and venting permits, 
without providing the standards that must be fulfilled by operators. We can point to Iraq, 
Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and China, as Section A of this chapter discussed. 
Regulators in these jurisdictions are empowered to grant flaring permits on a case-by-case 
basis, with the condition to pay penalties for flaring more than authorised quantities or quotas. 
We can relate this approach to the earlier discussion about the use of insignificant pricing 
mechanisms that do not create real pressure for operators to reduce emissions, the consequence 
being that operators can always get permits and pay penalties for excess flaring and venting of 
gas. This is not a good process measure as it creates uncertainty and does not provide 
ascertainable benchmarks for the oil and gas industry. Good decision-making must be 
characterised by a regime that gives certainty and predictability to the regulated industry.771 
Uncertainties and unpredictability can also lead to the application of different standards in 
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similar cases. This is where the exercise of discretionary power can create rooms for corruption 
and discrimination. 
There are better plans for flaring and venting in Brazil, the US, Canada, the UK, and Norway. 
This is because of the mandatory gas utilization ratios in some of these countries and explicit 
flaring and venting control rules that do not rely on the regulator or minister’s discretion. 
Recently, it is becoming more important for countries to clearly specify procedural standards 
to limit or check the erratic exercise of discretionary powers.772 For example, the regulations 
in the US states of Texas, North Dakota, Alaska, and California provide specific conditions for 
the grant of flaring and venting permits and technical requirements that operators must comply 
with as part of permit conditions. These clear provisions give certainty and predictability to oil 
and gas operators. 
The Canadian province of Alberta provides a good example of a jurisdiction with robust flaring 
and venting plans and avoids the unreasonable exercise of discretion in the grant of flaring and 
venting permits. The Gas Flaring and Venting Decision Tree requires operators to satisfy four 
major tests – public concern test, safety concern test, economic alternatives test, environmental 
impacts/benefits test – and scale through three stages: (1) to eliminate flaring, venting and 
incineration; or (2) reduce flaring, venting and incineration; or (3) meet performance and 
venting and fugitive emissions management requirements. 773  The detailed performance 
requirements cover flares and incinerators in the entire upstream oil and gas systems for 
burning sweet, sour, and acid gas, including portable equipment used for temporary operations, 
including well completion, servicing, and testing.774 This thesis does not discuss the extensive 
technical requirements, but the point to note here is the need to provide clear and detailed 
performance requirements covering upstream installations, components, and processes 
associated with flaring and venting. In addition to these, operators have a mandatory obligation 
to give notice of at least 24 hours to the Alberta Energy Regulator, residents, and schools within 
a close radius of the flare site in advance of any temporary flaring, venting and incineration.775  
In the UK, the plans for flaring and venting are part of the consent application process. The 
regulator – the Oil and Gas Authority – usually issues flaring and venting consents to operators 
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on an annual and field-by-field basis.776 A fundamental component of the consenting process 
is considering supporting factors, which are the submission of all appropriate data and 
evidence, alternative uses for the gas to be flared, the best application of technology, the 
operator’s historical performance and relevant upstream installation(s). 777  One distinctive 
feature of these plans for flaring is the consideration of the historical performance of the 
operator. This enables the regulator to exercise discretion favouring operators that show 
operational efficiency and incentivises operators with a poor performance record to ensure 
improvements, thereby promoting industry operational efficiency. 
Like the UK, operators in Norway obtain flaring permits annually from the Pollution Control 
Authority (now merged with the Norwegian Environment Agency under the Ministry of 
Climate and Environment).778 The regulatory requirement for the grant of emissions permit is 
for operators to prove that they can monitor and report emissions in a satisfactory manner.779 
Besides, there are no detailed technical specifications like the practice in Canada, the US, and 
the UK. The issuance of an emissions permit is on a case-by-case basis and without the need 
to specify emissions limits in the permits.780 
Other case study countries can improve their regimes regarding plans for flaring and venting 
by learning from the Alberta decision tree and other explicit provisions prevalent in the US and 
the UK. Such express regulatory requirements and technical specifications for controlling 
flaring and venting will help to provide clarity to operators and reduce the arbitrariness 
associated with the exercise of discretion by the regulator or minister. 
(2) Monitoring, data collection and asset integrity management 
Frequent emissions monitoring is an essential widely acknowledged requirement for emissions 
reduction. 781  Also, mandatory metering and reporting help in data collection for suitable 
mitigation strategies. Some known approaches are spectroscopic techniques (like infrared), 
 
776 OGA Flaring and Venting Guidance Note 2016. 
777 OGA Policy Position on Flaring and Venting 2018. 
778 Above n 624. 
779 Ibid, at s.11. 
780 Ibid. 
781 David R. Lyon and others “Aerial Surveys of Elevated Hydrocarbon Emissions from Oil and Gas Production 
Sites” (2016) 50 Environmental Science Technology 4877; Tegan N. Lavoie and others “Spatiotemporal 
Variability of Methane Emissions at Oil and Natural Gas Operations in the Eagle Ford Basin” (2017) 51 
Environmental Science Technology 8001; Daniel Zavala-Araiza and others “Methane Emissions from Oil and 
Gas Production Sites in Alberta, Canada” (2018) 6:27 Elemental Science of the Anthropocene 
https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.284; D. J. Varon and others “Satellite Discovery of Anomalously Large Methane 
Point Sources from Oil and Gas Production” (2019) 46 Geophysical Research Letters 13,516.  
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electromechanical techniques, electronic sensors, and satellite data capturing. 782  However, 
methane emissions from the oil and gas industry have been historically difficult to measure.783 
Research shows that fugitive methane emissions and venting from oil and gas facilities are 
poorly monitored and measured, thereby increasing the uncertainty associated with estimating 
carbon intensity.784 
There are some good examples of frameworks for upstream emissions monitoring and data 
collection. In Nigeria, the newly introduced metering system requires all oil and gas lessees or 
licensees to install metering equipment to quantify the volume of flared gas and ensure that 
operators comply with set flaring limits.785  In Norway, there is close monitoring of industry 
compliance with regulatory requirements for emissions reduction. 786  In Saudi Arabia, the 
regulation requires monitoring VOCs,787 but this requirement is limited, as it does not extend 
to GHGs. The state regulatory regime there focuses predominantly on air quality improvements. 
In the United Kingdom, the emissions monitoring system requires emissions monitoring and 
waste management plans.788  
A contemporary regulatory practice is to prescribe leak detection and repair (LDAR) 
programmes by operators/licensees in some jurisdictions. LDAR is the process of detecting 
leaks (fugitive emissions) in oil and gas installations and repairing the defective components 
using recognised industry procedures or entirely changing them.789 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) acknowledges the possibility 
of variations across jurisdictions. However, it identifies five key elements of a good LDAR 
programme, including component identification, leak definition, component monitoring, 
component repair, and record-keeping.790 Component identification means locating the leaking 
component on the site of the operation physically. Leak definition envisages observing features 
 
782 Joanna Kamieniak, Edward P. Randviir and Craig E. Banks “The Latest Developments in the Analytical 
Sensing of Methane” (2015) 73 Trends in Analytical Chemistry 146-157. 
783 IEA “Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas” (IEA June 2020) <https://www.iea.org/reports/methane-
emissions-from-oil-and-gas>.  
784 Masnadi and others, above n 13, at 853. 
785 Above n 297, at s. 6. 
786 See Part A, Section 2(f) of this chapter. 
787 Appendix 1 of the General Environmental Regulations 2001: Environmental Protection Standards, 
Presidency of Meteorology and Environment, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Document No. 1409-01, B. 5. 
788 Petroleum Act, above n 577, at s. 4, columns 1 and 2. 
789 Nicholas P. Cheremisinoff “Leak Detection and Repair” in Nicholas P. Cheremisinoff (ed) Pollution Control 
Handbook for Oil and Gas Engineering (John Wiley & Sons 2016) 757 at 764. 
790 USEPA Leak Detection and Repair: A Best Practices Guide (USEPA 2007) at 9-12. 
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such as smell and drip. Component monitoring means to probe the observed leak. Component 
repair requires fixing the leak. Record-keeping entails documenting the entire process. 
We find the regulatory requirement to implement LDAR programmes prominently in American 
and Canadian regulations. In the United States, the Bureau of Land Management Waste 
Prevention Rule requires comprehensive LDAR program implementation for operations on 
federally controlled lands.791 USEPA also recognizes the possibility of more stringent LDAR 
programmes at state and local government levels.792 
In Canada, federal regulations require operators to implement LDAR schemes, conduct a 
regular inspection for leaks and take corrective measures.793 Again, these requirements apply 
to operations on federal lands. Provincial authorities have powers to promulgate rules at a local 
level. In Alberta, the applicable regulation does not explicitly mention LDAR but provides for 
a similar programme. It requires operators to conduct emission surveys using either organic 
vapour analyser, gas imaging camera or any other equipment capable of detecting fugitive 
emissions;794 and repair all detected sources of fugitive emissions.795 In British Columbia, 
operators must develop and implement LDAR programmes to address all sources of fugitive 
emissions.796 
This chapter does not offer a comprehensive discussion of asset integrity management. 
However, jurisdictions with regulatory requirements to implement LDAR programmes 
emphasize ensuring optimal asset integrity management of oil and gas installations and 
components. Petroleum engineers have built a wide consensus on the necessity of using LDAR 
for asset integrity management and reiterated this in multiple conferences.797 There is also a 
 
791 Waste Prevention Rule, above n 398, at p. 49190. 
792 USEPA Leak Detection and Repair: A Best Practices Guide (USEPA 2016) 1. 
793 Methane Regulations, above n 487, at ss. 28-36. 
794 Directive 060, above n 523, at s. 8.10.2.2 
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796 Flaring and Venting Reduction Guideline, above n 571, at s. 7.6. 
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strong argument by USEPA for augmenting risk mitigation and climate change mitigation in 
the oil and gas industry with LDAR.798 Therefore, there is credible evidence regarding LDAR 
programs’ potential to reduce emissions in upstream operations. It is perhaps a question of 
which technique to adopt amongst the array of choices and regulatory prescriptions. 
The implementation of LDAR programmes are by no means the only solutions to GHG 
emissions in the upstream petroleum sector. Nevertheless, they represent a good start for 
ensuring result-oriented approaches to address fugitive emissions. Regulators and relevant 
agencies may wish to take a cue from American and Canadian jurisdictions by incorporating 
LDAR programmes in rulemaking and policy processes. 
(3) Emissions quantity disclosure 
There is a similar annual upstream GHG emissions quantity disclosure/reporting obligation 
that runs through most case study countries. Countries with such an express regulatory 
requirement are Brazil, Nigeria, the USA, Canada, UK, Norway, and China. In contrast, there 
are varied approaches to emissions reporting in Iraq, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and 
Venezuela. Some countries in this second group do not specifically target the reporting of 
upstream GHG emissions but require the recording and reporting of pollutants and wastes as 
part of environmental protection obligations of oil and gas companies and other corporate 
entities. The countries that fall under this sub-category are Iraq and Russia. In Iraq, the 
proposed Hydrocarbons Law would require oil and gas operators and other businesses to report 
operational and accidental discharges, leakage, and environmental wastes.799 In Russia, the 
purpose of reporting pollutants and wastes is purely for paying rates for negative impacts on 
the environment.800 
There are also slight differences in Venezuela and the UAE. In Venezuela, there is no express 
reporting obligation. Still, the permissible flaring limits set on a case-by-case basis by the 
Ministry of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources presupposes the existence of a 
method by which the Ministry ascertains that companies keep emissions within allowed limits. 
In the UAE, companies must keep a record of emissions but have no reporting obligation, and 
the regulator can audit the recorded measurements.801 In Saudi Arabia, there is no known 
 
798 Nicholas P. Cheremisinoff “Augmenting Risk Mitigation with Leak Detection and Repair” in Nicholas P. 
Cheremisinoff (ed) Dust Explosion and Fire Prevention Handbook: A Guide to Good Industry Practices (John 
Wiley & Sons 2014) 305-318. 
799 Above n 275, art 31(8). 
800 Russian Environmental Protection Law, above n 313, art 16. 
801 UAE Environmental Protection Law, above n 343, art 53. 
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reporting obligation, just as there is an absence of regulation targeting upstream GHG 
emissions. 
The identified jurisdictions without clear emissions reporting obligations can learn from the 
countries with express reporting requirements. It is also necessary to target upstream GHG 
emissions, especially flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions, in addition to general 
environmental pollutants and waste reporting provisions. This express or specific approach is 
becoming increasingly important given the need to mitigate climate change in different energy-
intensive sectors. A statutory or regulatory obligation to record and report the volume of GHG 
emissions from an industry is helpful to ascertain whether companies comply with permit limits 
and the emission reduction goals set for the sector, where applicable.802 Research shows that 
compulsory carbon disclosure can influence business processes and the environmental 
performance of energy-intensive industries.803 However, there is little evidence to ascertain the 
volume of GHG emissions reduction resulting from such a mandatory reporting obligation.804 
This chapter has analysed the legal regimes applicable to upstream flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions in the case study countries. What comes clear is the existence of multiple objectives, 
institutions, choices of instruments and methods for incentivising upstream operators to reduce 
GHG emissions. However, sector-specific approaches and explicit technical operational 
requirements can be effective regulatory interventions, compared to general climate policy or 
energy and environmental governance frameworks. In addition, this chapter has identified how 
countries may repurpose their existing laws to work for new purposes with an example of the 
refocused definition of resource conservation in California to target upstream flaring and 
venting. These general threads will prove valuable while answering the research question of 
this thesis in the conclusions segment. 
 Alignment with regulatory effectiveness  
The preceding comparative analysis of the circumstances in the case study countries can be 
matched against the tests and criteria for assessing effectiveness established in Chapter 2. 
Within the context of this thesis, the two key tests here are whether there is an express objective 
to address upstream GHG emissions in countries’ regulatory regimes; and whether there are 
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stipulated methods for incentivising oil and gas operators to reduce upstream GHG emissions, 
particularly flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. The other criteria that can also inform the 
discussion are legislative mandate, accountability, fair and transparent procedures, sufficient 
expertise, efficient action. Some of the criteria and tests seem to be interwoven and can be 
considered together. For example, legislative mandate relates to whether there is a clear legal 
authority for the regulator to exercise powers for the regulation of upstream GHG emissions. 
This illustrates the first test, being an express objective to reduce emissions. In addition, 
efficient action relates to whether the regulator adopts methods and measures that help to 
achieve the regulatory mandate set in the applicable law or regulation. This aligns with the 
second test explained above as to whether oil and gas jurisdictions have suitable methods for 
incentivising operators to reduce GHG emissions. Thus, these criteria can be grouped and 
considered accordingly in the next paragraphs.  
a) Clear regulatory objective or legislative mandate to reduce 
emissions 
The analysis above shows that there are multiple regulatory goals in different jurisdictions. 
However, within the assessment framework of this thesis, it is desirable for countries to state 
an express regulatory objective to target upstream GHG emissions, especially flaring, venting 
and fugitive emissions. This clarity will give the relevant institution or agency a mandate or 
reason to exercise regulatory powers. The study reveals good examples of jurisdictions with 
this express mandate, and most of them having a specific legal instrument dedicated to 
addressing upstream GHG emissions. These are Canada, the USA, UK, Norway, and Nigeria. 
b) Suitable methods or efficient action to reduce emissions 
What we also see in different countries is the existence of various regulatory methods. In most 
cases, there are environmental and petroleum industry governance approaches; and even 
general principle regulation such as the requirement to adhere to good oilfield practice. The 
key question to ask is whether these methods really spur efficient action to reduce upstream 
GHG emissions.  
The analysis above suggests the need for countries to go beyond general petroleum and 
environmental law provisions and techniques to incorporate industry-specific approaches. 
Petroleum and environmental law provisions may be suitable for some things, but do not 
provide sufficient direction and detailed provisions that address the intricacies and peculiarities 
of upstream GHG emissions, apart from slight mentions of flaring and environmental 
protection obligations.  
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The kinds of industry-specific methods that can spur efficient action to reduce emissions are 
those considered in Section B.3 of this chapter. These are emissions reduction targets for the 
upstream petroleum sector, strict flaring permit systems and price measures that send a strong 
signal to operators, intensity requirements proportional to resource output, and various 
technical process measures. As we have seen in the regulatory arrangements in Canada, the 
USA, the UK, Norway, and Nigeria, most of these industry-specific methods were introduced 
in addition to existing petroleum and environmental laws, and with a specific focus on upstream 
GHG emissions.  
However, it is important to acknowledge that a jurisdiction may not be able to incorporate these 
industry-specific methods all together due to the lack of regulatory capacity to enforce 
sophisticated techniques. Thus, what this thesis has done is to present an array of suitable 
methods that petroleum-producing jurisdictions can use to improve their regimes based on legal 
culture and enforcement feasibility. 
c) Accountability and fair and transparent procedures 
Accountability and fair and transparent procedures relate to whether there is a system to make 
the regulator accountable in the exercise of powers and whether the regulator follows due 
processes established by law in a transparent manner that leaves no room for uncertainties and 
capriciousness (unpredictability). It is not easy to comprehensively assess how all these 
requirements play out in the entire regulatory frameworks of all jurisdictions, but one place to 
look at, from the review of countries’ laws, is the arrangement made for granting flaring and 
venting permits. This goes back to the exercise of discretion, discussed in section 3 of this 
chapter. If there is anything to add to that discussion, it is to emphasise that laws should provide 
express requirements for the grant of flaring and venting permits, and not leaving the issue to 
the individual will or judgement of the regulator. The Alberta Decision Tree805 illustrates how 
regulators can exercise discretion in ways that encourage operators to reduce emissions.   
Additionally, there are ways for countries to make their regulators or regulatory institutions 
accountable and transparent in the exercise of powers. Two good examples are the use of 
ministerial oversight and inter-ministerial consultation. While these are some of the 
mechanisms to insulate the regulator against capture,806 they can also prevent capriciousness 
in the grant of flaring and venting permits. Ministerial oversight occurs where a different office 
 
805 See Section A and Section B.3 of this chapter. 
806 Steven P. Croley “Beyond Capture: Towards a New Theory of Regulation” in David Levi-Flaur (ed) Handbook 
on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar 2011) 50 at 61-65 
126 
 
performs oversight functions towards watching the regulator/agency against capture-oriented 
industrial activities and inconsistent decisions. For example, the minister of the environment 
may be empowered to monitor the regulator/regulatory agency for upstream emissions to avoid 
processes that do not meet established standards. 
The regulatory regime can also provide for inter-ministerial consultation between the regulator 
for upstream emissions and other relevant ministries prior to the promulgation or amendment 
of emission reduction rules, including the decision-making process for granting flaring and 
venting permits. This may present a bureaucratic bottleneck that impedes quick decision-
making and promulgation of rules, but it also provides an opportunity for well-informed rules 
and decisions. It also helps to avoid the regulatory trilemma, as the inter-ministerial 
consultative process could reveal rules and approaches that are either weak, or too rigid, or 
over-familiar with the regulated industry. 
 
d) Sufficient expertise 
This attribute has not surfaced explicitly or implicitly in the analysis conducted in this thesis, 
but it is important to note how it can inform the effectiveness of countries’ regulatory regimes. 
The regulator or regulatory agency should comprise people with sufficient expertise regarding 
the subject matter, especially the specific prescriptions required for an effective regime and 
other complementary measures. A profound understanding of the core issues, processes that 
are responsible for upstream emissions and technical solutions would be helpful, if not 
necessary, for determining regulatory expertise. Regulatory failure can occur where the 
regulator is not acting with sufficient expertise, in addition to the absence of the other criteria 
for good regulation. Howlett and Ramesh have also argued that ‘regulatory capacity deficits’ 
can play huge roles in governance failures. 
One final point to add is that sufficient expertise across different methods can help countries 
incorporate a larger variety of techniques in regulating upstream GHG emissions, as they would 
have the required technical capacity to enforce sophisticated or complex requirements. 
In this chapter, we have encountered very dense materials, but they help in answering the 
research question. The central point to keep in mind is the fact that this thesis set out to identify 
some desirable regulatory characteristics that can incentivise oil and gas operators to reduce 
upstream GHG emissions, particularly flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Clearly, the 
analysis suggests that countries would need to expressly state an objective to reduce upstream 
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GHG emissions and prescribe some industry-specific methods for achieving that regulatory 
goal. These two elements will give a clear mandate to the relevant regulatory institution and 
provide ascertainable benchmarks for the oil and gas industry. Countries would also need to 
incorporate other regulatory criteria considered above, such as accountability, fair and 
transparent procedures, especially in respect of granting flaring and venting permits, and ensure 
that their regulators and regulatory institutions have sufficient expertise. These would avoid 
uncertainties and position countries’ legal systems to better regulate upstream GHG emissions. 
These considerations will contribute significantly to answering the research question in 



















 Industry Initiatives  
This chapter examines a decentred understanding of regulation through the lens of industry-
driven measures for addressing upstream GHG emissions. The perception of complementarity 
between public/government regulation and private regulation is well-rooted in literature,807 thus 
industry measures are not inimical to state regulation of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. 
It is becoming more important to understand how technological change affects the interactions 
between the two types of regulation.808 For the oil and gas industry, this is underpinned by the 
emergence of new strategies to promote environmental responsibility. 
Furthermore, sustainability is a cardinal concern for businesses, especially with increased 
climate change awareness. Sectoral frameworks and international cooperative initiatives have 
emerged to drive emissions reduction in the oil and gas industry, underscoring the need for 
transformative change. This chapter examines some of such initiatives as part of the 
international regulatory structure for energy and climate change governance. The chapter also 
discusses proposed and ongoing climate measures of oil majors for abating flaring, venting, 
and fugitive emissions. The technical capacities, wealth of information and experience, and 
rules of these organisations are clear pointers to the decentred understanding of regulation.  
The tests and criteria discussed in Chapter 2 for assessing effectiveness will also contribute to 
informing the discussion in this chapter, especially in relation to the goals set by industry 
operators and methods adopted to reduce upstream GHG emissions. The chapter will turn to 
these considerations after a discussion of some industry initiatives. 
 Flaring Reduction Partnerships 
Flaring and venting reduction initiatives have recently emerged on the international scene, with 
the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFRP) being the most prominent.809 The 
GGFRP and the 2030 Zero Routine Flaring (ZRF) are two key public-private partnership 
 
807 Russell W. Mills “The Interaction of Private and Public Regulatory Governance: The Case of Association-Led 
Voluntary Aviation Safety Programs” (2016) 35:1 Policy and Society 43-55; Emily S. Bremer "Private 
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Adoption by Multinational Corporations” in Christoph Dörrenbächer and Mike Geppert (eds) Multinational 
Corporations and Organization Theory: Post Millennium Perspectives Research in the Sociology of 
Organizations (Emerald Publishing Limited 2017) 445-478. 
808  Nicolas Schmid and others “Governing Complex Societal Problems: The Impact of Private on Public 
Regulation through Technological Change” (2020) Regulation and Governance 
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12314.  
809 Anastasia Rodina “Burning Through: Reducing Associated Petroleum Gas Flaring to Enhance Natural Gas 
Resources Governance” (2016) Law in Transition Journal 82 at 89. 
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initiatives of the World Bank to address gas flaring and venting.810 The GGFRP comprises 18 
governments, 13 international oil companies (IOCs) and 3 international organizations totalling 
34 members.811 It started in 2002, with the key objective of catalysing optimum gas utilization 
by removing technical and regulatory barriers to flaring reduction through stakeholder 
facilitation, policy change, research, dissemination of best practices and project 
implementation. 812  The ZRF has over 27 states, 34 IOCs, and 34 intergovernmental 
organization totalling 95 participating members.813 It began operations in the year 2015 with 
the set objective to end routine flaring by 2030.814 
These initiatives – the GGFRP and the ZRF partnerships – have specific instruments through 
which they operate. Although the direct regulation of gas flaring falls within countries’ 
jurisdiction and their relevant national energy and environmental authorities,815 the GGFRP and 
ZFR periodically formulate complementary guidelines for GHG emissions reduction. For 
example, the 2008 Guidelines for Flare and Vent Measurement recommends using gas-to-oil 
ratios, mass balance, and process simulations as best practice for flare and vent estimation to 
achieve accurate measurement and mapping of suitable reduction methodologies.816 A further 
2009 guidance recommends targeted frameworks and appropriate penalties to incentivise 
flaring and venting reduction; and states clarity, autonomy, participation, accountability, 
transparency and predictability as criteria for regulators.817 Later technical guidance on gas 
monetization proposes processes and new technologies to convert flared gas into chemicals 
and liquid fuels instead of flaring and venting.818 
The multi-sectoral character of participants of these initiatives – comprising national oil 
companies (NOCs), international oil companies (IOCs), governments of sovereign states, and 
relevant international and intergovernmental organisations – provides a good platform for 
exchanging ideas amongst key stakeholders. These initiatives may have played a part in the 5% 
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global flaring reduction that Chapter 1 highlighted. There could have also been country-specific 
measures and other factors such as the influence of oil prices and declining production levels 
contributing to the drop in global gas flaring. For oil prices, OPEC and the United States Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) statistics reveal that the oil prices for 2017 increased beyond 
the prices for 2016. The OPEC yearly basket prices for oil in 2016 and 2017 were USD 40.76 
and USD 52.43 respectively per barrel.819 According to the EIA, Brent Crude and West Texas 
Intermediate Crude reached USD 65 and USD 51 respectively per barrel in 2017, being the 
highest end-of-year oil prices since 2013.820 These statistics show that oil price may have had 
no influence on the drop in global gas flaring. More generally, high oil and gas prices make 
good economic sense to utilize gas or implement gas-to-liquid initiatives to reduce flaring and 
venting.821 
One would have probably expected oil production levels to grow in line with high crude prices, 
but the reverse was the case for the period under reference. Instead, there was a global 
curtailment of production inventories by OPEC and some non-OPEC member countries, 
leading to a world crude oil production decline by 701,000 barrels per day (b/d), or 0.9% 
compared to 2016, to reach 74.69 million b/d, marking the first yearly decline since 2009.822 
This difference in production levels and the quantum of economic activities between 2016 and 
2017 may have contributed to the drop in global gas flaring emanating from upstream crude 
production. In addition, disruptions caused by COVID-19 resulted an 8% decline in global oil 
production from 82 million b/d in 2019 to 76 million b/d in 2020.823 However, US production 
of crude grew by 5.6% within the timeframe, leading to a record production in 2018 and 2019 
of 10.7 million barrels per day and 11.3 million barrels per day, respectively.824 Libya also 
recorded a crude production increase by 427,000 b/d, or 109.5%, due to OPEC curtailment 
exemption.825 
These flaring reduction partnerships are all reasonable measures to address upstream GHG 
emissions. However, host states would need to further work on incremental steps, policy 
milestones, and strategies to achieve zero flaring. Such actions could include annual flaring 
reduction targets leading up to 2030 or any other future date(s). 
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 Emissions Reporting Schemes: The Carbon Disclosure Project 
 
Carbon disclosure and reporting schemes have evolved over the years with initiatives such as 
the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, International Standards Organisation 14064-1:2018 for 
Greenhouse Gas Accounting and Verification, the United Nations Global Compact and Global 
Reporting Initiative and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). These reporting schemes enable 
corporations to strategize on carbon risks and influence appropriate decision-making for 
climate change mitigation.826 This thesis examines the CDP as a test case because it is one of 
the earliest reporting systems827 and among the most commonly used reporting platforms.828 
The CDP, based in the United Kingdom, was founded in 2002.829 It affords companies, regions, 
states, cities and investors a platform to self-measure and manage their environmental 
footprints. 830  Its reporting parameters include risks and opportunities, performance, GHG 
emissions accounting and governance.831 Research shows that companies’  strategies to address 
climate change may be supported by their annual corporate reports showing quadrants such as 
environmental asset management, loss and pollution prevention, GHG emissions and 
mitigating strategies.832 
Corporate environmental awareness through carbon disclosure schemes can incentivise 
corporate adoption of innovative solutions for emissions reduction. 833  The environmental 
performance or climate compliance of oil and gas companies may add to such companies’ 
reputation and validate their social licence to operate before shareholders, investors, the public 
and surrounding communities.834 This is the central idea behind the social license to operate 
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concept. Although it is yet to be formally entrenched into legal systems, its recurrence can spur 
corporate entities into changing their modus operandi.835    
However, the voluntarist approach of the CDP inhibits consistency or continuity of corporate 
emissions disclosure by oil and gas companies. While some players may be willing to disclose 
their emissions profile, others may not always be willing to do so because of poor 
environmental profile.836 There are also considerable variations in emissions data reporting. 
Some firms are comprehensive in their response to annual surveys, and others are opaque and 
hide their emissions profile from public scrutiny.837 For example, according to available data, 
between the years 2016 to 2018, organisations reacted differently to the CDP’s disclosure 
requests.838 While some companies responded and attained different scores, some others failed 
to respond in some cases and responded partially. For example, Total participated in the years 
2016, 2017 and 2018, with ‘B’, ‘A’, and ‘A’ ratings for the three years, respectively. Royal 
Dutch Shell participated in the three years under reference, with ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ ratings. 
Chevron participated in 2016 and 2017, with ‘B’ ratings for the two years, but declined to join 
in 2018. British Petroleum (BP) participated in 2016 and 2017, with ‘B’ and ‘A’ ratings for the 
two years but did not respond to the 2018 disclosure request. Exxon Mobil participated in 2016 
and 2017, with ‘C’ ratings for the two years, but did not respond to the 2018 disclosure request, 
as BP. Sinopec did not respond to disclosure request at all for the three years under reference. 
Saudi Aramco and Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. never participated in the initiative, at least 
from its inception until 2018, probably because they do not have shareholders and listed stock 
prices to worry about within the years under reference (2016-2018). The participation of these 
and other NOCs can improve emissions data availability and accountability of the CDP process, 
considering the fact that NOCs control vast amounts of oil and gas reserves and production. In 
2011, the World Bank reported that NOCs controlled approximately 90% of global oil reserves 
and 75% of global production.839 A more recent study finds that they account for about 55% of 
global production.840 In addition, the proportion of upstream petroleum investment carried out 
 
835 Chilenye Nwapi “Can the Concept of Social License to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal System” 
(2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349 at 350, 358 and 364.   
836 Dayuan Li and others “Environmental Legitimacy, Green Innovation, and Corporate Carbon Disclosure: 
Evidence from CDP China 100” (2018) 150 Journal of Business Ethics 1089 at 1098 and 1100. 
837 Daniel C. Matisoff, Douglas S. Noonan and John J. O’Brien “Convergence in Environmental Reporting: 
Assessing the Carbon Disclosure Project” (2013) 22 Business Strategy and the Environment 285 at 287, 288 and 
295. 
838 CDP, above n 829. 
839 Silvana Tordo, Brandon S. Tracy and Noora Arfaa National Oil Companies and Value Creation (World 
Bank Working Paper No. 218, 2011) at xi, 5, and 96. 
840 Natural Resource Governance Institute The National Oil Company Database (Natural Resource Governance 
Institute April 2019) at 2. 
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by NOCs is increasing, while that of IOCs is decreasing.841 For example, the share of upstream 
investments by NOCs, IOCs, and others in 2018 and 2019 were 44%, 19%, and 37%, 
respectively.842 In 2020, the figures stood at 47%, 18%, and 35%, respectively.843 This shifting 
trend justifies the need for serious regulatory intervention by countries and the commitment of 
NOCs to reduce the carbon footprint of their increasing operations. More so, the IEA has shown 
that petroleum-producing countries with NOCs account for approximately 75% of global 
methane emissions, with 66% of global methane emissions coming from 15 NOCs,844 covering 
all the case study countries in this thesis.  
A vital issue to consider is whether the disclosures actually lead to reducing flaring, venting, 
and fugitive emissions. Scholars have asserted that the petroleum industry has increased 
corporate greenwashing and environmentalism in the heat of the climate change debate.845 The 
annual corporate reports, carbon reporting to voluntary schemes such as the CDP, and industry-
driven mitigation strategies may be symbolic of corporate environmentalism. Such corporate 
gestures may not necessarily guarantee emissions reduction or disclose the industry’s actual 
environmental status or performance. 846  However, it is logical to expect that oil and gas 
producing companies’ reported environmental indices translate into tangible and feasible 
investments in emissions reduction technologies. Such investments would match emissions 
reports with corresponding actions that translate into climate change mitigation. 
 The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative and Private Corporate Measures 
 
The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) is a contemporary example of the petroleum 
industry’s commitment to addressing climate change. 847  Ten of the world’s largest oil 
companies, including investor-owned companies and national oil companies, launched the 
initiative at the UN Climate Summit in New York, September 2014.848 The cardinal objectives 
of the OGCI include reducing energy footprint (energy intensity), accelerating low-carbon 
solutions and enabling a circular carbon model through carbon capture, use and storage, 
 
841 IEA Oil 2021, above n 121, at 56. 
842 Ibid. 
843 Ibid. 
844 See IEA Methane Tracker data at <https://www.iea.org/reports/methane-tracker-2020/methane-from-oil-
gas>.   
845  Frances Brown After Greenwashing: Symbolic Corporate Environmentalism and Society (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) at 15 and 76.  
846 Le Luo and Qingliang Tang “Does Voluntary Carbon Disclosure Reflect Underlying Carbon Performance?” 
(2014) 10 Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 191 at 196. 
847 Matthew S. Bach “Is the Oil and Gas Industry Serious About Climate Action?” (2017) 59:2 Environment: 




improved industrial energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction, and transport emissions 
reduction.849 It also plans a ten-year USD1 billion investment in these areas through USD100 
million contribution from each member.850 These programmes cover a wide range of mitigation 
matters, but only some concern upstream flaring, venting, and leakage.  
Oil and gas companies seem to be playing active roles in mitigating climate change through 
the OGCI.851 There are reasons to justify this positive perspective. Member companies of the 
OGCI have made financial commitments in terms of investments in technologies and research 
and development of innovative operation methods to reduce GHG emissions.852 In 2017, the 
OGCI provided monetary and technical assistance to two studies on methane emissions and 
invested in Achates Power, a company researching the development of energy-efficient engines 
to reduce upstream GHG emissions.853 These and similar investments have emissions reduction 
potentials.854 Similarly, all its members provided emissions data at the time of writing and 
collectively invested USD5.5 billion in low carbon energy technologies and acquisition.855 The 
unanimous willingness of its members to provide emissions data signals transparency and 
commitment to reducing emissions.856  
Aside from the collective industry action by the OGCI, oil and gas majors have also 
independently and individually acknowledged the problem of anthropogenic climate change, 
their share of responsibility and enunciated self-imposed targets and GHG emissions reduction 
measures.857 Table 4 summarises the net-zero targets and plans to reduce flaring and venting, 
set by eight OGCI members, mostly announced in 2020. 
 
 
849 OGCI “A Catalyst for Change” (OGCI 2018) <www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com>; Climate Initiatives 
Platform “Oil and Gas Climate Initiative” (Climate Initiatives Platform September 2018) 
<www.climateinitiativesplatform.org>.   
850 Ibid. 
851  Matthew Bach “The Oil and Gas Sector: From Climate Laggard to Climate Leader?” (2019) 28:1 
Environmental Politics 87 at 94 and 97. 
852 OGCI Multinational CO2 Storage Resource Assessment: Availability of CO2 Storage Capacity in Key Markets 
(OGCI November 2017) at 2. 
853 OGCI Collaborating to Realize the Energy Transition: A Report from the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI 
October 2017) at 10. 
854 Ibid. 
855 OGCI At Work Committed to Climate Action: A Report from the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI 
September 2018) at 53. 
856 Matisoff, Noonan and O’Brien, above n 837. 
857 Jon Birger Skærseth and Tora Skodvin Climate Change and the Oil Industry: Common Problem, Different 
Strategies (Manchester University Press 2003) at 43, 65 and 67. 
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Table 4: Net-zero targets by major oil and gas companies 
Company Climate Target Targets for Flaring, venting and fugitive emissions Date Announced 
Repsol Net-zero company by 2050 Part of the net-zero target December 2019858 
Equinor Net-zero company by 2050 Part of the net-zero target November 2020859 
BP Net-zero company by 2050 Part of the net-zero target February 2020860 
Eni Net-zero company by 2050 Part of the net-zero target February 2020861 
Shell Net-zero company by 2050 
or sooner 
Part of the net-zero target April 2020862 
Total Net-zero company for 
European business interests 
by 2050 
Net-zero flaring and venting by 2030 and a 
short-term flaring reduction target of 80 per 
cent from 2010 to 2020863 
May 2020864 
Occidental Net-zero company between 
2040-2050 
Part of the net-zero target November 2020865 
Exxon 
Mobil 
Net-zero company by 2050 Part of the net-zero target February 2021 
 
The flaring reduction partnerships, emissions reporting schemes, the work of the OGCI, and 
the private corporate measures by oil majors underscore a commitment by the oil and gas 
industry to mitigate upstream flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Although these 
initiatives are still in their early phases, they point to one of the decentred understandings of 
regulation theory (private regulation), which Chapter 2 discussed. However, while oil majors 
may have crucial roles and commendable initiatives, petroleum-producing states need to ensure 
effective regulatory regimes through relevant reforms. The two types of regulation – private 
regulation and state regulation – support each other. 
In summary, it is important to say how industry measures align with the conceptual framework 
defined in Chapter 2. This needs to be done with an understanding that the conceptual 
framework primarily targets state regulatory measures. The consideration of industry initiatives 
 
858  Repsol Strategic Plan 2021-2025: Stepping Up the Transition: Driving Growth and Value, available at 
<www.repsol.com>.  
859 Equinor’s Net-Zero Announcement, available at <www.equinor.com>. 
860 BP’s Net-Zero Announcement, available at <www.bp.com>. 
861 Eni’s Long-Term Strategic Plan to 2050 and Action Plan 2020-2023, available at <www.eni.com>.  
862 Shell’s Responsible Investment Annual Briefing Updates, available at <www.shell.com>. 
863 Total “Our Commitments and Improvement Indicators” (Total 2019) <www.total.com>. 
864 Corporate Policy Announcement: Supporting EU’s carbon neutrality target, Total commits to become a Net 
Zero Emission Company for all its European Businesses by 2050, available at <www.total.com>. 
865 Occidental’s Climate Report 2020: Pathway to Net-Zero, available at <www.oxy.com>. 
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has been to appreciate how a decentred understanding of the theory of regulation applies to 
upstream GHG emissions reduction, and to identify how oil and gas companies are working to 
complement state approaches to the problem. However, the two fundamental questions to ask 
are whether there is a clear goal to reduce emissions, and whether there are specific methods 
adopted to achieve the set goal? 
One can answer these questions in the affirmative. As the discussion shows, there is a clear 
intention by oil and gas operators to reduce upstream GHG emissions. Most oil majors have 
also set carbon-neutrality goals for 2050, as Table 4 illustrates. Secondly, this chapter has 
provided a good summary of various industry-driven and industry-specific initiatives that are 
used by operators to reduce emissions. One can also point to the presence of another element 
of a good regulatory regime in the various private initiatives of oil and gas companies. As 
Chapter 2 showed, technical expertise is one of the key elements of regulatory powers outside 
state control. The acumen and industry-focused solutions developed and rolled out by the oil 
and gas industry, either through collective or private measures, clearly evidence the exercise 
of independent regulatory powers.   
However, it is important to recall that the primary focus of this thesis is on regulatory 
interventions by states. Even though there can be complementarity between state and industry 
regulatory measures, a lot depends on sovereign states that control a vast majority of oil and 













 Insights and Law Reform   
This chapter summarizes the insights drawn from this thesis and canvasses a law reform agenda 
to improve the legal frameworks in petroleum-producing countries. What is the point in 
ensuring optimal regulatory frameworks for reducing upstream GHG emissions? Why is it 
necessary to compare regimes across multiple petroleum jurisdictions? The conceptual 
significance of this thesis narrows down to ‘regulatory effectiveness’ regarding upstream GHG 
emissions reduction. The study has explored the theory of regulation and applied it to analyse 
the applicable regimes of twelve countries. The fundamental question to ask from the preceding 
chapters is what key elements constitute an effective regime for abating flaring, venting, and 
fugitive emissions? These questions can also be answered in relation to the tests for designing 
an effective regulatory regime, discussed in Chapter 2 and summarised in the concluding 
paragraphs of the preceding chapter.  
Furthermore, one can reflect on what the analysis in this thesis suggests about the issues 
identified by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) in their methane report (for UNEP) and Net Zero report (for the IEA) 
discussed in Chapter 1. These institutions recognize the need for energy transition but clearly 
point to the urgency of abating upstream GHG emissions in core oil and gas operations by 
using targeted measures.866 This thesis supports this approach to mitigating climate change in 
petroleum production, and this chapter goes on to summarize some relevant insights from this 
study to facilitate an effective regulatory regime to reduce flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. 
 Summary of Insights   
The matters discussed in this section have received more expansive and in depth analysis in 
different segments of Part B of Chapter 3, but they have been pulled together and presented in 
a summary form here to give a clear indication of the desirable characteristics that countries 
can use to strengthen their regulatory regimes regarding the subject matter of this thesis. In 
applying the concept of effectiveness defined in Chapter 2 to this research, Chapter 3 inquired 
into the prevalent regulatory goal or objective, relevant provisions, and institutional 
arrangements in petroleum-producing jurisdictions. From that analysis, some essential 
characteristics for ensuring an effective regime for abating flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions are as follows: 
 
866 See Chapter 1, Section D of this thesis. 
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1. The existence of a clear regulatory objective to reduce upstream GHG emissions, especially 
flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. This is a direct response to the first test for 
effectiveness discussed in Chapter 2, i.e., whether the aim of regulatory provisions has been 
clearly stated. Applied to the analysis in this thesis, the key recommendation is for countries 
to expressly state upstream GHG emissions reduction as a strategic objective in a suitable 
instrument (law or regulation). The IEA suggests that reducing upstream emissions should 
be the first charge priority of petroleum-producing countries and companies. Achieving 
this goal depends significantly on the character and nature of countries’ laws. One 
fundamental consideration in this regard is whether there is an express legal or regulatory 
objective to address upstream emissions. This thesis has demonstrated the existence of 
various governance agenda in many oil and gas provinces of the world. However, the 
analysis has established the essence of having clarity of a regulatory purpose to target 
flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions, as the cases of Canada, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Nigeria illustrate. This regulatory clarity also has an effect on how 
regulatory agencies exercise powers and interpret legal provisions. 
 
2. The existence of suitable instruments for achieving the set objective of upstream emissions 
reduction. The choice of regulatory instrument can be crucial for achieving set objectives. 
One fundamental insight in this regard is the shift from the decades-long practice of general 
environmental and petroleum legislation, and resource conservation to the adoption of 
stringent and specific regulations for reducing emissions in upstream oil and gas operations 
in jurisdictions such as Canada, Norway, the UK, Nigeria, and the United States. Other 
countries can initiate similar targeted measures to mitigate upstream GHG emissions. 
 
3. The existence of well-tailored and focused industry-specific methods that support the 
regulatory objective of abating upstream GHG emissions. This responds to the second test 
for effectiveness established in Chapter 2, i.e., whether there are suitable methods to spur 
the regulated entities to achieve the goal of upstream GHG emissions reduction. The 
expanded analysis in Part B of Chapter 3 provides examples of such industry- and issue-
specific instruments. These are carbon (or emission) intensity requirements on operators, 
setting of emissions reduction targets, structuring emissions permit systems to reduce 
laxity, and the optimal use of pricing mechanisms to incentivise efficient gas utilization. 
These targeted measures go beyond the generalities of environmental and petroleum 
legislation and address the problem of upstream GHG emissions. Therefore, petroleum-
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producing jurisdictions have an opportunity to reposition their regulatory regimes for 
effectively addressing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions.    
 A Law Reform Agenda 
Law reform becomes necessary where existing legal frameworks do not provide adequate 
solutions to a problem.867 The policy cycle requires the ever-revolving processes of agenda-
setting (problem definition), policy formulation/development, adoption, 
implementation/enforcement, and evaluation.868 Informed by the analysis in Chapter 3, this 
chapter proposes legal and institutional reforms that can help regulators maintain firm 
regulatory control while also incentivising industry-led innovation for reducing flaring, venting, 
and fugitive emissions. In addition, countries need to muster the political will to undertake the 
necessary reforms canvassed in the following paragraphs, and address petroleum dependency 
and rent-seeking, especially in IEA-designated producer economies. 
1. Mandatory prescriptions as part of the desirable characteristics 
Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Brazil, and China 
will need to initiate regulatory reforms to reposition their regimes to provide effective solutions 
to flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Jurisdictions such as Canada, Norway, the UK, and 
the US show some good practices in this respect. (It should be noted that these conclusions 
come out of the detailed examination made in this thesis, and not from any broad-brush 
categorization of countries.) The specific regulations in these countries (Canada, Norway, the 
UK, and the US) prescribe the mandatory implementation of certain industry-centric practices 
that are notable for decarbonising oil and gas operations. It becomes relevant to clarify 
regulatory objectives and adopt sector-oriented and issue-specific prescriptions and methods 
to reduce upstream GHG emissions. The mandatory requirements that have been identified in 
this thesis, and are also part of the desirable characteristics for reducing upstream GHG 
emissions, are incremental emissions reduction targets for the industry, stringent emissions 
permit systems, well-designed price mechanisms and optimal asset integrity management to 
avoid fugitive emissions. These are a suite of methods that countries can consider incorporating 
into their regulatory frameworks based on legal culture. While some jurisdictions may have the 
requisite technical capacity to enforce sophisticated regulatory techniques, others may not. 
 
867 Commonwealth Secretariat Changing the Law: A Practical Guide to Law Reform (Commonwealth Secretariat 
2017) at 12. 
868 Cosmo Howard “The Policy Cycle: A Model of Post-Machiavellian Policy-Making?” (2005) 64:3 Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 3 at 6; Marijn Janssen and Natalie Helbig “Innovating and Changing the Policy-
Cycle: Policy-Makers be Prepared” (2018) 35 Government Information Quarterly 99 at 101. 
140 
 
Thus, a country may not consider these regulatory measures all together. Nonetheless, the 
world needs a mix of multiple strategies to address flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. 
Countries could develop their regulatory capacities to be able to enforce complex requirements 
that incentivise operators to abate emissions. 
2. Encouraging innovation and hybridity 
To avoid the usual disadvantages of prescriptive command and control regimes, regulators can 
consider incorporating an element of a performance-based approach (discussed in Chapter 2) 
that allows the oil and gas sector to apply innovative solutions to complement regulatory 
provisions. It is also important to remember that it is rare to find a regulatory regime that purely 
implements a single approach to solving problems. Instead, a hybrid of different methods is the 
norm. The element of industry-specific incremental emissions reduction targets, discussed in 
Chapter 3, is a performance-based regulation attribute as it sets a goal for the upstream 
petroleum sector. Thus, countries can design their governance regimes to produce a hybrid of 
prescriptive and principle-based approaches. 
One important task is to explain or consider how a hybrid system can work in petroleum 
jurisdictions. To avoid any confusions, the reference to a hybrid regulatory regime here is 
simply a mix of prescriptive and result-oriented approaches to achieving upstream GHG 
emissions reduction. The prescriptive character would mean the specification of some of the 
mandatory requirements considered in the preceding analysis to ensure regulatory firmness. 
This can also provide ascertainable benchmarks for all industry operators in a jurisdiction, 
instead of leaving emissions reduction to chance or to the assumption that oil and gas 
companies would develop suitable strategies to address the problem. That is not always the 
case. As we have seen in Chapter 3, operators in most jurisdictions may prefer to flare or vent 
gas and pay insignificant penalties or fines in the absence of stricter regulatory controls. 
Therefore, the use of suitable industry-specific prescriptions by the regulator can be a good 
way of incentivising actions that help reduce upstream GHG emissions.  
From the discussion of regulatory theories in Chapter 2, we learn that one of the major 
drawbacks to prescriptive arrangements is that they can stifle innovation. This can be a major 
problem with prescribing mandatory methods for reducing upstream GHG emissions. 
Countries can avoid this problem by incorporating a result-oriented process that encourages 
operators to invest in the research and development of new emissions reduction methods to 
complement regulatory prescriptions. This simply means that two sets of methods can exist on 
a complementary basis. It is this co-existence that this thesis refers to as a hybrid approach. As 
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we saw in Chapter 4, there are already industry initiatives to reduce emissions. Clearly, the 
regulation of upstream GHG emissions is not within the exclusive purview of state authorities. 
We can further illustrate the point by looking at scholarly evidence and a good example from 
the UK. Scholars have suggested using goal-based technology-driving approaches to promote 
innovation in a prescriptive regime,869  one of which can be a provision in the regulatory 
instrument allowing oil and gas operators to develop alternative or complementary technical 
solutions to the problem of upstream emissions. Then regulators will have a chance to assess 
such solutions or technologies with the aid of independent experts and consider allowing their 
use to complement regulatory provisions. 
The UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has recently recommended 
five specific regulatory approaches to encourage innovation in the oil and gas industry during 
the energy transition.870 They include providing regulatory advice to innovators, supporting 
technological experimentation, streamlining regulatory approvals for innovators, and setting 
regulatory challenges to drive innovation.871 Some of these approaches are relevant to the issue 
of upstream emissions. For example, setting regulatory challenges for innovation is a form of 
goal setting that allows operators to develop alternative or complementary solutions. The 
experimentation idea can also be helpful where there is an arrangement for industry operators 
to work closely with regulators to monitor the development and small-scale testing of new 
technologies for abating upstream GHG emissions. An example is the production of fertilizer 
from associated gas to put the gas to good use rather than simply wasting it. 872  These 
approaches can allow operators in different jurisdictions to adopt and implement new emerging 
industry-driven technologies.  
The proposed oversight functions by the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) in the UK for the 
successful electrification of upstream operations provide some ideas about how regulators in 
other jurisdictions may be able to incentivise industry-led innovation. This topic was discussed 
in detail in Section A of Chapter 3. To support pioneering projects, the OGA has expressly 
informed the oil and gas industry of a willingness to approve future technologies for addressing 
 
869 OECD Regulatory Reform and Innovation (OECD 2016) at 35; Beverly Wagner and Nusa Fain “Regulatory 
Influences on Innovation in the Public Sector: The Role of Regulatory Regimes” (2018) 20:8 Public Management 
Review 1205 at 1211. 
870 Harry Armstrong, Imre Bárd and Ebba Engström Regulator Approaches to Facilitate, Support and Enable 
Innovation (BEIS Research Paper Series Number 2020/003, January 2020) at 14-54. 
871 Ibid. 
872 See Gas as Fertilizer Feedstock at <https://petrowiki.spe.org/Gas_as_fertilizer_feedstock>.  
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upstream GHG emissions.873 To enhance regulatory coordination, the OGA has also promised 
to use the learnings from participating in regulator-industry brainstorming sessions to align 
regulatory guidance and provisions with sectoral needs.874   
3. Institutional and political economy reforms 
Addressing upstream GHG emissions requires the existence of a suitable regulator. This may 
mean establishing a new agency or undertaking system-wide improvements to existing 
institutions for better performance. Similarly, petroleum-producing jurisdictions can improve 
their regulatory institutions to suit the specific peculiarities of the upstream sector.  
Some of the attributes of a good regulatory system, identified in Chapter 2, can have 
implications for the proposed reform agenda, but the ones that are more relevant to the present 
analysis are sufficient expertise (capability), transparency, and reporting requirements. Other 
vital considerations are the orientation of the regulatory institution, the law, and the political 
economy circumstances in petroleum-dependent countries.  The regulator or regulatory agency 
should comprise people with sufficient knowledge regarding the subject matter, especially the 
specific prescriptions required for an effective regime and other complementary measures. A 
profound understanding of the core issues and processes that are responsible for upstream GHG 
emissions and potential technical solutions could be helpful, especially as regulatory failure 
can occur where the regulator is not acting with sufficient expertise. Howlett and Ramesh have 
also argued that “regulatory capacity deficits can play considerable roles in governance 
failures.”875 
Regarding the orientation of the institution, some essential issues to consider are the relevant 
government body or agency that may be more suitable to regulate upstream emissions, and the 
underlying philosophy underpinning the existence of the regulator. Should it be the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Natural Resources or Energy? Alternatively, Conservation? Environment? 
Climate Change? Flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions are much of an environmental 
problem as they are a climate change problem. The legal regimes in most countries vest 
regulatory powers in either the Minister for the Environment (or, more recently, the Minister 
for Climate Change) to make rules applicable to climate change mitigation in different 
industries. Creating a ministry for climate change or a Climate Change Commission is a recent 
 
873 Above n 870. 
874 Ibid. 
875 Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh “Achilles’ Heels of Governance: Critical Capacity Deficits and Their Role 
in Governance Failures” (2016) 10 Regulation & Governance 301-313. 
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practice around the world. In this general sense, only a few countries have enacted specific 
climate change legislation, establishing a climate change commission or a similar institution. 
Some leading examples are the United Kingdom, 876  Norway, 877  France, 878  Sweden, 879 
Netherlands, 880  Denmark, 881  Mexico, 882  New Zealand 883  and Germany. 884  However, these 
climate change laws do not provide a clear answer for addressing emissions in all sectors of 
the economy. For upstream petroleum emissions, Chapter 3 revealed different circumstances 
and the peculiarities in various countries. The regulation of upstream GHG emissions 
predominantly falls under the powers of the industry regulator or the ministry of environment, 
and the institutions in different countries have various orientations and leanings. For example, 
in Canadian provinces, we find industry regulators and environmental regulators having a 
strong leaning towards a robust regime for reducing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. 
In the United States, there is a slightly different dynamic. At the federal level, the 
environmental regulator has a strong orientation towards reducing upstream emissions; 
whereas at the state level, industry regulators exercise more powers on the issue than 
environmental regulators. These examples suggest clearly that the orientation of regulatory 
agencies in different jurisdictions may vary, but it is important for countries to identify the 
dominant institution to regulate upstream GHG emissions and ensure that the institution has 
the right orientation for the job of mitigating flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. More so, 
it is vital that the designated regulator acts with sufficient expertise and utilizes industry-
specific technical specifications, such as the ones earlier enumerated, for incentivising 
upstream emissions reduction. 
However, a lot depends on the law and politics involved in the governance of the industry, 
which influence the underlying philosophy underpinning the regulator’s existence. The legal 
provisions of the applicable legislation and the political economy circumstances of a country 
can influence the orientation of the regulator. The analysis in Chapter 3 shows that many 
jurisdictions have no clear objective to target flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions with a 
sharp regulatory focus. The laws in such countries do not empower the relevant institutions to 
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exercise powers for the drastic reduction of upstream GHG emissions. Clearly, this area needs 
serious consideration in petroleum-producing jurisdictions. The law should expressly state the 
reasons for which the regulator can exercise powers, and this should capture making rules for 
the reduction of upstream GHG emissions. Canada, the United States, Norway, the UK, and 
Nigeria are striking examples where the law clearly provides a legal mandate to regulators to 
address flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Arguably, this clarity of regulatory powers can 
influence an institution’s orientation and disposition towards the issues that this thesis 
addresses. It can also provide an ascertainable basis or context for which regulators can 
interpret their mandates to achieve the goal of mitigating upstream GHG emissions.   
On the political-economy side, there is evidence to suggest that the circumstances in petroleum-
producing countries can hinder the emergence of a firm regulatory position to mitigate 
upstream GHG emissions. The dominant factors that come to mind are dependency, corruption, 
and lack of political will. In circumstances where there is a lack of political will to promulgate 
stringent climate policies and regulatory measures targeting emitting sectors, it becomes 
difficult to establish an effective regime that addresses flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions.885 The explanation of economic dependency is understandable; hence, the logical 
option for petroleum-producing countries to diversify their economies. The seminal global 
study of supply-side policies, by Gaulin and Le Billon,886 to address climate change in the oil 
and gas industry finds the most stringent and efficacious laws in countries with low dependency 
on oil and gas production and limited petroleum exports, except for Norway, Canada, and the 
United States. A corroborative study concludes that economic reliance on the fossil fuel 
economy and rent-seeking are significant barriers to efficacious national climate action in most 
petro-states.887 
Given the climate change debate, there is a fundamental question regarding oil-producing and 
exporting countries’ ability to adapt to a changing external environment.888 This leaves such 
countries with a strategic option of diversifying their economies.889 Less reliance on the petro-
economy may help countries establish stringent regimes to incentivise deeper decarbonisation 
of upstream petroleum operations. Saudi Arabia, an IEA-designated producer economy, has 
 
885 William F. Lamb and Jan C. Minx “The Political Economy of National Climate Policy: Architectures of 
Constraint and a Typology of Countries” (2020) 64 Energy Research & Social Science 101429. 
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World” (2017) 23 Energy Research & Social Science 182-188. 
889 Ibid at 185 and 187. 
145 
 
announced a vision to diversify its economy to reduce its dependence on oil revenues by 
2030.890 This includes a plan to increase non-oil exports in non-oil GDP from 16% to 50% by 
2030 and an increase in non-oil government revenue from 163 billion Saudi Riyal as of 2020 
to 1 trillion Saudi Riyal by 2030.891 Other producer economies would also need to initiate 
ambitious plans to wean themselves off oil revenues and firmly reposition their regulatory 
regimes for effectively addressing upstream GHG emissions.  
Research shows that corruption is one of the barriers to the adoption of strict regulatory regimes 
in countries with poor environmental performance.892 Lobbying and financial inducement of 
political leaders by industry players impede the formulation of stringent fossil fuel tax and 
reforming subsidy schemes to encourage large-scale decarbonization of the oil and gas 
industry. 893  Moreover, the peculiar democratic and institutional circumstances in most 
petroleum-producing countries provide opportunities for exploitation. In many resource-rich 
countries, corruption, political instability, and weak democratic institutions limit the possibility 
of imposing strict environmental standards on international oil companies.894 This thesis has 
not investigated these issues in depth, but it affirms existing scholarship on the matters. For 
example, the IEA-designated producer economies of Nigeria, Russia, Venezuela, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are the bedrock of global hydrocarbons supply.895 These 
countries are a subset of the core jurisdictions that play critical roles in bringing oil and gas to 
the world’s consumers. What we find about them, in relation to the political economy dynamics, 
are their large petroleum production, large petroleum export, and large oil and gas contribution 
to their national fiscal revenues. This thesis has shown that there is a weak regulatory regime 
regarding upstream GHG emissions in these countries. In comparison with IEA-designated 
countries, there is less dependence on oil and gas in the other producer economies examined in 
this thesis, especially the UK, Norway, Canada, and the United States. This observation 
confirms the position of existing scholarship about the character and strength of the laws in 
countries with high economic dependence on oil and gas. This thesis has also shown that there 
 
890 Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 available at <www.2030vision2030.gov.sa>.    
891 Ibid, at 61 and 67. 
892 Gaulin and Billon, above n 140, at 10; Lamb and Minx, above n 885. 
893 Cees van Beers and Jon Strand Political Determinants of Fossil Fuel Pricing (World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper May 2013); Lucy Baker, Peter Newell and Jon Phillips “The Political Economy of Energy 
Transitions: The Case of South Africa” (2014) 19:6 New Political Economy 791-818. 
894 P. B. Eregha and Ekundayo Peter Mesagan “Oil Resource Abundance, Institutions and Growth: Evidence from 
Oil Producing African Countries” (2016) 38 Journal of Policy Modeling 603-619; Marina Povitkina “The Limits 
of Democracy in Tackling Climate Change” (2018) 27:3 Environmental Politics 411-432. 
895 IEA Outlook for Producer Economies, above n 179, at 15. 
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is a prevalence of more robust regulatory regimes for reducing upstream GHG emissions in 
less petroleum-reliant jurisdictions when compared to IEA-designated producer economies. 
We find further corroboration in the lack of transparency and the absence of robust GHG 
emissions reporting schemes in most of the major producer economies. Chapter 2 identified 
these issues as some of the vital elements of a good regulatory system. They are also some 
fundamental areas that countries can focus reform efforts to strengthen their capability to 
regulate flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions effectively. Regarding transparency, Chapter 
3 identified the problem of unascertainable benchmarks for the grant or refusal of flaring and 
venting permits in most countries. Instead, the issue is predominantly at the discretion of the 
minister for petroleum resources. From administrative law, we learn that discretionary powers 
are susceptible to abuse and arbitrariness.896 Thus, the discretionary power a regulator has to 
grant flaring and venting permits on a case-by-case basis, without known criteria, is a loophole 
for corruption. The regulator’s modus operandi should be accessible and transparent to the 
industry and the public. Rules and procedures applicable to reducing upstream emissions 
should be clear and leave no room for the arbitrary exercise of powers. In addition, Chapter 3 
revealed the lack of robust upstream GHG emissions reporting schemes in some of the IEA-
designated producer economies. For example, the regulatory regime in the UAE expects 
operators to keep records of all combustion emissions and the quantum of air pollutants without 
any reporting obligations. There are also no express upstream emissions reporting obligations 
in Iraq and Venezuela. More so, these countries are yet to enact or promulgate laws and 
regulations that target flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions particularly. These are pointers 
to the unwillingness of the political leadership in these countries to adopt a firm regulatory 
position on upstream GHG emissions. Therefore, one can speculate that the regulation of 
flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions are susceptible to the issue of resource dependency. 
Only recently has Nigeria introduced regulations specifically targeting upstream emissions and 
stipulating strict reporting obligations on operators.  
From the analysis in the preceding chapters, it is arguable that the practical alternatives to 
flaring and venting are re-injection, capture and utilisation. These can put gas in profitable uses 
to mitigate its contribution to global warming, whether as carbon dioxide or methane emissions. 
However, gas pipeline networks are expensive. For example, the average cost for building a 
 
896 Jerzy Parchomiuk “Abuse of Discretionary Powers in Administrative Law: Evolution of the Judicial Review 
Models from ‘Administrative Morality’ to the Principle of Proportionality” (2018) 26:3 Journal for Legal Science 
and Practice 453 at 454-460, 468 and 475. 
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gas pipeline in the United States is over $7 million per mile (over $4 million per kilo meter).897 
This huge cost requirement does not look good in a time when global gas demand is weak, 
partly due to Covid-19.898 One can understand the spike in gas demand and prices in certain 
regions of the world in the third quarter of 2021. For example, due to natural gas shortage, 
electricity prices in France and Germany soared by about 40%, while natural gas prices soared 
to a seven-year high in the United States in September 2021.899 This phenomenon cannot be 
taken to represent a steady growth in global gas market due to the volatility associated with the 
industry, and considering the fact that the momentary spike was due to harsh weather events. 
Therefore, it may not speed up capital-intensive projects to expand gas utilisation infrastructure 
globally. 
In the absence of adequate pipeline network, the next option is liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
but this also is expensive. Recently, global investments in LNG projects have been stagnated 
by low gas price benchmarks and surplus supply.900 Nonetheless, the IEA projects that Qatar, 
Russia, and the United States will pick up LNG construction projects, with Qatar planning to 
dominate the global LNG market.901 
In addition, the production of gas-based hydrogen (in other words, fossil-based hydrogen) is 
gaining momentum as a transitional process to a low-carbon future.902 This puts pressure on 
gas use. It is also a good example that gas is still relevant and requires regulatory attention to 
abate flaring and venting in the production process. 
What we see here is that the commercialisation of gas through adequate pipelines and LNG 
projects may reduce flaring and venting, but they are not always easy options. This is primarily 
because of their huge cost implications, which still qualify as fossil investments. One problem 
with such investments is that they could make oil and gas companies resistant to climate change 
action until after recouping profitable returns on investments in gas utilisation infrastructure. 
This could adversely affect the pace of the energy transition. Therefore, regulatory pressure is 
important to compel oil and gas operators to reduce emissions. 
 
897 See Global Energy Monitor data at <https://www.gem.wiki/Oil_and_Gas_Pipeline_Construction_Costs>.  
898 IEA Global Energy Review 2020: The Impacts of the Covid-19 Crisis on Global Energy Demand and CO2 
Emissions (IEA 2020) at 4, 15, 28-30. 
899  
900 IEA World Energy Investments 2021 (IEA 2021) at 27. 
901 Ibid. 
902 IEA Gas Market Report Q3-2021 (IEA 2021) at 53, 57 and 59. 
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 Conclusions  
 
This thesis set out to examine the role of law in climate change mitigation in upstream oil and 
gas production to distil some desirable characteristics of an effective regulatory regime for 
abating gas flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions in petroleum-producing jurisdictions. To 
answer this central research question, the study was conducted within a six-chapter structure, 
adopting a qualitative framework built upon three pillars – conventional legal analysis, 
comparative analysis, and the theory of regulation. Chapter 1 introduced and explained useful 
contexts for the study. Chapter 2 discussed the theory of regulation to provide a conceptual 
framework to underpin the entire research. Chapter 2 also contextualised the framework for 
assessing effectiveness in relation to the thesis, given that the subject of effectiveness can be 
controversial and problematic. Since this thesis focuses on the design of a regulatory system 
that can solve the problem of upstream GHG emissions, the thesis adopted problem-solving 
effectiveness. The two tests that became evident were whether countries had a clearly defined 
aim to reduce upstream GHG emissions, and whether they had suitable methods for achieving 
that aim. Other criteria that can be used for testing effectiveness are legislative mandate, 
appropriate scheme of accountability, fair procedures, accessibility (transparency), sufficient 
expertise of the regulator and efficient action by the regime. Some of these criteria intersect 
with the two tests. These fundamentally informed the analysis conducted in the thesis. 
Chapters 3 and 4 applied the conceptual framework to examine national and industry-driven 
measures to reduce upstream GHG emissions. While Chapter 3 focused on the regulatory 
regimes of 12 major petroleum-producing countries, Chapter 4 discussed key industry 
initiatives to reduce upstream GHG emissions as practical examples of decentred 
understandings of regulation. Based on the comparative analysis of the regulatory regimes in 
different jurisdictions, Chapter 5 identified some conceptual insights from the research and 
canvassed a law reform agenda for countries to design specific regulatory instruments that 
provide mandatory prescriptions for upstream GHG emissions reduction while also working to 
incentivise industry-led innovation. Such an arrangement can create a hybrid regime that 
combines prescriptive command and control regulation elements and performance-based 
approaches to drive the large-scale reduction of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. These 
characteristics and design structure clearly respond to the question about the role of law in 
abating flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions in oil and gas production.        
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This thesis has made an original contribution to knowledge, being the first scholarly analysis 
that has addressed gas flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions on an international comparative 
scale, capturing a wide range of major producer economies, instead of the country-specific 
approach taken by earlier studies. It also differs from scholarly efforts in non-law disciplinary 
domains that focus predominantly on energy transition without reference to the likely global 
dominance of oil and fossil fuels and the lack of viable substitutes for decades to come. More 
so, this research has clearly identified the different types of laws and regulations for controlling 
upstream GHG emissions in petroleum-producing countries, and the analysis has suggested 
some essential attributes that countries can consider incorporating into their legal regimes 
through necessary regulatory reforms. The comprehensive consideration of these matters 
contributes to knowledge in the domains of energy and petroleum law, environmental law, and 
climate change law.   
 Key Findings and Policy Implications  
 
 Clarity of regulatory goal and targeted regulation   
The study reveals the existence of different regulatory goals in relation to upstream GHG 
emissions in petroleum-producing countries. These include general industry governance; 
environmental protection; resource conservation; climate change governance; air quality 
improvements; health, safety, and asset integrity controls. One notes that these types of laws 
have different origins and come from different times. For example, it is evident that most 
petroleum-producing jurisdictions were initially concerned with governing the production of 
oil and gas to derive maximum economic benefits and for their various national interests. As 
the US example shows, and certainly in other countries, indiscriminate drilling and production 
of oil informed the emergence of conservation laws and the increased relevance of 
environmental controls in the oil and gas industry. These laws also address other issues relating 
to the environment and air quality. Thus, they have vital purposes in their respective merits. 
However, they most times do not address upstream GHG emissions with the clarity and 
comprehensiveness necessary to drive large-scale reduction of flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. The analysis has shown that these types of laws can also be adapted (as are most 
laws) to changing circumstances. For instance, Chapter 3 demonstrated how the US state of 
California has redefined and repurposed its conservation law to target upstream petroleum 
flaring and venting specifically. 
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Let us recall that flaring accounts for about 75% of the carbon intensity of oil and gas 
production. Venting and fugitive emissions also contribute to the high emissions profile of the 
upstream petroleum sector, as Chapter 1 showed. This thesis has underscored the need for 
countries to clarify an objective of reducing upstream GHG emissions. This points to one of 
the fundamental tests for assessing effectiveness within the qualitative framework defined in 
Chapter 2, i.e., whether countries state a clear aim to reduce upstream GHG emissions in 
addition to all other existing governance objectives. The existence of this express regulatory 
objective will provide certainty to regulators about the purposes for which they can exercise 
powers. More so, the analysis has demonstrated that it is possible for countries to adopt 
expressly targeted regulation for the reduction of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions, as 
we see in Canada, the UK, Norway, the US, and Nigeria.  
One evident and distinctive character that accompanies targeted regulation is the use of 
industry-specific methods that support upstream GHG emissions reduction. This finding points 
to the second test for assessing effectiveness within the context of the thesis, i.e., whether 
countries have suitable methods to spur action by the regulated entities (oil and gas operators) 
towards achieving the goal of emissions reduction. Another way to look at it is whether the 
actions and methods adopted by the regulator are sufficient to incentivise operators to change 
their practices in ways that reduce emissions in oil and gas production processes. This thesis 
identified some striking examples (in Part B of Chapter 3) as essential design characteristics 
that can lead to an effective outcome for reducing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions; but 
most of those specifications will have to be considered by countries based on legal culture, as 
not all countries will have the technical capacity to enforce complex regulatory requirements. 
In addition, there may be no straitjacket set of rules or methods that can apply to all jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, based on the findings of this study, there can be a suite of good methods that 
countries can consider and adapt to their peculiar circumstances. The first one is the use of 
industry-specific incremental emissions reduction targets. Most countries have set national 
climate goals without any indication of how different sectors of the economy are going to 
contribute to achieving the national emissions reduction targets. Nevertheless, this thesis has 
demonstrated that national climate targets can be broken into sectoral contributions. It is in this 
context that countries can clearly set incremental yearly targets for the upstream petroleum 
sector to reduce the volume of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Examples of 
jurisdictions that set sector-specific emissions reduction targets are Canada, Nigeria, and Saudi 
Arabia, as seen in Chapter 3. Second, the adoption of stringent emissions permit systems can 
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contribute to the mitigation efforts of petroleum-producing countries. Regulators need to 
maintain firmness in setting strict and ascertainable conditions for the grant of flaring and 
venting permits. There also has to be some level of commitment to a well-planned future date 
for putting a stop to or achieving a drastic reduction in flaring and venting. This can avoid the 
trend where countries set and miss various dates to end flaring, as can be seen in Nigeria and 
Russia and many other petroleum jurisdictions. Third, low emissions intensity requirements 
can promote energy efficiency and reduce the expended cost of petroleum production. The 
technical literature in Chapter 1 showed that flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions are all part 
of the expended energy and cost for producing oil and gas, which can be reduced by improved 
efficiency and gas utilization measures. Chapter 3 revealed that the Canadian province of 
British Columbia provides an example of where to find a regulatory method that incentivises 
the reduction of flaring and venting. Operators in this province must utilize 95% of the gas 
produced alongside oil. There are other examples of gas utilization requirements, but they still 
leave room for the emission of large volumes of gas through flaring and venting. Countries can 
structure their regulatory regimes to adopt, and even exceed, British Columbia’s method of 
intensity requirements proportional to resource output. Fourth, well-designed price mechanism 
that cover upstream GHG emissions and send real pressure to operators can incentivise large-
scale reduction of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. The analysis in Chapter 3 
demonstrated this point using the Norwegian example and the US states of North Dakota and 
Alaska. In North Dakota, operators are required to pay an equal monetary value for flared gas. 
In Alaska, the law requires operators to pay double of the fair market value for flared gas. These 
clear examples show that countries can price upstream emissions proportional to resource value 
to avoid setting insignificant emissions charges or monetary penalties that companies can 
happily liquidate and continue flaring and venting gas. The fifth method that this thesis has 
identified is the use of optimal asset integrity management to prevent fugitive emissions. 
Chapter 1 drew attention to the volume of emissions that occur globally due to gas leaks from 
compromised assets, also known as fugitive emissions. Chapter 3 showed that multiple 
jurisdictions such as Canada, Norway, the UK, and the US require operators to implement 
various forms of leak detection and repair (LDAR) programmes to trace and fix sources of gas 
leaks. Regulators in other jurisdictions can consider including some of these measures as part 
of their specific legal frameworks, again, based on legal culture. Countries can also ameliorate 
the problems associated with prescriptive regimes with a strategic design that encourages 
innovation while maintaining regulatory firmness, as the UK example shows.      
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 Prevalent petro-economy dependency and lax regulatory regimes  
The research suggests the prevalence of lax regulatory regimes, especially in IEA-designated 
producer economies, but less petroleum-reliant countries show a high ability to promulgate 
strict and high-quality regulations for addressing climate change and petroleum upstream GHG 
emissions. Specific examples are Canada, the US, the UK, and Norway. This observation 
underscores the relevance of serious and well-planned economic diversification in oil-rich 
countries to facilitate a firm regulatory position on flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. 
Nevertheless, the research reveals a dramatic difference between Saudi Arabia and other IEA-
designated countries. Chapter 3 established the existence of a weak state governance regime 
for addressing upstream GHG emissions in the country, but the state-owned and controlled 
national oil company (NOC) – Saudi Aramco – has implemented useful strategies that have 
contributed to the reduction of flaring and venting significantly. The company’s master gas-
gathering network has supported optimal gas utilization and helped the country to reduce 
emissions from flaring to the extent that Saudi Arabia is currently responsible for less than 1% 
of the amount of gas flared globally.903 Other countries’ NOCs may learn from the Saudi 
example to invest more in gas-gathering and utilization infrastructure to support the 
decarbonisation agenda.  
 Industry commitment to reduce GHG emissions 
This thesis has also established the usefulness of private regulatory initiatives by oil majors to 
reduce GHG emissions. Specific examples are the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), and oil and gas company partnership with the World Bank 
gas flaring reduction programmes – the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership and the 2030 
Zero Flaring Initiative. Multiple oil majors have also announced general climate targets, and 
energy transition plans that include eliminating flaring and venting. The analysis of these 
initiatives in Chapter 4 suggests that oil and gas companies may have contributed to the global 
reduction of flaring from 2018 to 2020.  This is a good development, considering the regulatory 
goal of incentivising operators to reduce the carbon footprint (upstream GHG emissions) of 
their operations.  
The activities of industry-driven initiatives and the measures taken by multiple oil and gas 
companies clearly exemplify the decentred understanding of regulation in the context of private 
regulation of upstream GHG emissions. This confirms the views of Julia Black who introduced 
 
903 Above n 331. 
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the concept of decentred regulation, as Chapter 2 discussed. However, a lot still depends on 
state regulation and the commitment of NOCs that control a vast majority of oil and gas 
operations and global reserves, and account for increasing spending in oil and gas projects, as 
Chapter 4 showed. The large and likely larger volumes of oil and gas operations by NOCs can 
result in increased upstream GHG emissions absent effective regulatory interventions. 
Currently, NOCs account for approximately 75% of global methane emissions from the oil and 
gas sector.904 Thus, this thesis underscores the importance of complementary state and private 
interventions to achieve large-scale GHG emissions reduction in the oil and gas industry. The 
two types of regulation – state and private regulation – are not inimical to each other. Rather, 
they can exist, and certainly do exist on a complementary basis. The preceding analysis on how 
regulators can encourage innovation is a typical example of how the two types of regulation 
can work to achieve a common goal. As the analysis in Chapters 3 (Part B) and 5 showed, the 
proposed activities of the Oil and Gas Authority in the UK provide an even more direct and 
practical illustration of how countries can encourage operators to develop and test new 
industry-driven measures that can be implemented alongside prescribed regulatory measures 
for addressing flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions. Furthermore, the international 
coalitions of industry, state, and other non-governmental players to address flaring and other 
upstream GHG emissions, considered in Chapter 4, provide good platforms for the different 
parties involved to seek logical approaches to incentivising innovation. State and non-state 
actors can also learn about feasible solutions and gain insights from good practices based on 
information-sharing and synergy-building.   
 Relevance of regulatory theories 
What the entire analysis in Chapters 3 to 5 demonstrates about the conceptual framework 
discussed in Chapter 2 is that some ideas and theories of regulation are relevant to controlling 
upstream GHG emissions, while others do not appear to be relevant. For example, the central 
argument in the expositions of Nonet, Selznick, Ayres, and Braithwaite on responsive 
regulation is for government to be responsive to the conduct of regulated entities in deciding 
the necessity or otherwise of a more interventionist response.905 The practical implications of 
this kind of thinking did not surface in the regulatory regimes of the countries studied. Rather, 
most jurisdictions adopt a proactive approach to regulating flaring, venting, and fugitive 
emissions. Secondly, the idea of reflexive regulation, put forward by Maturana, von Foerster, 
 
904 IEA Methane Tracker, above n 844. 
905 Above notes 234 and 235. 
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Luhmann, and amplified by Teubner, Habermas, and other theorists entails a self-referential 
system through self-regulation.906 These authors suggest that entities can autonomously self-
recreate and self-organise their activities without recourse to external intervention.907 This is 
not the case with the regulation of flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions in petroleum-
producing jurisdictions. Oil and gas companies do not conduct their operations and control 
upstream GHG emissions as self-referential entities without regard for state governance 
measures. As the analysis in Chapter 4 has shown, oil and gas operators have internal industry-
driven approaches to emissions reduction, but they are also bound to comply with state 
regulatory interventions and prescriptions. It is in this sense that Vincent-Jones advocates for 
state regulatory oversight over the self-regulation of private entities, as opposed to the core 
ideas of reflexive regulation.908  
Looking to the positive side, the analysis in this thesis confirms the views of regulatory 
theorists such as Daintith, Prosser, Selznick, Baldwin, Lodge, and Cave, and Black, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. It would be recalled that some fundamental elements for the governance 
of regulated entities are standard-setting, behaviour modification, decision-making, the 
operation of specialist agencies, and the adoption of suitable mechanisms and methods for 
achieving regulatory goals. This study has demonstrated the applicability and significance of 
these characteristics in the control of upstream GHG emissions, particularly focusing on flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions. First, it is apparent that upstream petroleum regulators need to 
set targeted and sector-specific standards for the governance of upstream GHG emissions. This 
is evident in the adoption of different regulatory methods obtainable in numerous jurisdictions, 
in addition to general petroleum and environmental governance provisions. However, as the 
inquiry has proved, most of those general governance regimes do not and may not incentivise 
the large-scale reduction of upstream GHG emissions. While they may be suitable for other 
purposes and have their various legitimate origins, it makes sense to design regulatory systems 
that can address the pressing problem of mitigating climate change in the oil and gas industry. 
This sector-specific state regulatory character is quite different from the self-referential 
approach put forward by advocates of reflexive regulation. From the analysis in Chapters 3 and 
5, it is evident that countries should adopt some prescriptive requirements to serve as minimum 
ascertainable benchmarks for industry operators to reduce the environmental externalities of 
their operations – flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions particularly. The objective of 
 
906 Above notes 242 and 244. 
907 Ibid. 
908 Above notes 248 and 249. 
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incentivising emissions reduction responds to the element of behavioural modification, which 
the above-mentioned regulatory scholars have identified as a fundamental component of a good 
regulatory regime. Second, the thesis has demonstrated the reasonableness and usefulness of 
an optimal and transparent decision-making process for granting flaring and venting permits, 
as opposed to the discretionary regimes obtainable in various jurisdictions. From conceptual 
and empirical perspectives, we learn that such discretionary arrangements can be subject to 
arbitrariness and bad outcomes. Third, this thesis has demonstrated that petroleum-producing 
countries need specialist or dedicated agencies or institutions with suitable expertise and an 
express legal mandate to address upstream GHG emissions. Such bodies can be existing state 
ministries, departments or agencies that are repurposed to address the subject-matter of this 
inquiry. This also depends on whether countries are willing to initiate the necessary legal 
reform that Chapter 5 canvassed.  
Finally, this thesis strongly confirms the views of Maljean-Dubois regarding regulatory 
arrangements that produce a good result. A good result, within the context of the foregoing 
analysis, will mean a significant reduction of upstream GHG emissions, particularly flaring, 
venting, and fugitive emissions, in response to the applicable regulatory regime.  From the 
discussion in Chapter 2, one essential point in Maljean-Dubois’ exposition on regulatory 
effectiveness is what she refers to as ‘problem-solving effectiveness’, which focuses on the 
goals of regulatory or legal provisions and how regulators spur action towards achieving 
regulatory goals using suitable methods and strategies.909 This understanding fits nicely with 
the findings and policy implications of this study, as explained in the preceding sections of this 
concluding chapter and in Chapter 5. The analysis also affirms the context-specific approach 
to addressing environmental problems, as Warnock and Baker-Galloway explain,910 to the 
extent that countries should have regulatory regimes that are designed within the context of the 
particular problems to be addressed – in this case, flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions (all 
upstream GHG emissions). Therefore, regulators in petroleum-producing jurisdictions have an 
opportunity to reform their regimes using the insights drawn from this inquiry, and particularly 
focusing on clear regulatory goals and mandates, industry-specific instruments, and methods 
discussed above for driving the reduction of upstream flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions 
significantly.          
 
909 Maljean-Dubois, above n 265. 
910 Above n 224. 
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 Future Directions  
This thesis has undertaken a qualitative examination of the potential of specific prescriptive 
regulatory regimes for reducing upstream petroleum GHG emissions in the context of legal 
effectiveness, but it has not ascertained what volume of emissions would be reduced by making 
such improvements in regulatory regimes. Future inquiries may quantify the probable 
emissions reduction traceable to regulatory changes. It is also possible to deepen the empirical 
analysis in the future using survey data from suitable respondents.  
In addition, this thesis noted the important role of optimal gas infrastructure and viable local 
and international markets to aid efficient gas utilization, thereby reducing flaring and venting. 
It is important to acknowledge that these efforts will require huge capital investments that may 
not withstand scrutiny from a climate change point of view. Furthermore, the sunk capital could 
lead oil and gas companies to resist climate action. So, there is a degree of politics here that 
needs critical analysis. Future studies can inquire into legal and policy mechanisms for 
addressing these issues. Equally, deserving close scholarly attention is the need to research 
useful solutions for addressing institutional and political bottlenecks hindering the construction 
of gas infrastructure, especially across international boundaries.  
Finally, this thesis focused on flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions in upstream oil and gas 
production. Other sources of GHG emissions, such as decommissioning and crude refining 
operations, also need strategic interventions. Future studies can inquire into regulatory design 
options for abating GHG emissions emanating from these and other carbon-intensive activities 













 Primary Sources 
 
 Legislation, Bills, and Regulations 
 
Brazil 
• ANP Resolution No. 806 of 17 January 2020. 
• ANP Resolution No. 815 of 20 April 2020. 
• ANP Resolution No. 816 of 20 April 2020. 
• CNPE Resolution No. 17 of 2017 and CNPE Resolution No. 16 of 2019. 
• Gas Act, Federal Law No. 11909 of March 4, 2009. 
• Petroleum Law, Federal Law No. 9478 of August 6, 1997 DUO (Official Federal Gazette) 
of August 7, 1997. 




Federal Laws and Regulations 
• Canadian Energy Regulator Act, S.C., 2019, c. 28. 
• Canadian Environmental Protection Act S.C. 1999, c. 33. 
• Canada Oil and Gas Drilling and Production Regulations, 2009 SOR/2009-315. 
• Canadian Oil and Gas Operations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. O-7. 
• Canadian Petroleum Resources Act R. S. C. 1985, c. 36. 
• Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act S.C. 2018, c. 12. 
• Output-Based Pricing System Regulations SOR/2019-266. 
• Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change 2016 Cat. No.: En4-
294/2016E-PDF, ISBN: 978-0-660-07023-0. 
• Regulations Respecting Reduction in the Release of Methane and Certain Volatile 






Provincial Statutes and Regulations 
 
Alberta 
• Alberta Energy Regulator Directive 060: Upstream Petroleum Industry Flaring, 
Incineration, and Venting, Released 13 December 2018, Effective from 1 January 2020. 
• Curtailment Rules, Alberta Regulation 214/2018 with amendments up to and including 
Alberta Regulation 198/2020. 
• Gas Resources Preservation Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter G-4. 
• Gas Resources Preservation Regulation, Alberta Regulation 328/2002 with amendments 
up to and including Alberta Regulation 171/2020. 
• Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter O-6. 
• Oil and Gas Conservation Rules, Alberta Regulation 151/1971 with amendments up to 
and including Alberta Regulation 165/2020. 
• Oil Sands Conservation Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000 Chapter O-7. 
• Oil Sands Conservation Rules, Alberta Regulation 76/1988 with amendments up to and 
including Alberta Regulation 29/2017. 
• Oil Sands Emissions Limit Act, Statutes of Alberta, 2016, Chapter O-7.5. 
• Responsible Energy Development Act, Statutes of Alberta, 2012 Chapter R-17.3. 
 
British Columbia 
• British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission Flaring and Venting Reduction Guideline, 
Version 5.1: May 2018. 
• Drilling and Production Regulation, B.C. Reg. 282/2010. 
• Oil and Gas Activities Act, SBC 2008 Chapter 36. 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
• Canada–Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, 
c.3.  
• Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, RSNL1990 Chapter P-10 (As amended in 2019). 
• Management of Greenhouse Gas Act, SNL2016 Chapter M-1.001 (As Amended by 2018 
c40). 
• Management of Greenhouse Gas Regulations 116/18 under the Management of 
Greenhouse Gas Act (As Amended by 31/19). 
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• Petroleum Drilling Regulations under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, O.C 96-225. 
• Petroleum Regulations under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, O.C. 96-935. 
• The Atlantic Accord 1985. 
 
Saskatchewan 
• Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Chapter O-2 of The Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, 
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• Assembly Bill No. 1057 Chapter 771, s. 7 amending s. 690 of the California Public 
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• Assembly Bill No. 1440 An Act to Amend Sections 3106 and 6830.1 of the Public 
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• Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Special Official Gazette No. 5.908, 
February 19 2009). 
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